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ABSTRACT 
Happiness and Superlative Value in the Eudemian Ethics 
Giulia Bonasio 
In my dissertation Happiness and Superlative Value in the Eudemian Ethics, I analyze 
dimensions of the Eudemian Ethics (EE) that, as I see it, make the EE a distinctive 
contribution to ethics. The EE discusses a superlative excellence called kalokagathia, the 
virtue of being-beautiful-and-good, which does not figure in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE). 
The agent who possesses kalokagathia is the best agent of Aristotle’s EE. Scholars tend to 
hold that the practically wise person, the phronimos, or the theoretically wise person, the 
sophos, are the best agents of the NE. If my reading of the EE is right, then the EE and the NE 
conceive differently of the best agent. This is salient in both treatises’ construals of the unity 
of the virtues. In the NE, the unity of the virtues includes the character virtues and phronêsis. 
In the EE, it additionally includes the virtues of theoretical thinking, or so I argue. The EE 
starts with what I call the Superlative Thesis (ST): happiness is what is best, most beautiful, 
and most pleasant of all. I take this beginning to be programmatic. Aristotle aims to show 
how these three kinds of value combine in the best human life, rather than coming apart. The 
Pleasure Thesis (PT) is the most contested aspect of ST: happiness is the most pleasant thing 
of all. On my reading, Aristotle fully embraces PT. In laying out his proposal for the best 
human life, the Aristotle of the EE develops a distinctive kind of naturalism, which I call 
Natural Goods Naturalism. I reconstruct this position in two steps: by interpreting the EE’s 
function argument; and by exploring the notion of natural goods, which is central to the EE, 
but does not figure in the NE. In sum, my dissertation argues that the EE contains a 
distinctive and under-appreciated option within ancient ethics, and that it contains ideas that 
are relevant to today’s virtue ethics and ethical naturalism.  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CHAPTER ONE 
Introductory Remarks on Happiness and the Superlative Thesis 
A perennial question has been raised in antiquity and continues to be on our minds: how 
can we be happy? The answer to this question is difficult and there is no general agreement. 
What is more, it is not even clear that happiness is a unified and agreed upon notion. For 
Aristotle, eudaimonia - happiness, literally “to have a good daimon” - is the highest goal of 
human life.  Aristotle’s philosophical proposal in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) has received 1
considerable attention from antiquity on. Conversely, the Eudemian Ethics (EE) is still 
largely unexplored. It is my aim in this work to shed light on some aspects of Aristotle’s 
philosophical proposal in this treatise. Is the ethical theory of the EE largely the same as the 
theory of the NE, or are there important differences? Specifically, does the Aristotle of the EE 
propose a different view on happiness? Does he discuss a well-lived human life in terms that 
are familiar from the NE, or does he employ conceptual tools that are distinctively 
Eudemian? 
If we look at how the two treatises begin, something strikes us as profoundly different. 
From the very first lines of the work, the NE focuses on the good, while three value-
properties take center stage in the EE: the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant. All three 
kinds of values are presented as immediately connected to happiness. Aristotle says that 
 Eudaimonia is translated “happiness” for lack of a better term: I use this translation for the sake of clarity 1
insofar as it is ingrained in the literature on the topic. Other possible translations are “flourishing,” “well-being,” 
etc. Some important contributions on Aristotle’s notion of happiness are: W.F. R. Hardie, Aristotle ethical theory 
(Oxford, 1968); J. Cooper, Reason and the human good (Cambridge, 1975); J. McDowell, “The role of 
eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics,” in Essays on Aristotle's ethics, A.O. Rorty (ed.) (Berkeley, 1980); J. 
Dybikowski, “Is Aristotelian Eudaimonia happiness?”, Dialogue, 20, 1981, pp. 185-200; T. Nagel, “Aristotle on 
eudaimonia,” in Rorty; J.L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on eudaimonia,” in Rorty; R. Kraut, Aristotle on the human good 
(Princeton, 1989); A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life (Oxford, 1992); S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle 
(Oxford, 1994); N. Sherman (eds.), Aristotle’s Ethics: critical essays (Oxford, 1998); P. Destrée, Aristote, 
Bonheur et vertus (Paris, 2003); G. Lear, Happy lives and human good (Princeton, 2006); M. Pakaluk, G. 
Pearson, Moral psychology and human actions (Oxford, 2011); C.D.C. Reeve, Action, contemplation and 
happiness (Cambridge, 2012); P. Destrée, M. Zingano (eds.), Theoria, (Paris, 2015). For a history of happiness, 
F. De Luise, G. Farinetti, Storia della felicità. Gli antichi e i moderni (Torino, 2001). 
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happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant thing of all. Throughout this 
dissertation, I argue that the EE can be read as an extended argument. Aristotle aims to prove 
that happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant thing of all.  
I investigate the relation of the best agent to these three kinds of value. Aristotle calls 
this agent the kalos kagathos. The kalos kagathos is the agent who has kalokagathia, the 
complex virtue of being-beautiful-and-good. And on account of this high-level excellence, 
she lives a life that deserves to be called happy. Her happiness displays the superlative value 
mentioned in the first sentence of the EE: it is the best, the most beautiful, and the most 
pleasant thing of all. The route to happiness, I argue, admits a lot of variability regarding the 
specifics of a given person’s good life. And yet the ideal of happiness, and of being a good 
person, is ambitious. When we say that someone is a good person, we are saying that overall 
she is good. That is, we do not specify in what respect the agent is good, whether the agent is 
courageous or generous, and so forth. We envisage a person who is good without 
qualification or specification. This is how Aristotle portrays the person who has 
kalokagathia: she is good overall. The questions that I explore are: what virtues does the 
agent need to have in order to be kalos kagathos? How do these virtues function and interact 
with each other?  
In the EE, Aristotle is not only concerned with the case of the best agent. The 
perspective of what I call the agent in a standard state also plays a fundamental role in 
determining what is good, beautiful, and pleasant for human beings. Aristotle puts forward a 
notion that is absent from the NE: the notion of natural goods. What are the natural goods? 
On my reading, what is good is not what is good absolutely. It is not what is good for the best 
agent, either. What is good in the sense of the natural goods, is the good for human beings as 
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we are by nature or for the most part. I introduce the notion of the agent in a standard state to 
capture this idea: the agent in a standard state is how human beings are by nature or for the 
most part. That is, as Aristotle conceives of this, by nature or for the most part we are adult, 
healthy individuals in normal conditions (i.e. in the standard state, we are not drunk, not 
under the effect of drugs, etc.).  
Connected to the notion of natural goods is the better known and yet contested notion 
of function (ἔργον). The idea that human beings have a function is familiar from the NE. In 
Plato’s Republic, the claim is that the human soul has a function. The perspective of the EE 
on the function is close to that of the Republic: the human soul - rather than human beings - 
has a function. I compare and analyze the so-called Function Arguments that appear in the 
three works: NE, EE and Republic. The very notion of a “function” can seem off-putting, as if 
someone had made us for some purpose, as humans make knives.  I address the unfortunate, 2
albeit standard, translation “function” as I go along. For now, let me note that the thought is 
not that a creator made us to serve or to have a specific function, or, closer to the Greek 
ergon, to do some “job.” In the light of this I take it to be a fundamental question about 
Aristotle’s ethics why he talks about the ergon of human beings, as he does in the NE, or of 
the human soul, as he does in the EE. 
I conclude my analysis by exploring the most contested of the three value-properties 
that Aristotle assigns to happiness: the pleasant. In antiquity, pleasure was seen in a negative 
light especially in discussions that envisaged hedonism as an opponent. At the beginning of 
the EE and of the NE, Aristotle mentions the life of pleasure as one of the candidates for the 
 R. Barney, “Aristotle’s Argument for a Human Function”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34, 2008, 2
293-322.; C.M. Korsgaard, “Aristotle’s Function Argument,” in The Constitution of Agency, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008; G. Lawrence, “Human Good and Human Function,” in R. Kraut, The Blackwell Guide 
to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 
!3
role of best life. He puts much effort into arguing against this view and in favor of his own 
proposal that the life of virtue is the best life. And yet, why does Aristotle connect happiness 
to pleasure from the very first lines of the EE? As I demonstrate, the best life as Aristotle 
conceives of it cannot lack pleasure. Feeling pleasure in virtuous activity serves as a sign that 
the agent is fully virtuous. If we are to diagnose who is fully virtuous, we can look for this 
symptom. I argue that Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in the EE suggests that the pleasant is 
a non-derivative value. In other words, it is not a value that is posterior to some more 
fundamental value such as the good. It plays an essential role in motivation and in the good 
life.  
In this chapter, I aim to achieve two things. First, I offer a conspectus of the 
dissertation, sketching its main themes, questions, and proposals. Second, I defend an 
interpretive claim that is fundamental to my dissertation as a whole. This claim is modest, 
and yet, at the same time, it prepares the ground for the arguments laid out in the following 
chapters. This is why its defense is to some extent part of my introductory account of the EE. 
Namely, I propose that the EE is concerned with happiness. Its most basic ambition is to lay 
out a view of what makes a person happy. This is a modest claim because it applies to many 
texts in ancient ethics. It is also a modest claim because, put in this preliminary way, it is not 
contentious. It is a claim worth spelling out with respect to the EE, however, insofar as the 
EE begins with a remarkable premise about happiness: that happiness is at once the best, the 
most beautiful, and the most pleasant. The EE puts forward a distinctive account of happiness 
that explores the roles of three kinds of value in a happy life—of goodness, beauty, and 
pleasure. 
!4
The structure of the Introduction, then, is to first supply some background on the 
scholarship that has treated the EE (section 1). Second, I discuss the substantive accounts of 
happiness in the EE and in the NE (section 2) and the respective formal accounts of happiness 
(section 3). I turn next to a discussion of what I call the Superlative Thesis (ST), namely that 
happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant thing of all (section 4), 
including an analysis of a quote by Theognis that Aristotle employs (section 5). I examine 
each of the three claims that constitute ST (section 6). I discuss two fundamental elements in 
the definitions of happiness, namely how Aristotle conceives of complete virtue and of the 
best and most complete virtue (section 7). I conclude with an outline of the chapters (section 
8). 
1. The state-of-the-art 
Even in antiquity, the EE was far less studied than the NE.  For a long time, the EE has 3
not been regarded as Aristotelian. Following the work of Werner Jaeger (1923), scholars 
began to consider the EE a genuine part of the Aristotelian oeuvre.  The EE contains three 4
books (NE V, VI, VII= EE IV, V, VI) that in some manuscripts appear in the NE, and in others 
in the EE. For centuries these books were treated as if they were original components of the 
NE. Aspasius, in his commentary on NE I-IV and VII-VIII, mentions a controversy about the 
authorship of book VII. And he reports that some scholars attributed it to Eudemus, a student 
of Aristotle. In the 1970s, C. Rowe published a study of the development of Aristotle’s 
 Up to the II century, the EE was considered Aristotle’s main ethical treatise. However, after the commentary of 3
Aspasius, the NE starts to be regarded as the main Aristotelian ethical treatise. J. Barnes (1999) puts forward two 
hypotheses: either Aspasius was commenting on two Peripatetic ethical treatises - the commentary on the NE 
survived while we have only snippets of the one on the EE - or he was indeed commenting on the NE. 
 W. Jaeger, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin, 1923).4
!5
thought in the EE and in the NE.  A few years later, in 1978, A. Kenny argued that the 5
common books were an original part of the EE.  He based his argument on a stylometric 6
analysis of the common books and of the undisputed books of the two ethics. The analysis 
brought to light stronger similarities between the style of the common books and that of the 
undisputed books of the EE.  However, there is still no agreement among scholars on this 7
matter. To add even more uncertainty, the chronology of the two treatises is still disputed. C. 
Rowe argued that the EE was written before the NE. A. Kenny argued in favor of the idea 
that the EE was later than the NE. Since the publication of these two studies in 1970s, 
scholars side with one position or the other, at times adducing further evidence, but without 
reaching a unified and agreed upon view. One way or another, the NE has long been read as 
“the” ethical treatise by Aristotle. In effect, many aspects and ideas that appear only in the EE 
have been neglected by Aristotle scholars. Kenny pointed out that since the Middle Ages, a 
new commentary on the NE was published roughly every decade, while we have only a few 
commentaries on the EE.  
Though two recent translations - by A. Kenny (2011) and by B. Inwood and R. Woolf 
(2013) - make the EE as a whole (as opposed to only those parts that are not in the NE) 
accessible in a highly readable way, the EE remains far less studied than the NE.  There is 8
only one recent monograph dedicated to the EE (Buddensiek 1999) and two collections of 
 C.J. Rowe, The Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 5
1971).
 A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, Oxford: OUP, 1978, second edition: 2016.6
 In the catalogue of Andronicus, the EE appears in eight books, but there is no mention of the NE. 7
 The first English translation of the EE that includes the common books is by A. Kenny (Oxford University 8
Press, 2011). Simpson translates the treatise including the common books. The first complete translation of the 
EE in a modern language is the Italian translation by Fermani: Aristotele, Le tre Etiche, A. Fermani (ed.), 
Bompiani, 2008. 
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essays (Moraux and Harlfinger 1971; Leigh 2012). Studies that explore the relation between 
the two ethics shed some light on selected aspects of the EE (Kapp 1912, Rowe 1971, Cooper 
1975, Kenny 1978/2016, Kenny 1992, Donini 2014, Destrée and Zingano 2014). 
Commentaries published together with translations offer some interpretation of the text 
(Dirlmeier 1962, Woods 1992, Donini 1999, Zanatta 2012, Simpson 2013, Dalimier 2013). 
Studies dedicated to Aristotle’s ethics at times include comparisons or sections dedicated to 
the EE (Cooper 1975, Hardie 1980, Broadie 1994).  
Recently, however, there has been an emerging interest in the EE. An example is the 
Symposium Aristotelicum of July 2017 dedicated to EE II, including a number of reading 
groups internationally (in Paris, Princeton, and elsewhere) leading up to the Symposium, as 
well as a conference in Dublin in June 2018 about questions that arise both with respect to the 
NE and EE. My work contributes to this trend by opening up new avenues of research. In 
chapter II, I point out that, while there is a discussion of the unity of the virtues understood as 
a unity of phronêsis and character virtues (Dahl 1984, Irwin 1988, Badhwar 1996, Halper 
1999, Natali 2001, Annas 2011, Russell 2014) there is no discussion of a larger unity of the 
virtues that includes the character virtues as well as all the virtues of thinking, practical and 
theoretical. Scholars tend to hold that the best agent of the NE is the phronimos or the sophos 
(Cooper 1975, McDowell 1979, Woods 1986, Wiggins 1988, Reeve 1992). But there is no 
discussion of the best agent in the EE. In chapter III, I investigate the Eudemian notion of 
natural goods that has not yet been the object of a dedicated study so far, but for an article by 
Broadie (2010). I argue that the notion of natural goods is part of an unexplored and 
distinctive kind of naturalism: what I call Natural Goods Naturalism (NGN). In chapter IV, I 
compare the well-known and well-studied Function Argument in the NE (Williams 1972, 
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Nozick 1981, Nagel 1981, Barney 2008, Korsgaard 2008) with the Function Argument in the 
EE and in Plato’s Republic. I propose an analysis of the Function Argument in the EE. I argue 
that the Function Argument is essential for Aristotle’s discussion of the best life at the end of 
the EE. In chapter V, I engage with scholarly views on pleasure in Aristotle’s ethics 
(Festugière 1941, Ryle 1954, Moss 2006, Corcilius 2011, Shields 2011, Olfert 2014, Warren 
2014). The existing literature on pleasure in Aristotle’s ethics focuses on the NE. I argue that 
if we read the account of pleasure in EE VI=NE VII within the context of the EE, this account 
is an essential step in proving what I call the Pleasure Thesis.  
Even though I do not focus specifically on the chronology of the two ethics or on the 
common books, I here provide a brief sketch of where I suspend judgment and which 
hypothesis I employ. Regarding the chronology, I do not think that there is enough evidence 
to side with one view or the other. For current purposes, this is not necessary. By engaging 
with happiness, virtue, natural goods, the Function Argument, and pleasure I aim to 
demonstrate that there are several lines of argument that begin in Book I of the EE and are 
developed until the treatise’s conclusion in Book VIII; that is, I aim to elucidate ways in 
which the EE can be read as an extended argument. This is compatible with it being the 
earlier and with it being the later Aristotelian treatise on ethics. It is also compatible with the 
observation that the EE’s text is dense and at times corrupt (especially with regard to the very 
last book), and that not all passages and sections of the treatise seem equally well integrated. 
It is possible for the EE as a whole to offer one distinctive outlook, and yet to contain some 
passages that do not seem to be fully polished and revised with a view to the book as a whole. 
This applies - albeit more rarely - also to the text of the NE. I state this at the outset in order 
to forestall the following type of objection. What if we were to think that, on consideration, 
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some passages are in one way or another ill-integrated? It would not follow, of course, that 
the treatise as a whole fails to offer a distinctive ethical outlook. A brief comparison with any 
monograph today makes this evident: it is entirely compatible to take an author to put 
forward a given view throughout an extended treatise, and yet to have failed to “catch” 
everything during the review process. This is even more salient for ancient authors, for whom 
the process of writing and revision were probably very different from today. For example, we 
may think that in antiquity there was no process of revision with a view to publication. I 
myself am not going to argue that any particular passages are ill-integrated in this manner. 
But I want to state explicitly that my interpretation does not hang on there being no such 
passages whatsoever. 
As for the common books, I consider them a part of the EE. This cannot be more than a 
hypothesis, especially since I do not engage here in close philological work that pertains to 
this question. Instead, I put forward reconstructions of lines of argument in the EE that are, 
on the one hand, especially compelling if the middle books are original parts of the EE, and 
that, on the other hand, lend credibility to this hypothesis. This mode of reconstruction is self-
consciously circular, though I submit not in a problematic way. Rather, I here follow an 
established method of putting together a “picture,” a way of reconstructing and reading a text, 
that can be assessed by its philosophical and historical plausibility. Along these lines, I 
provide arguments that show that the common books contain essential parts of Aristotle’s 
argument in the EE. This view is compatible with the idea that these books were revised or 
edited in order to fit also the argument of the NE too. If this is enough to say that the EE is 
earlier than the NE, I would concede this. 
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The history of the manuscripts containing the EE is far from linear. As D. Harlfinger 
reconstructs it, the text of the EE does not appear in the two main manuscripts of Aristotle’s 
works: the 10th century Laurentianus (K) and the 12th Parisiensis (L). The text appears in the 
Vaticanus (P) - a 13th c. copy of K - and in the early 15th c. Marcianus (M). According to the 
stemma codicum created by Harlfinger, we can distinguish two manuscript traditions: the 
Recensio Messanensis and the Recensio Constantinopolitana.  There is no complete 9
Medieval translation of the EE. What has survived is a partial translation of William of 
Moerbeke (13th c.). There are Latin translations of EE VIII.2-3 preserved under the name of 
Liber de bona fortuna. These seem to be translations of a Greek manuscript that did not 
survive. We do not know whether the Byzantines had access to the EE insofar as there are no 
commentaries from that period. There are some translations of the text during so-called 
period of Renaissance Humanism (by G. Manetti and by G. Tifernate).  Regarding the 10
transmission of the common books, they were reported by the Laurentianus 81,15. In 1447, 
Bessarion received a manuscript (Rav. 210) of the EE without the common books. Based on 
this manuscript, he decided to make a copy of the EE without the common books.  
A.I. Bekker’s edition of the EE is based on the manuscripts Vaticanus 1342 (P) and 
Marcianus 213 (M). Bekker also examined the CCC MS 112 up to EE 1216 a 7. The two 
other existing editions of the EE are by F. Susemihl (1881), who completed the study of CCC 
MS 112 up to the end of EE I, and more recently by R. Walzer and J. Mingay (1991). 
Susemihl analyzed the manuscript Laurentianus 81,15 (L), which belongs to the so-called 
 Cf. D. Harlfinger, “Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik,” in Untersuchungen zur 9
Eudemischen Ethik, P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger (eds.), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1971, pp. 1-51. 
 E. Garin, “Le traduzioni umanistiche di Aristotele nel secolo XV,” in Atti e Memorie dell’Accademia 10
Fiorentina di Scienze Morali, La Colombaria, Vol. 16, II, 1947-1950. A. Pelzer, “Les versions latines des 
ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d’Aristote en usage au XIII siècle,” in “Rev. Néoscol. Philos.”, 23, 
1921. 
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Recensio Constantinopolitana. F. Dirlmeier (1962) proposed a reconstruction of the text of 
the EE, in addition to the commentary. F. Buddensiek is preparing a new commentary of the 
text. C. Rowe is currently in the process of revising the edition of the text including an 
unexamined manuscript that contains the EE and that is now preserved in Munich. In this 
work, I use the edition of Susemihl, as well as the edition of Walzer and Mingay. Departures 
from these editions are reported in the footnotes. The translations of the EE are either by B. 
Inwood and R. Woolf modified by the author, or done by the author. My translations of the 
EE are indebted to Inwood/Woolf, Woods, Simpson, Donini, Zanatta, Dalimier and Dirlmeier. 
My translations of the NE are indebted to Crisp, Irwin, Reeve, Rowe, as well as at times by 
Natali, Bodéüs and Dirlmeier. 
2. Happiness: a substantive account 
For a long time, scholars working on Aristotle’s notion of happiness found themselves 
in different “camps,” defending the so-called dominant interpretation or the so-called 
inclusive interpretation respectively. Others aim to supersede what can appear to be an 
entrenched debate, arguing for hybrids of both views.  For current purposes, an outline of the 11
main issues and contentions suffices. This debate picks up on Aristotle’s discussion of kinds 
of lives: the life of politics on the one hand, and the life of contemplation on the other. It also 
attends to those places in the NE where Aristotle ranks faculties and activities of the soul as 
higher or lower. Defenders of the dominant interpretation understand happiness as 
contemplative activity. In other words, according to the dominant interpretation, happiness 
consists in the life of theôria. Defenders of the inclusive interpretation argue that happiness is 
 The distinction between a dominant and an inclusive interpretation is first proposed by W.F.R. Hardie, 11
Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford 1968). P. Donini (Abitudine e saggezza, Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 
2014) proposes a way to overcome the differences in the two interpretations.
!11
constituted by activity according to all of the virtues.  This debate, we may say, concerns 12
Aristotle’s substantive account of happiness. It addresses the substance of what constitutes a 
happy life: what it is that the best and happy person does. In both treatises, Aristotle examines 
substantive accounts of happiness that have been put forward by philosophers and by 
common people. Arguably, he develops his own view through engagement with these 
traditional and earlier positions, or at any rate, he uses engagement with these positions as an 
expository method. 
What the best life is was a common question in Greek literature.  The best lives are 13
traditionally deemed to be the life of honor, the life of pleasure, or the life of wealth. In EE I, 
Aristotle considers three competing answers to the question of what the greatest good in life 
 Hardie explains the problem of how to interpret happiness in the NE, given the two accounts of happiness - 12
one in NE I and the other in NE X - as a problem between an inclusive and a dominant conception. According to 
Hardie, in the NE, Aristotle conceives of happiness in an inclusive way, namely as a final end composed of 
multiple independent goods. In book X, the best kind of happiness seems to consist exclusively in philosophical 
activity (W.F.R. Hardie, “The final good in Aristotle’s ethics,” in Aristotle, J.M.E. Moravcisk (ed.), Anchor 
Books, 1967). Among others, A. Kenny, J. Cooper, and R. Kraut defend the dominant interpretation of happiness 
in the NE; J.L. Ackrill defends the inclusive interpretation. Lear argues that virtuous activity is an approximation 
to contemplative activity. More recently J.L. Labarrière (2003) defends the dominant view against P. Destrée 
(2003) who defends an inclusive view. I mention some contributions to this debate insofar as they are relevant 
for my argument in this chapter: J.L. Austin, “Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle,” in J.M.E. 
Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle, Critical essays (New York 1967); W.F. R. Hardie, Aristotle ethical theory, Oxford 
University Press, 1968, J. Cooper, Reason and the human good, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1975; J. 
McDowell, “The role of eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics,” in Essays on Aristotle's ethics, A.O. Rorty (ed.), 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980; T. Nagel, “Aristotle on eudaimonia,” in Rorty 1980; J.L. Ackrill, 
“Aristotle on eudaimonia,” in Rorty 1980; R. Kraut, Aristotle on the human good, Princeton University Press, 
1989; A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life, Oxford University Press, 1992; S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 
Oxford University Press, 1994; R. Crisp, “Aristotle’s Inclusivism,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 12, 
1993, pp. 111-136. N. Sherman (eds.), Aristotle’s Ethics: critical essays, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998; P. 
Destrée, Aristote, Bonheur et vertus, Paris, 2003; G. Lear, Happy lives and human good, Princeton University 
Press, 2006; M. Pakaluk, G. Pearson, Moral psychology and human actions, Oxford University Press, 2011; 
C.D.C. Reeve, Action, contemplation and happiness, Harvard University Press, 2012; P. Destrée, M. Zingano 
(eds.), Theoria, Vrin, 2015. For a history of happiness, F. De Luise, G. Farinetti, Storia della felicità. Gli antichi 
e i moderni, Einaudi, 2001. 
 Cf. Herodotus, Histories I 29-33. On the best life cf. B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur 13
Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen (Hamburg 1946); R. Joly, Le thème philosophique des 
genres de vie dans l’antiquité classique (Bruxelles, 1956), p. 12; S. White, “Is Aristotelian happiness a good life 
or the best life?” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 8, (1990), pp. 97-137. P. Cosenza, R. Laurenti, Il piacere 
nella filosofia greca, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1993. S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1994); S. Gastaldi, 
Bios Hairetotatos. Generi di vita e felicità in Aristotele (Napoli, 2003); K. Vogt, Desiring the good (Oxford, 
2017), ch. 2. 
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is: the greatest good is practical wisdom (φρόνησις), virtue or pleasure. Aristotle says that 
people think that these are the things in which happiness consists. 
(T1) Happiness and the blessed (µακαρίως) and beautiful life might be found in 
three things above all, namely those that are thought to be the most choiceworthy: 
some say that the greatest good is practical wisdom, others that it is virtue, and 
others that it is pleasure.  14
Who are these people who think that the greatest good is practical wisdom, virtue, or 
pleasure? These three proposals - that the greatest good is practical wisdom, virtue, or 
pleasure - seem to be the proposals of philosophers or perhaps poets; they do not seem to 
reflect what Aristotle considers the view of ordinary people. In the NE, Aristotle assigns the 
view that the best life is pleasure to ordinary people. However, in the EE, he seems to 
examine first these three proposals and then to move to what ordinary people think. While 
talking about these three views, Aristotle says that people debate about which of these three 
things contribute more to happiness, and in general about their importance in relation to 
happiness. This seems to suggest that there is a debate about these proposals and that this 
debate is theoretical. We may even think that Aristotle has in mind the ethical proposals of 
Socrates and Plato - both Socrates and Plato agree that the life of virtue/knowledge is the best 
- and of Eudoxos - for whom pleasure is the best. And yet, Aristotle reports the views not 
only of philosophers or wise people, but also of non-philosophers. He says that anyone who 
can live by her own decision and set a goal for her life, thinks that the aim of the best life is 
honor, reputation, wealth or education.  It is not clear whether Aristotle has in mind what he 15
elsewhere calls “the many” (οἱ πολλοί) - an expression that generically picks out ordinary 
 EE I 1214 a 30-35.14
 EE I 1214 b 6-10. The text is problematic. Inwood and Woolf translate “everyone capable of living by their 15
own decision ought to lay down an end.” They read dei thesthai: dei is not in the manuscripts, but it is inserted 
by editors. Most manuscripts provide no finite verb. 
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people - or whether these people who are able to live by their own decision are a more 
restricted group. In the EE, Aristotle says it is the most important thing of all—and a task for 
all of us or everyone who at all has the opportunity to turn to it—that we come up with a 
conception of a good life. Interpreters differ on how ambitious and on how expansive this is. 
Broadie, for example, considers this an elitist dimension of Aristotle’s ethics.  Very few 16
people, she argues, can ask themselves what would make them happy. Vogt, on the contrary, 
defends the idea that for Aristotle, the good that ethics studies is the well-lived human life. 
Whether it is demanding or not, it is a fundamental ethical task to come up with a conception 
of what would make us happy, so that we can be guided by it.   17
In any case, if we compare these answers - the answers of the philosophers and of this 
second group of people - one element strikes us as counterintuitive: pleasure figures among 
the answers given by philosophers, but it does not appear among the answers of those who 
can live by their own decision. It is counterintuitive because the life of pleasure was one of 
the paradigmatic best lives: the most famous example is the life of Sardanapalus who lives 
aiming at pleasure. And if current opinions are included among the opinions of people who 
live by their own decision, pleasure should be there. This absence of pleasure among the 
things that people consider to be the best already may be a sign that for the Aristotle of the 
EE, pleasure has a special place and has to be understood in a certain way. I will say more on 
this in section 4 of this introduction and in chapter V of the dissertation. In a nutshell, it 
seems that Aristotle is not talking about those pleasures that non-philosophers may choose as 
the aim of their life - for example, bodily pleasures or excessive pleasures. He seems to talk 
 S. Broadie,  Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1994). 16
 K. Vogt, Desiring the good (Oxford, 2017), p. 43.17
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about those pleasures that philosophers choose as the aim of a good life - pleasures that are 
unimpeded activities of our natural state, as Aristotle says in EE VI=NE VII - and that can 
compete with practical wisdom and virtue. Let us now look at the substantive accounts of 
happiness in the NE. In NE I, Aristotle offers a brief survey of what people think about the 
best life. 
(T2) Most people, I should think, agree about what it is called, since both 
ordinary people and sophisticated people (χαρίεντες) call it happiness, 
understanding being happy as equivalent to living well and acting well. They 
disagree about substantive conceptions of happiness, ordinary people giving an 
account which differs from that of the philosophers. For the many think it is 
something straightforward and obvious, like pleasure, wealth, or honor, some 
thinking it to be one thing, others another.   18
In this passage, Aristotle considers the opinion of sophisticated people - χαρίεντες - and 
of the many. These people called χαρίεντες are indeed called philosophers a few lines below 
in the passage. Philosophers and the many agree on a very minimal view of happiness: we all 
strive for happiness. However, not everyone agrees that happiness is the greatest good.  For 19
example, as Aristotle discusses it at the end of EE I, on a different account the greatest good 
is the Form of the Good. What is more, it is clear that there is disagreement on the substantive 
account of happiness. For the many, happiness consists in pleasure, wealth, or honor. There 
are some differences between the EE and the NE regarding what ordinary people think. More 
in detail, in the NE, pleasure takes the place of education and reputation. And pleasure figures 
among the answers of the many and it does not appear among the answers of philosophers. 
Despite this difference, in the EE and in the NE, Aristotle offers a similar sketch of the best 
 NE 1095 a 17-23.18
 Cf. Vogt 2017.19
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lives. Aristotle says that people consider the best lives to be the life of politics, of philosophy/
contemplation and of enjoyment. 
(T3) EE I: Since there are three things that rank as conducive to happiness, the 
ones that were earlier described as the greatest possible human goods, namely 
virtue, wisdom and pleasure, we see also that there are three lives, chosen by all 
who have the means to do so - that of politics, that of philosophy, and that of 
enjoyment (πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν).  20
(T4) NE I: For people seem, not unreasonably, to base their conception of the 
good - happiness, that is - on their own lives. The masses, the coarsest people, see 
it as pleasure, and so they like the life of enjoyment. There are three especially 
prominent types of life: that just mentioned, the life of politics, and thirdly the life 
of contemplation (θεωρητικός).  21
These lists differ in how they call one of the three lives: philosophical, as the EE has it, 
or contemplative, as the NE has it. This difference in describing one of these three lives bears 
on a distinct conception of this kind of life in the NE. By calling it the life of contemplation, 
it is already explicit what this life consists of or at least what its activity is. Conversely, to talk 
about the life of philosophy is less specific. A philosopher’s activity need not be called 
theôria. A philosopher can be an inquirer and investigator, someone who examines life; here 
terms related to zêtêsis could be used. A philosopher might also be concerned with a wide 
range of topics: how best to live, the universe, the gods, numbers, and more. In other words, 
several kinds of thinking and several kinds of objects may figure in the philosopher’s life. 
The notion of a life of theôria, however, envisages a life of one distinctive kind of reasoning 
activity, called (in translation) contemplation, which is concerned with its own, high-level 
objects. To shed more light on this difference in the conceptions of the best life, let us turn to 
the definitions of happiness in the two treatises.  
 EE I 1215 a 33-35.20
 NE 1095 b 18-21.21
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3. Happiness: a formal account 
A key element for arguments in favor of the dominant and the inclusive views of 
happiness is the formal definition of happiness. Aristotle offers two definitions of happiness: 
one in the EE and another in the NE. By themselves, these definitions do not pronounce on 
what it is, in substance, that constitutes happiness. In the EE and in the NE, happiness is 
defined as follows: 
(EE) Happiness is the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue.  22
(NE) The human good [happiness] turns out to be activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue, if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best 
and the most complete. Again, this must be over a complete life.   23
Formally speaking, then, there is some overlap. In both treatises, Aristotle defines 
happiness as activity in a complete life. What it means for a life to be “complete” is the object 
of controversies that, for present purposes, I should set aside.  The formal definitions in the 24
EE and in the NE, however, also differ. Two differences matter for my argument: (i) in the 
EE, Aristotle explicitly mentions happiness, while in the NE, he speaks of the human good; 
(ii) in the EE, happiness is defined as activity according to complete virtue; in the NE, as 
activity according to the best and most complete virtue. 
 Scholars debate how to interpret the expression “complete virtue” (ἀρετὴν τελείαν). 
More than that, they discuss how to understand the expression “the best and most complete 
 EE 1219 a 39, tr. by B. Inwood and R. Woolf. ἡ εὐδαιµονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν.22
 NE 1098 a 17-19, my translation. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ 23
ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. 
 T. Irwin, “Conceptions of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 24
Aristotle, 2012; C. Horn, “Eine Schwalbe macht noch keinen Frühling,” in Glück, Tugend, Zeit, W. Mesch (ed.), 
(Stuttgart, 2013), pp 21-40.
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virtue” (τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην).  Is Aristotle referring to the same virtue in the two 25
treatises? What is this virtue? Scholars discuss whether the definitions of happiness in the two 
treatises, given these characterizations of virtue, are compatible or not. Among defenders of 
the dominant position, we can find two different interpretative options: some scholars argue 
that the best and most complete virtue is sophia, others that it is nous.  There are also what 26
we may call hybrid views: some scholars argue that the best and most complete virtue is 
phronêsis, others that it is a combination of sophia and phronêsis.  Scholars who support the 27
inclusive interpretation argue that the best and most complete virtue is a virtue that includes 
virtues of thinking and virtues of character.   28
Donini proposes a way to overcome the distinction between the inclusive and dominant 
interpretations. Insofar as sophia co-functions with other virtues, this virtue does not include 
all of the virtues, but it requires that other virtues are present in order to function well.  If 29
sophia cannot function well without the rest of the virtues, it seems plausible to say that, even 
if the life of contemplation is the best life, it ultimately is a life that involves all the virtues. 
 Some of the major contributions to the discussion on happiness in the two treatises are: P. Donini, Abitudine e 25
saggezza, Edizioni dell’Orso, 2014; P. Donini, “Due libri su eudaimonia in Aristotele,” Phronesis 39, 1994, pp. 
98-110. A. Kenny provides a comparison of the two views of happiness: The Aristotelian Ethics, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2016 (first edition: 1978); A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1992. See also C.J. Rowe, The Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics, Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society, 1971; S.A. White, Sovereign virtue. Aristotle on the relation between happiness and 
prosperity, Stanford University Press, 1992. 
 Among others, Cooper, Kraut, Kenny, and Donini argue that the best virtue is sophia. The first to defend the 26
position in antiquity is Aspasius. Labarrière argues that the best virtue is nous.
 Among scholars who argue that the best virtue is phronêsis there is Rowe. The first defender of this position 27
in antiquity is Eustrate. Natali argues that the best virtue is a combination of phronêsis and sophia.
 Cf. J. Ackrill, P. Destrée. 28
 P. Donini, “Happiness and theôria in books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics,” p. 14. Cf. T. Irwin, 29
“Conceptions of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, 
2012.
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This view is compatible with the idea that the best activity is contemplation. But, insofar as 
human beings cannot live in a way that involves only contemplation, other virtues need to be 
part of the best life. As for the NE, the dominant interpretation is currently the most 
widespread. It is based on the definition of happiness, on the so-called Function Argument 
that says that the function of human beings is rational activity, and on the explicit claim in NE 
X that the best life is the life of contemplation. 
The inclusive interpretation has prevailed with regard to the EE.  Even though the EE 30
is less investigated than the NE, studies that focus on happiness in Aristotle’s ethics often 
mention the difference between the EE’s and the NE’s conceptions of happiness. And they 
argue that in the EE, happiness is activity according to all the virtues.  While in the NE, there 31
are two kinds of happiness, in the EE, there is only one kind of happiness. Already the 
definition of happiness in the EE suggests an inclusive view: in the definition, there is no 
mention of a virtue that is the best and most complete. Talking about a virtue that is best and 
most complete suggests that there is a ranking of virtues and that there is a virtue which is 
best and most complete. Conversely, talking about complete virtue suggests that this virtue 
includes the other virtues as parts. I will say more about this below, when I turn specifically 
to the notion of complete virtue. Here it is sufficient to say that scholars agree that in the EE 
happiness is activity according to complete virtue, and that complete virtue is taken to include 
all the virtues.  32
 Even though there are not many studies on the EE, comparatively speaking to the NE, the discussion of 30
happiness is one of the most investigated topic: cf. A. Kenny 1992 and J. Cooper 1975. 
 Cooper and Kenny argues that in the EE, happiness is activity according to all the parts of the soul. Kenny 31
argues that kalokagathia is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. 
 Cf. A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life (Oxford 1992); S.A. White, Sovereign virtue. Aristotle on the 32
relation between happiness and prosperity (Stanford 1992). 
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The dominant-inclusive debate is not only focused on comparing the definitions of 
happiness in the two ethics. It concerns also the coherence of Aristotle’s outlook within the 
NE. At the end of NE I, Aristotle offers a sketch of the soul. Together with the function 
argument in NE I.7, this sketch clarifies that there is a hierarchy: theoretical thinking is higher 
and better than practical reasoning. This line of thought shows up again at the very end of the 
treatise. In NE X, Aristotle says that there are two kinds of happiness: the best kind of 
happiness consists in contemplation and the second best consists in virtuous activity.  The 33
second best life consists in the life of the phronimos (the practically wise person), understood 
as the person who has excellence in practical reasoning as well as the character virtues. Alas, 
for long stretches of text in between Books I and X it seems that Aristotle is very seriously 
concerned with the character virtues, with decision-making, and with practical wisdom. If 
one reads these books unaware of how the treatise ends, one would not suspect that the life of 
the character virtues and phronêsis falls in any way short of the life Aristotle recommends—
or so scholars have observed. Accordingly, as clear as the evidence in Book X seems to be, 
the question of how happiness is understood in the NE remains debated.  34
4. The Superlative Thesis 
Let us look more closely at the beginning of the EE and at the thesis that Aristotle 
defends in this treatise. The EE starts with a programmatic claim - what I call the Superlative 
 NE 1177 a 13 -14.33
 Cf. P. Donini, Abitudine e Saggezza. Aristotele dall’Etica Eudemia all’Etica Nicomachea (Alessandria, 2014). 34
Donini argues that the life of the phronimos is included in the life of the sophos. Insofar as the theoretically wise 
person needs to live in a community, she performs virtuous actions. In this sense, Donini argues that with regard 
to the NE, the inclusive and dominant views can be reconciled. 
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Thesis (ST) - that happiness is the best, the most beautiful and the most pleasant thing of 
all:  35
(T5) The poet who declared his opinion at the god’s site in Delos, inscribing it on 
the gateway of the Temple of Leto, distinguished the good, the beautiful and the 
pleasant as not all belonging to the same thing. He wrote: “Most beautiful is what 
is most just, best is being healthy, most pleasant of all is to attain what one 
desires.” We should not agree with him. For happiness, being most beautiful and 
best, is the most pleasant of all things.  36
Three properties are attributed in the superlative to happiness: the good, the beautiful, 
and the pleasant. Above I spoke about the differences between the notions of happiness in the 
NE and in the EE. More fundamentally and prior to Aristotle’s specific notions in these 
treatises, we should note differences between our notion of happiness today and eudaimonia, 
as Aristotle conceives of it. I mention only the two most striking ones. First, while today we 
can say that someone is happy for a short time, even for a moment, for Aristotle, happiness is 
a life-long activity. This is part of what it means that happiness is the activity of a complete 
life. Second, for Aristotle, happiness is not a feeling. Instead, happiness has a distinctive 
metaphysical status: it is an activity. Aristotle distinguishes between activities and processes: 
while activities have their end in themselves, processes have an external end. The 
paradigmatic example of a process is house-building: the end of house-building is external to 
the process. It is a house. As for activities, Aristotle speaks of seeing or studying: these 
 G. Olof, “Das Proimioon der Eudemischen Ethik,” in P. Moraux. H. Dieter, Untersuchungen der Eudemischen 35
Ethik, Aktes des 5. Symposium Aristotelikum, 1971. 
 EE I 1214 a 1-7, trans. by B. Inwood and R. Woods modified by GB. ὁ µὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὑτοῦ 36
γνώµην ἀποφηνάµενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητῴου, διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό 
τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας “κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν: πάντων ἥδιστον δ᾽ 
οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν:” ἡµεῖς δ᾽ αὐτῷ µὴ συγχωρῶµεν. ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιµονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἁπάντων οὖσα 
ἥδιστον ἐστίν
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activities do not have an external end.  Happiness as seeing and studying is an activity and it 37
has an end in itself.  
According to ST, the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant are co-extensional when they 
are in the superlative. In other words, in the superlative these three kinds of value are found 
in one and the same thing: happiness. Happiness, insofar as it has the three value-properties 
in the superlative is the most desired object. This claim is compatible with the idea that we 
may still pursue a plurality of goods in our life.  And yet, happiness is the final goal.  By 38 39
postulating that happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant thing of all, 
Aristotle says that there are three values-properties that matter in life. Let us examine the 
context in which ST appears in the NE: 
(T6) Actions in accordance with virtue are pleasant in themselves. But they are 
also good and beautiful as well as pleasant; indeed, since the good person is a 
good judge of goodness and beauty, actions in accordance with virtue have them 
to a degree greater than anything else; and here he judges in accordance with our 
views. Happiness, then, is the best, the most beautiful and the pleasantest thing, 
and these are not separate as in the inscriptions at Delos: “most beautiful is that 
which is the most just, and best is being healthy. But most pleasant is obtaining 
what one longs for.” This is because the best activities have all these [GB: value-
properties]. And we say that happiness consists in them, or one of them - the 
best.  40
 J.B. Beere, “Being in energeia and being in capacity,” in Doing and being, Oxford University Press, 2009. 37
 Wiggins and Nussbaum discuss value pluralism, albeit in relation to akrasia and weakness of will. Cf. D. 38
Wiggins  “Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire” in Essays on 
Aristotle's Ethics, A.O. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980 and M. Nussbaum, The 
Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. With the expression “value pluralism,” 
philosophers refer to the view that there are many values not reducible to one supervalue (dominant value). 
Value pluralism is opposed to value monism. Value monism is the position according to which there is one 
supervalue, on which all the other values depend. I use the expressions “value pluralism” and “value monism” 
as referring to views that accept many values - value pluralism - or one value - value monism - as central.
 Cf. J. McDowell, “The role of eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in A. Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 39
University of California Press, 1980. 
 NE 1099 a 21-29, trans. by R. Crisp with changed by GB.40
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As the passage shows, the Superlative Thesis does not play a programmatic role in the 
NE. First of all, ST does not take center-stage at the beginning of the treatise. Second, the 
passage appears in a discussion of beliefs that people have in relation to happiness. The 
formulations of ST in the two treatises differ in two fundamental respects. In the NE, the 
three value-properties are on a par with each other: happiness is best, most beautiful, and 
most pleasant. In the EE, the text signals that we may not take them to be on a par, or at any 
rate, that ST is more intuitive with respect to the good and the beautiful than with respect to 
the pleasant. Aristotle says that happiness, insofar as it is best and most beautiful, is also most 
pleasant. In the NE, Aristotle’s focus is on actions, and only later on happiness: virtuous 
actions are best, most beautiful, and most pleasant. It follows that happiness, being activity 
according to virtue, is also best, most beautiful, and most pleasant.  
In the EE, I suggested, ST is a programmatic claim. This provides us with an hypothesis 
for exegesis. Namely, it means that we should approach the text as starting out with a 
demonstrandum that is then, step by step, analyzed and defended. Immediately after the 
introductory passage where Aristotle formulates ST, he further specifies how he wants to 
proceed: 
(T7) There are many points of interest concerning each kind of object and nature 
that create difficulty and need examining. Some of these pertain only to our 
knowing, others pertain to the acquisition of the object and to actions as well. 
Regarding those that involve only theoretical philosophy (φιλοσοφίαν 
θεωρητικήν), we must state, when the right opportunity presents itself, whatever 
is appropriate (οἰκεῖον) to the method (τῇ µεθόδῳ). First, however, we must 
examine what living well consists in and how it is to be achieved (κτητόν).  41
Aristotle says that we should investigate what happiness is and how happiness is 
acquired. The first question pertains to knowledge and the second to actions. Aristotle points 
 EE 1214 a 17-30.41
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out that it is necessary to examine what is appropriate (οἰκεῖον) to the method. In the NE, 
Aristotle says that investigations in the domain of ethics do not have the same exactness as 
investigations in the domain of theoretical philosophy.  Conversely, in the EE, there is no 42
concern regarding the precision adequate for ethical investigations. The passage suggests that 
there are two domains - the domain of theoretical philosophy, and an unnamed domain. To 
this unnamed domain belongs the question of the acquisition of happiness. Each domain has 
its own method - literally “a way to go through.”  And Aristotle says that we should proceed 43
in a way that is appropriate to the domains. 
In EE II, Aristotle adds an important element to his programmatic claims. He says that 
we should investigate the genus and the definition of happiness. This way of proceeding 
closely resembles what we find in the Protrepticus and in Plato’s dialogues: 
(T8) That the genus (τὸ γένος) and the definition (τὸν ὅρον) of happiness are well 
formulated is supported by views that we all hold: (a) doing well and living well 
are the same as being happy; (b) each of these, both life and action, is an 
acquisition and an activity, since a life of activity involves acquisition of things - 
the smith makes a bridle, the rider uses it; (c) one cannot be happy for only a day, 
or if one is a child, or at every stage of life. That is why Solon’s injunction to call 
no one happy while alive, but only when life is complete, is a good one, since 
nothing incomplete is happy; for it is not whole.  44
 NE 1098 b 1-13. Cf. G. Anagnostopoulos, Aristotle on the goals and exactness of ethics, Berkeley: University 42
of California Press, 1994.
 On the method used in the EE. Cf. Allan and Karbowsky: D.J. Allan, Quasi-mathematical method in the 43
Eudemian Ethics, in Aristote et les problèmes de méthode, Ed. S. Mansion, Louvain and Paris, 1961, pp. 
303-318; J. Karbowsky, Φαινόµενα as witnesses and examples: the methodology of EE I.6, in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient philosophy, 49, B. Inwood (ed.), 2015. See also D. Frede, The Endoxon Mystique: what ἔνδοξα are and 
what they are not, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 43, 2012. G.E.L. Owen, Tithenai ta φαινόµενα, in S. 
Mansion (eds.), Aristote et le problème des méthodes, Louvain, 1961. D. Devereux, Scientific and ethical 
methods in Aristotle’s Eudemian and Nicomachean ethics, in Bridging the gap between Aristotle’s ethics and 
science, D. Henry, K.M. Nielsen (eds.), Oxford University Press,  2015. R. Kraut, How to justify ethical 
propositions: Aristotle’s method, in Blackwell guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford, 
2006.
 EE 1219 b 1-5.44
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The method of distinguishing the genus and the definition is reminiscent of the so-
called method of division that divides up a genus into species. This method is developed and 
examined by Plato for example in the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Statesman. In the passage, 
Aristotle says that there is a certain agreement regarding the genus and the definition of 
happiness. Aristotle is far from suggesting that everybody agrees on what happiness consists 
in. The “views that we all hold” seem to be opinions of wise people: to exemplify what these 
views are, Aristotle quotes the opinion of Solon, who was considered among the wisest 
people in antiquity. Yet, what are the genus and the definition of happiness? Happiness is an 
activity. This may be the genus of happiness. Regarding the definition, Aristotle points out 
that it is activity of a complete life according to complete virtue. Let us now turn to the 
examination of the quote of the unnamed poet that Aristotle reports at the beginning of the 
EE. 
5. Theognis’ quote 
Aristotle sets out his view by distinguishing it from the view of a poet, expressed in a 
verse that was inscribed on the temple of Leto in Delos. It was a widespread assumption in 
antiquity that Theognis was the author of the inscription. Stobaeus quotes the passage and 
attributes it to Theognis.  However, the quote may belong to what we consider common 45
sayings in popular wisdom.  The manuscript tradition that reports Theognis’ poetry does not 46
include precisely the same exact text quoted by Aristotle.  It is unclear what Aristotle’s 47
 Stobaeus, Anthology, 4.38.8.45
 T. Hudson-Williams (eds.), The elegies of Theognis (New York 1979).46
 Cf. T. Hudson-Williams (eds.), The elegies of Theognis, p. 257. In the manuscript, instead of λῷστον, there is 47
ῥᾷστον. In addition, the pentameter differs at the beginning: Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, ῥᾷστον δ΄ ἔσθ΄ ὑγιαίνειν 
ἥδιστον δὲ τυχεῖν ὧν τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.
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source was. In particular, the passage occurs also in the NE, but the text is slightly different 
from what we find in the EE: ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ’ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.  In the NE, there is no 48
term of comparison - “of all” - and there is the perfect πέφυχ’ of the Greek verb φύω - to 
“bring forth.” These differences do not affect the translation of the passage in a significant 
way, but they may suggest that Aristotle relied on different sources in the EE and in the NE. 
Regarding the two versions of the quote in the EE and in the NE, we may consider different 
hypotheses. First, it is conceivable that Aristotle was not interested in reporting the quote in 
its original phrasing, simply because he cared exclusively about its content. If this is 
plausible, Aristotle may not have paid much attention to reporting the same quote in two 
treatises, as long as the content of the quote was clear. Second, Aristotle may have cared 
about the content to the extent of modifying the formulation, namely by using ἥδιστον and 
not τερπνότατον in the EE. This nuance may have appeared philosophically relevant for his 
discussion in the EE and in the NE. And he may have focused on the term for pleasure and on 
the list of what is best, most beautiful, and most pleasant, setting aside the exact phrasing of 
the rest of the quote. 
A brief sketch of the circulation of this quote in antiquity may shed light on Aristotle’s 
choice of one source rather than another. As the quote is reported in the EE and in the NE, 
“most pleasant” translates ἥδιστον. The term for pleasure most used by Aristotle and by Plato 
is ἡδονή (ἥδιστον is the corresponding adjective in the superlative form). For example, in the 
discussion of pleasure in the Philebus, ἡδονή occurs many times. And yet, the term ἡδονή is 
not frequently used in Theognis’ poetry.  The first occurrence of ἡδονή that arrived to us 49
appears in Simonides’ fragment 71. Metrical reasons may have prevented authors from using 
 NE, 1099 a 26-27.48
 Cf. B.A. van Groningen, Theognis (Amsterdam, 1966).49
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the term. This is why it does not appear in the Homeric poems, or so scholars assume.  50
However, ἥδιστον appears in other authors who specifically relate a version of this poem. 
Only Theognis, if indeed the attribution of the quote to this poet is correct, uses the term 
τερπνότατον. Is this choice indicative of a different nuance in the understanding of pleasure? 
If we analyze the occurrences of the words for pleasure, the difference between ἡδονή and 
τέρποµαι is not clear: ἡδονή comes from a Sanskrit root; the term was used mostly for the 
pleasure of tasting. Τέρποµαι is used for example in Iliad 11.780 and Odyssey 23.212; it 
expressed how one fully enjoys something.  Theognis says that the most pleasant is what 51
one desires: in this context, τερπνότατον seems more appropriate than ἥδιστον. This different 
choice of the term for pleasure may suggest that Aristotle appropriated the quote and even 
changed the term for pleasure in order to better fit his own philosophical analysis of pleasure, 
where ἡδονή is the standard term for pleasure. However, this is evidently no more than a 
hypothesis, and one that involves a good deal of speculation. 
In the quote, Theognis proposes a list of things and of their corresponding value-
properties: justice is the most beautiful thing, health is the best, and the most pleasant is what 
one desires. Stobaeus reports that a similar list occurs in a skolion that some authors in 
antiquity attributed to Simonides and others to Epicharmus.  In early Greek poetry, lists of 52
the best, most beautiful, and most pleasant are widespread. Especially in symposia, we often 
find questions such as “what is the best thing? What is the most beautiful?” They were a 
poetic device designed to prompt the discussion. In the context of Theognis’ elegies, the lines 
 J. Kurath, The semantic sources of the words for emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and the Germanic 50
languages (Menasha 1921).
 J. Kurath, The semantic sources of the words for emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and the Germanic 51
languages (Menasha 1921).
 Skolion on Plato’s Gorgias 451e. Reported by Hudson-Williams.52
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quoted by Aristotle occur in a sympotic context: two young men are described as they engage 
in a conversation on what is the best, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant thing.  
Another Theognidean passage seems to be thematically connected to T1. Aristotle does 
not quote the passage. However, this passage further helps us supply context for the 
beginning of the EE. It is not a philosophical “invention” to ask how virtue and happiness 
relate to the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant. Aristotle and Theognis, and quite likely 
others - for example Sappho - share an interest in this question. What appears to be a fairly 
technical question to us—how different kinds of value are to be distinguished and what their 
domains are—seems to have been a widespread concern among poets. A particularly famous 
and difficult phrase is ascribed to Sappho: ὀ µὲν γὰρ κάλος ὄσσον ἴδην πέλεται [κάλος], ὀ δὲ 
κἄγαθος αὔτικα καὶ κάλος ἔσσεται.  The translation of this sentence is controversial.  53 54
Literally, the sentence may be taken to say that when someone is beautiful, one can see him 
to be beautiful, but when someone is good, he will also be beautiful. Dirlmeier offers a 
paraphrase along these lines: “the beautiful person is beautiful, that much we can see. Is he 
also good? Conversely, there is no doubt that the good man is beautiful.”  This fragment 55
more than others passages, shows that contemporaries problematized the relation between 
beauty and ethical excellence, and assumed that ultimately, a combination of both is best.  
 Sappho, fr. 49 Diehl. Dirlmeier paraphrases this difficult passage in this way “Der Schöne ist schön: das ist 53
ein Urteil der Augen. Aber ist er auch gut? Daß umgekehrt der Gute ohne weiteres schön ist, darüber ist kein 
Zweifel” (F. Dirlmeier, Komm. Zu dem MM, p. 425).
A. Czerniawski translates it: “A beautiful man is only so in appearance, while a good man will be beautiful as 54
well”. 
 More should be said on the notion of beauty in antiquity. We may suppose that Sappho’s notion of beauty is 55
different from beauty as athletic fitness. In Sappho’s terms, being beautiful is close to being the object of desire 
and love. For a detailed study of kalos-kallos, see D. Konstan, Beauty: the fortune of an Ancient Greek idea, 
Oxford University Press, 2015.
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In the Elegies, Theognis says that it is rare for someone to be both virtuous and 
beautiful. The person who has beauty and virtue is considered happy.  This kind of 56
observation illustrates that the topic is not an abstract one. Rather, this is the sort of 
observation one may make in everyday life. One admires those who are beautiful, but 
observes that they are not always good people. This leads one to ask how the two values—
beauty and goodness—relate and whether they go together. Aristotle adds a third value-
property: the pleasant. Here too everyday ethical thinking supplies context and motivation. 
We often enjoy something, but we are conflicted about the pleasure we take. This suggests 
that pleasure, though a value, is not identical with goodness. For after all, it seems that 
something is, qua pleasure, attractive, and yet not good. Hence we may want to know how the 
pleasant and the good relate. In contrast to Theognis, who attributes beauty and virtue to the 
happy person, Aristotle says that happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most 
pleasant thing of all. 
6. Happiness and three kinds of value 
Let us now turn to an examination of the conjunctions of premises that constitute ST. I 
take it that ST comprises three claims:  
1. Happiness is the best. 
2. Happiness is the most beautiful. 
3. Happiness is also the most pleasant. [Pleasure Thesis] 
My formulation of 3 contains a qualifier: “also.” This qualifier signals that 3 has a 
special dialectical status. Aristotle is aware that, in arguing that happiness is also the most 
 Theognis, Elegies, l. 933-934, my translation: “few people have virtue and beauty, happy is the one who have 56
both.” Παύροις ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος ὀπηδεῖ ὄλβιος, ὅς τούτων ἀµφοτέρων ἔλαχεν.
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pleasant, he is up against those who have anti-hedonist intuitions. Because 3 has a special 
dialectical status, then, I assign it a label: I call it the Pleasure Thesis (PT). The conjunction 
of 1, 2, and 3 provides us with two further premises, which speak to the relationship between 
the three kinds of value:  
Coextension of Superlative Value: That which is best, most beautiful, and most 
pleasant, is the very same thing, namely happiness. 
Difference among Value: The good, the beautiful, and the pleasant are three kinds of 
value. 
Coextension and Difference address the relationships between the three values. They 
say, in a nutshell, that while the three kinds of value attach to the same thing when they occur 
in their superlative forms, they are different properties. Something that is a bit pleasant need 
not also be good and beautiful. Something that is moderately beautiful need not be pleasant 
and good. Something that is somewhat good or good with some qualification need not be 
pleasant and beautiful. Only in the superlative case, the three properties go together.   
1, 2, and 3, combined with Coextension and Difference, express, in condensed form, 
much of what I explore in this dissertation, albeit not all of it. As I go along I will fine-tune 
my analysis of the relationship between the three values, and I will have more to say about 
the specifics of 1, 2, and 3. For now, however, I want to provide a sketch of 1, 2, and 3. 
For Aristotle, saying that happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most 
pleasant thing of all, is a way of saying that happiness is the final aim or the highest good of 
human life. That is, happiness displays all the values that matter in a human life. Throughout 
this dissertation, I argue that the entire EE can be read as an extended argument in favor of 
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the premises that constitute ST. Let me offer an overview of Aristotle’s arguments for the 
claims that happiness is the best, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant thing of all, 
starting with the claim that happiness is the best thing of all. In EE I, Aristotle says that 
happiness is the best thing of all because: (i) happiness is considered the best thing in 
common beliefs: most people think that happiness is the best;  (ii) happiness and not the 57
Form of the Good, as Plato says, is the best because it is the final aim of human life.   58
In EE I 1217 a 22, Aristotle says that it is agreed that happiness is the greatest and best 
of human goods. A few lines later, he adds that happiness is the best of the things that are 
achievable by human action (πρακτά). Aristotle refutes the Platonic claim that the Form of 
the Good is best by saying that: 
-  the Form of the Good is dialectical and empty (λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς) (1217 b 20); 
-  the good is said in many ways and there is no single science that studies the good in 
itself (1217 b 35); 
- there is no common good separated from the things that are good (1218 a 10-15); 
- the demonstration that the good itself (τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν) is the one because the 
numbers strive for unity is hazardous (1218 a 25);  
- the Form of the Good is not achievable by action (1218 a 25).  
As a conclusion to this refutation, Aristotle argues that happiness is what is best insofar 
as happiness, and not the Form of the Good, is “that for the sake of which” (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) we 
do everything else in life. Happiness is achievable by action, while the Form of the Good is 
not among the prakta. In other words, happiness is the final goal of human action. 
 EE 1217 a 20; Cf. NE 1095 a 20. 57
 EE 1217 b 1-1218 b 15; Cf. NE I.6.58
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Throughout the entire EE, Aristotle provides arguments to substantiate this claim. Cooper 
explains what Aristotle means by saying that happiness is “that for the sake of which”: 
happiness is the best insofar as when we are happy, all our desires are satisfied.  The 59
argument against Plato’s view that the greatest good is the Form of the Good comes up also 
in the NE.  However, in the NE, Aristotle’s argument that happiness is the best does not 60
follow from the refutation of the Platonic claim. In the NE, Aristotle focuses first on the 
good. Only as a second move does Aristotle say that happiness is the good. As Vogt argues, 
the NE seems to start with a metaethical question about the property of goodness. Only later 
on in NE I does Aristotle specify that ethics should focus on the practical good for human 
beings and this is happiness.  Conversely, in the EE, the focus is on happiness right from the 61
start of the treatise. That is, the claim “happiness is the best” is postulated already in the first 
lines of the treatise. Nevertheless, the refutation of the Platonic claim that the Form of the 
Good is the best comes up also in the EE as a divergent metaethical perspective, one that does 
not think of the good as practical and an object of desire, but as the Form of the Good. 
 Cooper 1975, p. 121. 59
 NE I.6. At the end of the argument, Aristotle explicitly says that we should conclude this discussion of the 60
Form of the Good and move to something else, namely to what he considers the greatest good: happiness.
 Cf. Vogt 2017, p. 47.61
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I now turn to the second claim of ST (2), that happiness is the most beautiful thing of 
all.  The first difficulty to substantiate this claim is that Aristotle does not offer a definition 62
of the beautiful in the EE or in the NE. However, in EE VIII.3 he speaks about “beautiful 
things,” in ways that supply at least some elements toward a definition of the beautiful. 
Namely, beautiful things are said to be not only praiseworthy in themselves, but also 
choiceworthy.  They contrast with good things, which are said to be (merely) praiseworthy 63
in themselves.  Hence, our working definition of the beautiful is: the beautiful is what is 64
praiseworthy in itself and also choiceworthy. And yet, this working definition opens up lots of 
questions regarding the relation or the distinction between the good and the beautiful. Is the 
beautiful also good? Does one property include the other? The answers to these and similar 
questions are difficult. To add to this difficulty, the translation of the Greek term kalon is 
controversial and not only because the term has in general a range of meanings. Beyond this, 
it is not clear that Aristotle uses it consistently throughout the EE. At times, kalon is fittingly 
 The translation of kalon is controversial. Irwin and Rowe translate “the fine” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 62
translated by T. Irwin, Hackett, 1999. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by C. Rowe and S. Broadie, 
Oxford University Press, 2002). Ross and Crisp translate “noble” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by D. 
Ross, 1925. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by R. Crisp, Cambridge University Press, 2000). According to 
D. Konstan, there is a difference between kallos and kalon. Konstan argues that kalon can express physical 
beauty, but this usage is rare, while kallos refers primarily to physical beauty. (D. Konstan, Beauty: the fortunes 
of an Ancient Greek idea, Oxford University Press, 2015). For the relevant semantic range in Aristotle, see 
Eudemian Ethics, 1230 b 20-39, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 b 3-11, Physics, 246 b, Politics, 1254 b 38-1255 a 6, 
Sophistical Refutations, 164 b 20 -26, Rhetoric, 1372 a 12-18. For a discussion of kalon in Aristotle, see K. 
Rogers, “Aristotle’s conception of to kalon,” Ancient Philosophy, 13, 1993; R. Kraut, “An aesthetic reading of 
Aristotle’s ethics,” in V. Harte, M. Lane, Politeia in Greek and Roman philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 
2013; G.R. Lear, “Aristotle on moral virtue and the fine,” in R. Kraut, Blackwell guide to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell Publisher, 2015; R. Crisp, “Nobility in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Phronesis, 
59, 2014, pp. 231-45; J. Tutuska, “Aristotle on the noble and the good: philosophical imprecision in the 
Nicomachean Ethics,” Ancient Philosophy, 33, 2013; T.H. Irwin, “The sense and reference of kalon in 
Aristotle,” Classical Philology, 105, 4, Special Issue on Beauty, Harmony and the Good, 2010, pp. 381-396; T. 
H. Irwin, “Beauty and morality in Aristotle,” in J. Miller, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a critical guide, 
Cambridge, 2011, pp.239-53. J. Cooper, “Reason, moral virtue and moral value,” in M. Frede, G. Striker (eds.), 
Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford, 1999); J.D. Monan, Moral knowledge and its methodology in Aristotle 
(Oxford, 1968). 
 EE 1248 b 17-21.63
 EE 1248 b 19.64
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translated “good.” At times, it is better to translate it as “beautiful.”  That is, while we are 65
aiming to arrive at some clarity about the difference between the good and the kalon, we must 
be explicit about the following: we are aiming to clarify the difference between two concepts 
and two properties, not about the difference between two words. To put this another way, I 
take it that ST refers, in talking about the good and the kalon, to two properties, even if at 
times “kalon” can be translated as “good.”  
In EE 1218 b 5, Aristotle says that the part of the good that does not concern action is 
beautiful. This idea occurs also in the Metaphysics.  And yet, Aristotle does not say that this 66
part of the good is the beautiful. This last claim would be in contrast with the idea that the 
beautiful and the good are two value-properties, albeit connected. More than that, it would be 
in contrast with the idea that the best agent acts for the sake of the beautiful.  To render 67
explicit how the beautiful relates to the good is almost impossible, given what Aristotle says 
on these two values. For present purposes it is enough to establish that, if the best agent acts 
for the sake of the beautiful, the beautiful must concern also actions.  This is confirmed by 68
Aristotle’s claim that when one acts aiming at the beautiful she acts virtuously. 
(T9) Virtue makes everyone choose for the sake of something, and this 
“something for the sake of which” is what is beautiful. That being so, it is clear 
that courage too, being a virtue, will make us endure what is fearful for the sake 
 Allan argues that in some passages of the EE, Aristotle seems to use the word kalon in an ambiguous way. 65
D.J. Allan, “The fine and the good in the Eudemian Ethics,” in P. Moraux, D. Harlfinger (eds.), Üntersuchungen 
zur Eudemischer Ethik,  De Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 63-72. Irwin argues that the beautiful has many opposites in 
Aristotle’s works, cf. T.H. Irwin, “The sense and reference of kalon in Aristotle,” Classical Philology, 105, 4, 
Special Issue on Beauty, Harmony and the Good, 2010, p. 382.
 Metaphysics, 1078 a 31.66
 EE III 1230 a 27-35. 67
 EE VIII 1248 b 35-38.68
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of something, and that will be due neither to ignorance (since virtue makes our 
judgments more correct) nor to pleasure, but because doing so is beautiful.   69
As Aristotle says, when we pursue virtuous action for its own sake, we do not have any 
external goal. In other words, we pursue virtuous actions because it is beautiful. This is why 
the beautiful is what is praiseworthy and choiceworthy in itself. And yet, why is happiness 
beautiful? Happiness is the most beautiful thing of all insofar as it is most of all chosen for its 
own sake. What is more, it is praiseworthy on its own account. In a related way, one may 
argue that it is beautiful because it is activity according to complete virtue. And acting 
virtuously is acting aiming at the beautiful.  To anticipate a conclusion that I discuss in the 70
section on complete virtue, this complete virtue is kalokagathia, which is the virtue of being-
beautiful-and-good. 
Finally, it is time to turn to (3), the claim that happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. 
As I mentioned already, Aristotle discusses three things that philosophers or poets consider 
worthy of choice: practical wisdom, virtue and pleasure. Aristotle says that philosophers or 
poets think that happiness consists in one of these three things. In book I, there is no definite 
answer to the question of which of these lives - the life of practical wisdom, of virtue and of 
pleasure - is the best. Aristotle states that we should first examine what practical wisdom and 
virtue are, and whether they are part of the best life. He says that pleasure will be discussed 
later. In particular, he says that it should be discussed whether there are pleasures other than 
the bodily pleasures that make someone happy and that are part of the best life:  
(T10) There is no need to investigate what these pleasures (bodily pleasures) are, 
but instead whether or not they contribute anything to happiness, how they do so, 
and whether these are the pleasures that should be connected with living 
beautifully, if in fact any pleasure should be connected with such a life; or is it 
 EE II 1230 a 27-35.69
 EE 1248 b 34-37, 1249 a 10-17, 1249 b 17-24. 70
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rather that one must share in pleasures in some other way, and that the pleasures 
reasonably supposed to give the happy person a life of pleasure, and not merely 
an absence of pain, are different ones. These matters must be examined later.  71
Aristotle takes into account various hypotheses: first of all, he considers whether bodily 
pleasures are part of the happy life. Second, he asks whether there are pleasures other than the 
bodily pleasures that contribute to the happy life. Third, he puts forward the idea that 
pleasures that come from absence of pain - what Plato calls restorative pleasures - are not the 
pleasures of the happy life. According to Plato, in the account that he offers in the Philebus, 
one way to conceive of pleasure is to think about the restored state that occurs after pain.  72
However, as Aristotle suggests, there may be pleasures not connected with pain. These 
pleasures seem to be included in the definition of pleasure in EE VI=NE VII (they are closer 
to pure pleasures, as Plato calls them in the Philebus). These pleasures are unimpeded 
activities according to our natural state; these are the pleasures of a happy life.  
Yet, besides the pleasure being an element of the happy life, why is happiness the most 
pleasant? Aristotle proposes what Rapp calls a “contingent identity.”  Pleasure is unimpeded 73
activity of our natural state. What is more, it is the sign of perfect activity and best agency. 
Happiness is an activity as well. It is complete and must be also unimpeded. One may argue 
that it is perfect insofar as it is complete and has its end in itself; it is the best activity a 
human being can desire and engage in. Aristotle classifies both pleasure and happiness as 
activities, and he claims that happiness is pleasure insofar as it is unimpeded activity 
according to our natural state. The conclusion of Aristotle’s argument that demonstrates what 
 EE 1216 a 33-1216 b 1.71
 Plato, Philebus 32b.72
 EE V, 1153 b 13-17. The expression contingent identity is used in C. Rapp, “NE VII. 13-14: pleasure and 73
Eudaimonia,” in  Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, book VII: Symposium Aristotelicum, C. Natali ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 209-237.
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I call the Pleasure Thesis, namely that happiness is the most pleasant thing of all, occurs at 
the end of the EE: 
(T11) We have, as well, discussed pleasure, stating what it is like and how it is 
good and that things which are pleasant simpliciter are also beautiful and that 
things which are good simpliciter are pleasant. And pleasure occurs only in 
acting, which is why the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly and why 
it is not pointless for people to value living pleasantly.  74
The passage comes up within the discussion of kalokagathia - the virtue of being-
beautiful-and-good. It may appear to be unrelated to what is discussed before or after the 
passage. However, if read together with the beginning of the EE and with ST, T11 is the 
conclusion of Aristotle’s argument that happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. 
7. Complete virtue 
It is now time to address an issue that has been postponed long enough: the analysis of 
another essential element in the definitions of happiness, namely complete virtue. The 
expression ἀρετὴ τελεία can be read in many ways.  It can be translated “complete virtue”, 75
“perfect virtue” or “final virtue.” In what follows, I show that the translation “complete 
virtue” fits better the view that Aristotle is defending in the EE. I translate τὴν τελειοτάτην 
ἀρετήν - which occurs in the NE’s definition of happiness - as “most complete virtue” in 
order to stress that Aristotle is indeed using the same adjective in the two treatises - albeit in 
the superlative in the NE. In the EE, the definition of happiness suggests that there is one 
complete virtue. In the NE, as the definition of happiness suggests, there is more than one 
 EE 1249 a 17-21.74
 Cf. J. Cooper, Reason and the Human Good (Indianapolis, 1986), p. 100; A. Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect 75
Life (Oxford 1992), p. 16; T. Irwin, “Conceptions of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in C. Shields (ed.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, 2012; P. Destrée argues that in the Metaphysics, teleios is connected to 
agathos (P. Destrée, “Bonheur et completude” in Aristote, bonheur et vertus, Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, 2003, p. 56). 
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complete virtue. That is, the expression “most complete and best” suggests that there is one 
virtue that is not only complete, but it is also the very best.  
Let us first examine completeness in the NE. The adjective teleios is difficult to 
translate and to understand. In NE 1097 a 25, Aristotle says that a thing is most complete - 
teleiotaton - if it is chosen always as an end and never as a means for something else. In NE 
1097 b 1, and in NE 1176 b 30, happiness is said to be teleiotaton. Happiness is teleiotaton 
because it is chosen for its own sake and for nothing else. It is, thereby, the ultimate or chief 
end, the end for the sake of which other ends are pursued. This is how completeness is 
explained if it is happiness - an activity - that is most complete. But what does it mean that a 
virtue is teleion? Let us consider some options. (i) A virtue can be complete if it does not lack 
any parts. In this sense, a virtue is complete if it is a whole with all its parts. (ii) A virtue can 
be complete insofar as it is by itself a final value, a value that is pursued for its own sake. My 
hypothesis is that we can distinguish two ways of understanding completeness: completeness-
qua-inherent-value and completeness-qua-unity-of-virtue. I submit that the first way applies 
to the discussion of complete virtue in the NE, while the second applies to the discussion of 
complete virtue in the EE. 
Cooper seems to understand complete virtue as explained in option (ii). Cooper argues 
that in the NE, the superlative - τελειοτάτην “most final,” as Cooper translates it - suggests 
that this virtue is the most final or the most complete in a special context, rather than the 
virtue that is a whole. According to Cooper, sophia is most final or most complete insofar as, 
as Cooper says, “it has its value in itself.”  Cooper says that actions according to the other 76
virtues “bring with them other goods,” while sophia and contemplation do not need other 
 Cooper p. 100.76
!38
goods.  In other words, sophia is the most final or most complete because it is the virtue of 77
the activity that most of all is chosen for its own sake - contemplation - and because it is the 
virtue of the most self-sufficient activity. In NE I, Aristotle does not make explicit what the 
connection between finality or completeness and self-sufficiency is. I will turn to this in a 
moment. Cooper adds that Aristotle does not say explicitly that happiness is activity 
according to sophia. Aristotle needs to leave room for two lives that in NE X are said to be 
happy lives: the life of contemplation and the life according to phronêsis and the character 
virtues. For this reason, Cooper says that it is not explicit that sophia is the best and most 
complete virtue. It becomes clear that it is the best and most complete virtue once we read 
book X, where Aristotle says that the life of phronêsis and of the character virtues is happy 
only in a secondary way.  
Irwin reaches a similar conclusion as Cooper, namely that this most complete and best 
virtue is sophia.  He argues that only theoretical activity - of which sophia is the virtue - 78
meets the two conditions outlined in book I, that is, that happiness is complete or final and 
self-sufficient. It is complete or final because it is chosen for its own sake and for nothing 
else. It is self-sufficient because self-sufficiency follows from completeness or finality. In 
book I, Aristotle does not explain how it follows from completeness or finality. Irwin argues 
that the idea is that “an end that leaves life lacking something could only be worth pursuing 
for an end that makes life lack nothing.”  Hence, insofar as happiness is pursued for its own 79
 Cooper, p. 100.77
 T. Irwin, “Conceptions of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 78
Aristotle, 2012. Cf. A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life (Oxford, 1992), p. 18.
T. Irwin, “Conceptions of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in C. Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 79
Aristotle, 2012.
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sake as final end, it must be self-sufficient (it must have αὐτάρκεια - self-sufficiency). Both 
Cooper and Irwin support the idea that in the NE completeness has to be understood as 
inherent value. This seems the most plausible way of reading completeness in this treatise. 
When he defines happiness, Aristotle says that it is activity according to the best and 
the most complete virtue. Let us examine more closely how we can understand “the best.” 
Similar considerations to the ones regarding completeness apply to “the best.” Cooper 
suggests that sophia is the best virtue insofar as it is the virtue of the best element in us. That 
is, as Aristotle suggests in NE X 1177 a 12, the capacity of contemplation. Irwin argues that 
sophia is the best virtue because theoretical study is the activity of the best part of human 
beings. Labarrière argues that the best virtue - the virtue that allows us to contemplate - is 
nous.  Once again, this is not explicit in book I. As I explained above, scholars are divided 80
between those who support the inclusive interpretation and those who support the dominant 
interpretation.  81
Let us turn to how complete virtue is understood in the EE. For Cooper, the expression 
ἀρετὴ τελεία, as it occurs in the definition of happiness in EE II 1219 a 39, suggests that there 
 Labarrière 2003.80
 Cf. P. Destrée, M. Zingano, Theoria, Studies on the Status and Meaning of Contemplation in Aristotle’s 81
Ethics, Peeters, 2014;   C.D.C. Reeve, Action, Contemplation and Happiness, Harvard University Press, 2012; 
A. Lännström, Loving the fine: virtue and happiness in Aristotle’s ethics, University of Notre Dame Press, 2006; 
G. Lear, Happy lives and the human good, Princeton University Press, 2004; R. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human 
Good, Princeton University Press, 1989, J.L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Proceedings of the British 
Academy 60, 1974, pp. 339-359. Lear, Cooper, Kenny and al. think that in the EE happiness includes ethical and 
theoretical virtuous activity. According to J. Cooper (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, Hackett Publishing, 
1975), the EE proposes an inclusive view of happiness insofar as it considers the individual as a complex of 
reason and emotion and not only an intellectual being. According to C.J. Rowe (The Eudemian and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 1971), there is an incongruity between 
happiness in NE I 7, X 7 and EE II 1. As Rowe says, in NE happiness is “the actuality of the virtue of the 
superior part of the soul” and in the EE it is the whole of virtue. Rowe says that in the NE, happiness seems to 
be mostly theoretical and in the EE, it seems to be practical and theoretical. Labarrière argues that happiness is 
activity according to nous (J.-L. Labarrière, “ Comment vivre la vie de l’esprit ou être le plus soi-même,” in P. 
Destrée, Aristote, bonheur et vertus, 2003, pp. 79-106).
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is a virtue which is a whole.  In order to clarify what complete and whole mean, let us look 82
at a passage in the Physics, where teleion is said to be very close in its nature to holon: 
(T12) That of which there is nothing left out (ἔξω), it is whole (ὅλον) or complete 
(τέλειον). For we define a whole precisely as that from which nothing is absent, 
for example, a ‘whole man or a whole chest.’ And as with particular wholes, so it 
is in the main sense (κυρίως) [for the whole that is not a part of something 
else]: the whole is that of which there is nothing left out; whereas that from which 
something, no matter what, is missing and left outside is not ‘all’ (ἀπῇ). And 
‘whole’ and ‘complete,’ if not altogether the same, are close in their nature, and 
nothing is complete (τέλειον) unless it has an end (τέλος); but an end is a limit.  83
Aristotle says that the whole or the complete is that from which nothing is left out. And 
he adds that complete and whole are close in their nature. This passage is key for my 
interpretation of complete virtue in the EE. Based on the definition of the whole and of 
completeness in the Physics, complete virtue must be the virtue from which nothing is left 
out. In other words, as also Cooper and Irwin argue, it is the virtue that includes all the other 
virtues. Let us examine some possible candidates for complete virtue mentioned in the 
definition of happiness. I chose these virtues as possible candidates either because Aristotle 
says that these virtues are complete or because scholars have argued that one of these virtues 
is complete virtue (mostly in relation to the NE, two exceptions are Cooper 1975 and Kenny 
1992 who also discuss complete virtue in the EE). These candidates are: megalopsychia, 
dikaiosunê, phronêsis, sophia and kalokagathia.  I turn first to views that seem clearly 84
unpromising - that complete virtue is megalopsychia, or dikaiosunê - and then to proposals 
that have greater plausibility - that complete virtue is phronêsis, sophia or kalokagathia. 
 Cf. Kenny 1992, p. 19. 82
 Physics 207 a 9-15. Translation by GB.83
 Décarie discusses complete virtue and considers as candidates justice, sophia and kalokagathia. V. Décarie, 84
“Vertu totale, vertu parfaite et kalokagathia dans l’Éthique à Eudème,” in Sens et Existence, G.B. Madison (ed), 
Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1975, pp. 60-76.
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Aristotle says that megalopsychia (greatness of soul) is the strongest virtue 
(κράτιστη),  and that it never occurs without kalokagathia.  And yet, Aristotle never calls 85 86
megalopsychia complete virtue. Megalopsychia functions with all the virtues. However, it is 
not clear what these virtues are. They seem to be the character virtues and practical wisdom.  87
Aristotle points out that megalopsychia is the adornment or the crown of the virtues. Scholars 
have debated how to understand this claim: they suggest that either megalopsychia is not a 
virtue at all, or it includes all the virtues and somehow it perfects them.  As Curzer argues, 88
for Aristotle, a philosophical notion of megalopsychia is an attempt to reconcile the Homeric 
virtue of grandeur with his new virtue of moderation.  Megalopsychia has a particular task: 89
it permits the person who possesses it to judge the big and the small in different fields. On 
similar grounds, it is a virtue that combines honor with self-knowledge. In the EE, Aristotle 
distinguishes a particular form of megalopsychia and a more general form of megalopsychia. 
If one possesses the general megalopsychia, this agent possesses all the virtues.  As Aristotle 90
says, this general form of megalopsychia occurs together with complete virtue. However, it is 
not the virtue that includes all the other virtues. In particular, it seems not to include the virtue 
 EE 1232 a 34.85
 NE 1123 a 8. 86
 P. Stover, “Moral virtue and megalopsychia,” Ancient Philosophy 23, 2003. M. Pakaluk, “The meaning of 87
Aristotelian magnanimity,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 26, 2004, pp. 265-8. R. Crisp, “Aristotle on 
Greatness of Soul,” in Blackwell guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell, 2006. 
 Curzer argues in favor of the first option. Cf. H.J. Curzer, “Megalopsychia and appropriate ambition,” in 88
Aristotle and the virtues, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 Cf. Curzer 2012.89
 EE 1232 b 23-25. Cooper argues that this distinction is introduced to solve the tension between 90
megalopsychia as the virtue of doing great deeds and the virtue of acting moderately. J.M. Cooper, Reason and 
Human Good in Aristotle, Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 196.
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of theoretical thinking. And for these reason, it cannot be the complete virtue mentioned in 
the definition of happiness. 
Aristotle calls dikaiosunê (justice) complete virtue.  As he explains, there are different 91
forms of justice: the highest form of justice is complete virtue. Justice is considered, as 
megalopsychia, the strongest of the virtues. However, Aristotle says that justice is complete 
virtue in a qualified sense and not simpliciter (ἀπλῶς).  He says that justice is a whole 92
(ὃλον).  One may argue that justice as a whole is the same thing as kalokagathia. Both 93
virtues seem to include all the other virtues. However, Aristotle does not say enough on 
justice as a whole to pursue this line of thought further. He focuses on the form of justice that 
is a part of virtue. Let us turn to more plausible candidates. 
Aristotle says that phronêsis (practical wisdom) always functions in conjunction with 
the character virtues.  For this reason, scholars speak of a unity of the virtues that includes 94
practical wisdom and character virtues. However, Aristotle does not say that practical wisdom 
includes all the virtues. One piece of evidence that speaks against the view that practical 
wisdom includes all the virtues is that Aristotle says that phronêsis prescribes (ἐπιτάττει) for 
the sake of theoretical wisdom.  That is, practical wisdom “serve” or “prepare the ground” 95
 EE=NE 1129 b 27. Cf. F. Masi, "Come un architetto sta a un calzolaio": la nozione aristotelica di giustizia 91
commutativa,” in Antiquorum Philosophia, vol. 10, 2016, pp. 123-149.
 EE=NE 1129 b 27-30.92
 EE=NE 1130 a 16.93
 EE=NE 1144 a 30; 1144 b 15.94
 EE=NE 1145 a 7; EE VIII 1249 b 15. The claim in EE VIII is that practical wisdom prescribes for the sake of 95
the divine. The claim is obscure: one way to read it is that practical wisdom prescribes for the theoretical 
capacity (mentioned a few lines before the passage). And the divine is the highest object of this capacity.
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for theoretical wisdom: sophia.  Practical wisdom cannot be the complete virtue mentioned 96
in the definition of happiness in the EE insofar as it does not include sophia. In addition, it is 
not the virtue of the most final or self-sufficient activity: it prescribes for the sake of sophia. 
And this seems enough to say that theoretical wisdom is more complete than practical 
wisdom. Let me draw attention to one passage in the Magna Moralia (MM) that explicitly 
confirms that practical wisdom is not complete virtue.  In MM 1184 a 34, Aristotle says that 97
practical wisdom is not complete because when one acquires it, she still wants and needs 
other things. Even though the attribution to Aristotle of the MM is contested, this passage 
excludes practical wisdom. 
Sophia (theoretical wisdom) is the virtue of theoretical contemplation. It is not clear 
whether sophia is the complete virtue mentioned in the EE’s definition of happiness. That is, 
sophia does not include the other virtues. However, it is the virtue of the most self-sufficient 
activity. In EE=NE 1144 a 1-6, Aristotle says that sophia is part of complete virtue and it 
produces happiness. This is the decisive argument that shows that sophia is part of complete 
virtue, but it is not the complete virtue mentioned in the EE’s definition of happiness. Insofar 
as EE=NE 1144 a 1-6 occurs in one of the so-called common books, it may also raise a 
problem for the interpretation of complete virtue in the NE. That is, if sophia is said to be part 
of complete virtue, how can it be the most complete virtue of the NE? The answer to this 
question is not clear. One way to solve the problem is to admit that the common books - or at 
least this passage - belong to the EE. Another way to read the passage is that sophia is indeed 
 In MM 1198 b 12-18, the author argues that practical wisdom is a steward of sophia.96
 Cf. Cooper 1975, p. 121.97
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the most complete part of complete virtue. However, in the NE, it remains unclear what this 
complete virtue is.  98
Kalokagathia is the virtue of being-beautiful-and-good, as I translate it, and it is 
discussed in detail in EE VIII.3.  It does not come up in the NE. In EE VIII.3, Aristotle calls 99
this virtue a whole (ὃλον); he says that it is composed of all the virtues discussed so far in the 
treatises.  In chapter II, I provide a detailed argument that kalokagathia includes all the 100
virtues.  For present purposes, I focus only on the idea that Aristotle calls this virtue a 101
whole and that this virtue is the complete virtue according to which happiness is the activity. 
In EE II.1, Aristotle says that virtue can be a whole - ὃλον - or a part:  102
(T13) Happiness, then, is the activity of the good soul. And since happiness is 
something complete, and a life can be complete or incomplete, and so too virtue 
(since it can be a whole or a part), and the activity of what is complete is itself 
complete, it follows that happiness would be the activity of a complete life in 
accordance with complete virtue.   103
In the passage, Aristotle says that happiness is complete (τελέον) in a complete life. He 
compares the happy life to virtue insofar as as life can be complete or incomplete, virtue can 
 Cooper argues that sophia is most final (teleion) insofar as the activity of contemplation does not need other 98
goods. However, he does not explain what the complete virtue of which theoretical contemplation is part is. Cf. 
Cooper 1975, p. 118. 
 EE VIII 1248 b 8-1249 b 25. 99
 EE VIII 1248 b 8-16.100
 Kenny, Buddensiek, Monan and Gastaldi argue that kalokagathia includes the virtues of thinking. Verdenius 101
and Moraux and Harlfinger argue that it does not include the virtues of thinking. 
 Defenders of the inclusive interpretation argue that the most complete virtue refers to all the virtues. A.A. 102
Long summarises the debate in Aristotle on eudaimonia, nous and divinity, in Aristotle’s NE, J. Miller (ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
 EE 1219 a 35-39. 103
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be complete or incomplete.  In other words, virtue can be a whole - ὃλον - or a part. Based 104
on this double occurrence of ὃλον - right before the definition of happiness and in the 
description of kalokagathia - and based on the similarity between ὃλον and τέλειον, 
kalokagathia seems to be the complete virtue we have been looking for. Evidences in favor of 
this claim are provided also by the examination and exclusion of other possible candidates for 
the role of complete virtue. In addition, Aristotle says that the agent who possesses 
kalokagathia is completely virtuous: this agent acts aiming at the beautiful, and for her, 
natural goods are not only good, but also beautiful.  This is a further reason for saying that 105
kalokagathia is complete virtue. 
8. Chapter Outline 
To conclude the Introduction, let me offer a sketch of each chapter. In this dissertation, I 
shed light on the distinctive proposal of the Eudemian Ethics by focusing on: (i) the analysis 
of a superlative excellence called kalokagathia and of (ii) the notion of natural goods, which 
do not figure in the Nicomachean Ethics; (iii) the function arguments in the EE, in the NE 
and in the Republic; and (iv) the role of pleasure in relation to happiness and to human 
agency. I argue that the agent who possesses kalokagathia is the best agent of Aristotle’s EE. 
This interpretive proposal has significant implications. Scholars tend to hold that the 
practically wise person, the phronimos, or the theoretically wise person, the sophos, are the 
 On happiness being complete and self-sufficient see N.O. Dahl, “Contemplation and eudaimonia in the NE,” 104
in J. Miller (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2011. C.D.C. Reeve, Action, contemplation and happiness, 
Harvard University Press, 2012. Aristotle distinguishes activities from processes: activities have their ends in 
themselves, they do not have external ends to reach in order to be complete. Conversely, processes have external 
ends. A process is complete only when it reaches its end. An activity is always complete when it is happening. 
J.B. Beere, “Being in energeia and being in capacity,” in Doing and being, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Aristotle uses the example of seeing: when we see a tree outside the window, we are seeing the tree and at the 
same time we have already seen it. The end happens at the same time of the activity: there is no temporal lack 
between the starting point of the activity and its end. The act itself of seeing is its end. In this sense, happiness is 
complete qua activity.
 EE VIII.3 1249 a 5, 1249 a16, 105
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best agents of the NE. If this is compelling, and if my reading of the EE is right, then the EE 
and the NE conceive differently of the best agent. This is salient in both treatises’ construal of 
the unity of the virtues. In the NE, the unity of the virtues includes the character virtues and 
phronêsis. In the EE, it additionally includes the virtues of theoretical thinking, or so I argue. 
As I have shown, the EE starts with what I call the Superlative Thesis (ST). Aristotle aims to 
show how these three kinds of value-properties combine in the best human life, rather than 
coming apart. The Pleasure Thesis (PT) is the most contested aspect of ST: happiness is the 
most pleasant thing of all. On my reading, Aristotle fully embraces PT. In laying out his 
proposal for the best human life, the Aristotle of the EE develops a distinctive kind of 
naturalism, which I call Natural Goods Naturalism. I reconstruct this position in two steps: by 
interpreting the EE’s function argument; and by exploring the notion of natural goods, which 
is central to the EE, but does not figure in the NE. In sum, my dissertation argues that the EE 
contains a distinctive and under-appreciated option within ancient ethics, and that it contains 
ideas that are relevant to today’s virtue ethics. 
In chapter II, I argue that in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle proposes a different best 
agent from the one of the Nicomachean Ethics, often considered the phronimos or the sophos. 
In the EE, the best agent is the kalos kagathos, the person who has kalokagathia. Closely 
related, I argue that in the EE, Aristotle proposes a strong version of the unity of the virtues: 
the person who is kalos kagathos has “all” the virtues. Kalokagathia is a whole and the 
virtues are its parts. I investigate how we should understand this whole and the relation 
between individual virtues within this whole. 
In chapter III, I reconstruct the notion of natural goods as this appears in the EE. I argue 
that Aristotle’s conception of natural goods provides an unexplored resource for a type of 
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ethical naturalism that I call Natural Goods Naturalism. I analyze what natural goods are and 
for whom they are good. On my reading, the expressions “natural goods” and “goods-
simpliciter” pick out the same goods. I depart from the long standing view that goods-
simpliciter are good for the good person. In the reading that I propose, goods-simpliciter, that 
is, natural goods, are good for the agent in what I call the standard state. The standard state is 
the state in which human beings are for the most part or by nature. 
In chapter IV, I analyze the Function Arguments (FAs) in Eudemian Ethics II 1218 b 
30- 1219 a 25, in Nicomachean Ethics I 1097 b 29- 1098 a 14, and in Plato’s Republic I 353 
e- 354 a. I provide a chart that compares the structure and the elements of the three 
arguments. I argue that the FAs in the EE and in the NE illuminate the discussions of the best 
life that occur at the end of the two ethics - respectively in NE X and in EE VIII. In the NE, 
the function (ergon) of the human being is activity according to reason and its best fulfillment 
is contemplation. In the EE, Aristotle focuses on the human soul. The function of the human 
soul is living and the best fulfillment of this function is activity according to all the parts of 
the soul that share in reason. 
In chapter V, I argue that the discussion of pleasure in EE VI (NE VII) is part of a larger 
argument in the EE that aims at proving PT. Contra Moss (2012), my analysis signals that 
Aristotle takes the pleasant to be an independent property and not an appearance of the good. 
I argue that the good and the pleasant are to be explained via a relation between the agent’s 
psychology and how things are going ‘in the world.’ The pleasant is not a mere appearance of 
the good, or in some other way derivative or dependent on the good. With respect to 




Kalokagathia and the unity of the virtues in the Eudemian Ethics 
In discussions of the NE, it is a central theme which kind of life Aristotle considers 
best. Two primary candidates are the life of contemplation on the one hand, and the life of 
politics on the other hand. At this point, scholars tend to argue that Aristotle considers the life 
of contemplation best.  On this view, the NE’s best agent is the sophos. Many contributions 106
that shaped virtue ethics and Aristotelian naturalism in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, however, 
focused on the political life, or in other words, on the ideal of character virtue combined with 
excellence in deliberation. In this context, it became customary to refer to the NE’s best agent 
as the phronimos.  Much research went into understanding what the phronimos knows, what 107
kind of affective and desiderative attitudes the phronimos has, and how the phronimos’ 
agency is different from the agency of the merely controlled or vicious agent.   108
Both interpretive positions come with views of the so-called unity of virtues, the idea 
that the set of virtues that the best agent possesses is unified. With respect to the person who 
 W.F.R. Hardie, “The final good in Aristotle’s ethics,” in Aristotle, J.M.E. Moravcisk (ed.), Palgrave 106
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phronimos, almost independently of the controversial question of whether the best life, according to the NE, is 
the life of theoria.
 For discussion of the ideal agent in the NE, see S. Drefcinski, “The fallible phronimos,” in Ancient 108
Philosophy, 16, 1996, pp. 139-153; H.J. Curzer, “How good people do bad things. Aristotle on the misdeeds of 
the virtuous,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 28, 2005, pp. 233-256; M. Hoffman, Der Standard des 
Guten bei Aristoteles. Regularität im Umbestimmten (Freiburg-Munich, 2010); R. Hursthouse, “What does the 
Aristotelian phronimos know?” In L. Jost, J. Wuerth (eds.) Perfecting virtues (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 38-57; I. 
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leads the life of theôria, the sophos, it is asked to what extent and how the virtues of an active 
political life are part of Aristotle’s ideal. It would seem that the sophos must also have the 
virtues of character; but the focus of her life is on theorizing. With respect to the life of 
politics, it is assumed that the person who has the virtues of character in a full or strict sense 
also has phronêsis - practical wisdom.  Both views, however, fall short of the claim I 109
ascribe to the Aristotle of the Eudemian Ethics (EE). The EE’s best agent, I argue, 
straightforwardly has all the virtues, in a sense that is not primarily geared toward theorizing 
or toward an active life in the polis.   
I argue that the best agent of the EE differs from the best agent of the NE (whether the 
latter is the sophos or the phronimos), to the extent that it seems advisable to refer to this 
agent by a different designation.  Possible candidates for the role of best agent, in addition 110
to the phronimos and to the sophos, are the spoudaios, the agathos, the epieikês, and the kalos 
kagathos. I propose that the best agent, as Aristotle conceives of this agent in the EE is the 
kalos kagathos: the person who possesses the distinctive and complex quality of being good-
and-beautiful (kalokagathia).  The agent who possesses kalokagathia is not merely good 111
(spoudaios or agathos), or decent (epieikês), or practically wise (phronimos). She is also not 
primarily a theorizer. She possesses all the virtues, without the weighing and prioritizing that 
 Scholars debate whether phronêsis is understood in exactly the same ways in the EE and in the NE. W. 109
Jaeger, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin, 1923); C. Rowe, The Eudemian 
and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle’s Thought, Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society, Supplement 3, 1971; A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford, 1978, 2016).
 Relevant Greek terms are often employed in the masculine form; for this reason the transition to feminine 110
forms (as today we often employ in philosophical discussion) can be confusing. Moreover, Aristotle’s own 
views on women and men make it unlikely that he thinks of an account of the best agent as gender neutral. 
Nevertheless, for the most part I seek to employ gender neutral expressions. 
 F. Dirlmeier translates the term with the German expression “die Schön-und-Gutheit” (F. Dirlmeier, 111
Aristoteles: Eudemische Ethik  (Berlin, 1962). Similarly, P. Donini translates it as “bontà e bellezza morale” (P. 
Donini, Aristotele: Etica Eudemia (Roma-Bari, 1999). B. Inwood and R. Woolf translate it as “nobility” (B. 
Inwood, R. Woolf, Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics (Cambridge, 2012).
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is involved in either leading a life of contemplation or of theory. Namely, she possesses 
character virtues and all the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking and she thereby 
enjoys happiness as defined at the beginning of the EE.   112
In the first sentence of the EE, Aristotle advances a programmatic claim: that happiness 
is the best, most beautiful, and most pleasant thing of all (Superlative Thesis). The best agent 
of the EE, the kalos kagathos, possesses happiness in this sense. That is, this agent exhibits a 
complex but unified set of virtues and likewise, the agent’s happiness exhibits a complex but 
unified set of value properties. Kalokagathia can be compared to happiness insofar as both 
have superlative value: kalokagathia is the best of the virtues and happiness is the best 
activity. To capture the idea of superlative value, I call kalokagathia a superexcellence. My 
analysis of kalokagathia helps reconstruct the distinctive project of the EE by tying together 
the beginning and the end of the treatise: kalokagathia corresponds, on the level of virtue, to 
the way in which the Aristotle of the EE conceives of eudaimonia, happiness. The discussion 
of the perfect agent is fundamental to Aristotle’s project in the EE: by claiming that the kalos 
kagathos is the agent who possesses all the virtues, Aristotle argues that excellent thinking 
and excellent action go together and are both necessary for being the best agent. 
I start by analyzing a text that is fundamental for my argument and that occurs toward 
the end of the treatise, EE VIII.3 1248 b 8-15. On my reading, Aristotle states that the 
individual virtues as discussed throughout the EE are parts of a superexcellence called 
kalokagathia (section 1). This superexcellence is a whole with parts (section 2). Based on my 
analysis of EE VIII.3, I turn to the specifics of how we should conceive of this ideal of 
unified, complete, and superlative virtue. Both in the best agent and in agents who are 
 EE I 1214 a 7-8.112
!51
virtuous in lesser ways, I argue, the virtues of character depend on the virtues of thinking 
(section 3). Next I explore a claim that is shared between the NE and the EE, namely that 
practical wisdom and the character virtues mutually entail each other (section 4). The final 
steps in my argument take me to the virtues of theoretical thinking. I defend the view that 
kalokagathia includes nous (section 5) as well as sophia and epistêmê (section 6), and I refute 
the concern that, according to Aristotle, some theoretically wise persons lack practical 
wisdom (section 7). 
1. Kalokagathia and its relation to particular virtues 
EE VIII.3 contains the most extensive Aristotelian discussion of kalokagathia.  113
Aristotle uses this notion to refer to the best kind of excellence a person can attain. The term 
kalokagathia may suggest that this superexcellence combines two excellences: being 
beautiful (kalon) and being good (agathon). However, Aristotle uses the term simply to 
express superlative excellence. What this superlative excellence amounts to, then, is a matter 
of his substantive ethical proposals. In the spirit of this analysis, my translation of kalon is 
intended as technical. It captures no more and no less than the idea that the kalon is, as 
Aristotle puts this, choiceworthy for itself and praiseworthy for its own sake (EE VIII.3 1248 
b 19-21). In other words, though I speak of the “beautiful,” I do not mean to pick out the 
aesthetic domain or physical beauty in particular. Instead I use “beautiful” as a placeholder 
for the wide semantic range that the term has in Aristotle, including “noble,” “fine,” “fitting,” 
 Outside the EE, kalokagathia is discussed in ways that resemble the EE discussion in Magna Moralia (1207 113
b 20-1208 a 4). The term kalokagathia occurs twice in the Nicomachean Ethics (1124 a 4, 1179 b 10), though 
here it does not seem at all fundamental for Aristotle’s project, as well as once in the Rhetoric (1424 a 17) and 
once in the Politics (1259 b 34). 
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and more.  In effect, on my reading the superexcellence of kalokagathia consists in the 114
possession of all the virtues, rather than to the combined possession of beauty and goodness. 
This is explicitly stated when Aristotle introduces kalokagathia. At the beginning of the 
final chapter of the treatise - EE VIII.3 1248 b 8-15 - Aristotle remarks that individual virtues 
have been discussed throughout the treatise (κατὰ µέρος µὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς 
εἴρηται). Translated literally, Aristotle says that up to now he discussed each individual virtue 
qua part, or that he proceeded “part by part” (κατὰ µέρος) in addressing each individual 
virtue.  Given that the question of the unity of the virtues, and thereby the question of parts 115
and wholes, shall concern us, we need to attend carefully to this transition. What we need to 
get clear about is the sense in which particular virtues are each by themselves excellences, 
while at the same time they are (or can be studied as) parts. The mere fact that the virtues are 
analyzed individually earlier in the treatise suggests that, up to a point, they are self-standing. 
They can be studied as individual virtues without this being misleading or confused. Only 
now, toward the end of the treatise, Aristotle signals that they can also be viewed as parts. 
 The translation of kalon is controversial. Irwin and Rowe translate “the fine” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 114
translated by T. Irwin, Hackett, 1999. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by C. Rowe and S. Broadie, 
Oxford University Press, 2002). Ross and Crisp translate “noble” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by D. 
Ross, 1925. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by R. Crisp, Cambridge University Press, 2000). According to 
D. Konstan, there is a difference between kallos and kalon. Konstan argues that kalon can express physical 
beauty, but this usage is rare, while kallos refers primarily to physical beauty. (D. Konstan, Beauty: the fortunes 
of an Ancient Greek idea, Oxford University Press, 2015). For the relevant semantic range in Aristotle, see 
Eudemian Ethics, 1230 b 20-39, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 b 3-11, Physics, 246 b, Politics, 1254 b 38-1255 a 6, 
Sophistical Refutations, 164 b 20 -26, Rhetoric, 1372 a 12-18. For a discussion of kalon in Aristotle, see K. 
Rogers, “Aristotle’s conception of to kalon,” Ancient Philosophy, 13, 1993; R. Kraut, “An aesthetic reading of 
Aristotle’s ethics,” in V. Harte, M. Lane, Politeia in Greek and Roman philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 
2013; G.R. Lear, “Aristotle on moral virtue and the fine,” in R. Kraut, Blackwell guide to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell Publisher, 2015; R. Crisp, “Nobility in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Phronesis, 
59, 2014, pp. 231-45; J. Tutuska, “Aristotle on the noble and the good: philosophical imprecision in the 
Nicomachean Ethics,” Ancient Philosophy, 33, 2013; T.H. Irwin, “The sense and reference of kalon in 
Aristotle,” Classical Philology, 105, 4, Special Issue on Beauty, Harmony and the Good, 2010, pp. 381-396; T. 
H. Irwin, “Beauty and morality in Aristotle,” in J. Miller, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a critical guide, 
Cambridge, 2011, pp.239-53. J. Cooper, “Reason, moral virtue and moral value,” in M. Frede, G. Striker (eds.), 
Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford, 1999); J.D. Monan, Moral knowledge and its methodology in Aristotle 
(Oxford, 1968). 
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The individual virtues are now discussed insofar as they are parts of kalokagathia. This 
leaves us with the following hypothesis: Aristotle conceives of the particular virtues both as 
virtues in their own right, and as parts of a comprehensive kind of excellence that he calls 
kalokagathia. Insofar as the particular virtues seem to have a certain level of separateness—
sufficient to make their discussion qua individual virtues plausible—I shall assume that the 
EE’s unity of the virtues is, indeed, a unity of the virtues. In other words, the relevant unity is 
not simply virtue in the singular.  Here, then, is the text where Aristotle signals the 116
transition from discussing the virtues individually to discussing the virtue that includes all of 
them: 
(T1) We have spoken earlier about each virtue qua part (κατὰ µέρος µὲν οὖν περὶ 
ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον); but since we have separately distinguished the 
capacity of each of them, we have to discuss the virtue composed by them, which 
we already referred to as being-beautiful-and-good. Now it is evident that 
whoever truly has this appellation must have the  individual virtues (τὰς κατὰ 
µέρος ἀρετάς). For it cannot be otherwise in other cases, either. For no one is 
healthy in his body as a whole (ὅλον), yet not in any part (µέρος) of it; rather, all 
parts, or most parts and the most important ones, should be in the same state as 
the whole (ὅλῳ).  117
Before I say more about the relevant notions of parts and whole, let me address the 
scope of “by them” in T1. Aristotle says that kalokagathia is composed “by them” (ἐκ 
τούτων), where τούτων refers to the virtues mentioned in the first line of T1. Given that 
Aristotle refers back to the virtues that were previously discussed in the EE, I take it that ἐκ 
τούτων in effect means “by all of these” insofar as Aristotle says that “we have spoken earlier 
about each virtue qua part.” He refers to all the virtues that have been discussed in the earlier 
 The question of whether we should speak about virtue in the singular or about virtues in the plural comes up 116
in Plato’s dialogues. In the Meno, Socrates says that even though the virtues are many, all of them have one and 
the same form (72 d). In the Republic, Plato argues that justice is the harmony of all the parts of the soul (443 d). 
In this sense, all the virtues are forms of justice.
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books of the treatise, and these are all the virtues of thinking and of character (EE II.1, III, 
and V). That is, ἐκ τούτων refers to the character virtues and to the virtues of practical and 
theoretical thinking. Insofar as in T1, Aristotle says that kalokagathia is composed by these 
virtues - ἐκ τούτων - we can conclude that kalokagathia is composed by all the virtues 
discussed in the treatise.  
Against my reading, someone could raise the objection that Aristotle explicitly backs 
away from the claim that kalokagathia comprises all virtues. His comparison with health says 
that, for someone’s body to be healthy as a whole, all or most or the most important parts of 
the body must be healthy. By analogy, this means that for someone to have kalokagathia she 
must be virtuous in all or most or the most important parts of the soul; or in other words, she 
must have all or most or the most important parts of virtue. Doesn’t this permit for cases in 
which the person who is kalos kagathos precisely does not have all the virtues, as I say she 
does? 
Let’s dwell for a moment on the example of health. When we ascribe health to 
someone, we typically refer to the person as a whole. We may say that someone is healthy 
after she recovered from a particular illness, say, a fever. But if only the fever had 
disappeared, and the person still did not feel well, we would not say “she is healthy.” We only 
say “she is healthy” when the person as a whole has recovered. This need not mean that the 
person is perfectly healthy in every possible respect. Instead, we take “she is healthy” to be 
true if all or most or the most important parts of the body are healthy. Being healthy is a 
quality of the whole, i.e. the body, and in this sense, it is a self-standing quality. However, the 
quality of the whole cannot exist if it does not exist in all or most or the most important of the 
parts. In the case of being healthy, the well-functioning of the individual parts - all, most or 
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the most important ones - of the body and their co-functioning produce the state of being 
healthy.  
Now suppose the person who recovered from an illness is mildly allergic to some rare 
food. Hence she is not perfectly healthy. Still, once she recovered from her illness we will say 
“she is healthy.” This is the kind of case that is covered by saying that one is healthy when 
one is healthy in most or the most important parts. In the case of kalokagathia, the same 
“relaxed” all-quantifier (as we may put this) applies in analogous fashion. Suppose someone 
has all the virtues. This includes that she is courageous. Now suppose she has a mild fear of 
some harmless spider. The perfectly courageous person would not have this fear. And yet, if 
this mild fear is the only way in which someone falls short with respect to any of the virtues, 
she can count as having kalokagathia. The relaxed all-quantifier makes Aristotle’s notion of 
kalokagathia somewhat flexible.  It signals that Aristotle is not concerned with an abstract 
ideal. He is concerned with an ideal that “real” agents can strive for. And yet, the relaxed all-
quantifier does not make this ideal any less demanding with a view to the scope of the 
relevant excellences. Just as a person who is healthy in the most important parts of her body 
cannot lack health in any vital organs or other fundamental respects, the person who has 
superexcellence cannot lack any of the main virtues—and those are the virtues of character, 
of practical thinking, and of theoretical thinking.  
2. Kalokagathia as unified and complete virtue 
The comparison between health and kalokagathia addresses, moreover, another 
dimension of the kind of property we are concerned with. Namely, we may wonder whether 
kalokagathia is (i) additive, (ii) scalar, or (iii) on-off, as I shall put this. According to (i), an 
agent is more or less kalos kagathos depending on how many of the individual virtues she 
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has. The more of them she possesses, and the better they interact, the more is kalos kagathos. 
According to (ii), agents can have all the virtues, and yet have this unified state to greater and 
lesser degrees. According to (iii), kalokagathia is a whole that is constituted only if a certain 
threshold is reached, such that the person has all, most, or the most important individual 
virtues and the virtues co-function in relevant ways (more on which below). On the view that 
I am here proposing, (iii) is most plausible. We do not call a person healthy if only we can 
enumerate a number of organs, etc., of hers, that are healthy; this leaves too much space for 
her not being healthy after all. The additive option, thus, is not compelling. We do call people 
more or less healthy, as the scalar option has it. And yet this is not the way of ascribing health 
that Aristotle envisages here. Instead, he invokes ascriptions of health where we say, without 
qualification, that someone is healthy. The scalar option, then, does not seem interpretively 
right either. Instead, the thought seems to be that if the conditions of the parts of a whole hit a 
threshold, then the body is healthy and, respectively, the person is kalos kagathos.  
As in the healthy body the main organs and the main parts of the body interact in such a 
way that the result is an healthy individual, in the case of kalokagathia, the main parts of the 
soul and their corresponding virtues need to be in place, interact, and co-function. What are 
the main parts of the soul and the corresponding virtues? The main parts of the soul are those 
that for Aristotle are distinctively human insofar as they partake in or inherently relate to 
reason.  These are the parts that Aristotle distinguishes from the vegetative, generative and 118
nutritive parts that also animals have.  The virtues of the parts that partake in reason are the 119
virtues of thinking; the virtues of the parts that inherently relate to reason - being able to 
 Cf. S. Sauvé Meyer, “Proceeding to clarity about virtue: the methods of ethics in EE 2.1-2 118
(1219b26-1220a20),” forthcoming contribution to the Symposium Aristotelicum on EE II.
 EE II 1219 b 25-32.119
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“listen” and “obey” (πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν) - are the virtues of character.  Together, these 120
virtues can be considered the most important ones insofar as they are the virtues of parts of 
the distinctively human soul. We need these virtues in order to have kalokagathia, in the same 
way in which we need the main organs to be healthy in order for the body to be healthy as a 
whole. For this reason, the agent cannot lack any of these virtues.  
If kalokagathia is an on-off state, as I argued it is, it is metaphysically a blend as 
opposed to an aggregate. By this I mean that one does not become kalos kagathos by 
accumulating more and more positive traits. Instead, the very way in which one’s positive 
traits inter-relate gives rise to a self-standing property that one either has or does not have. In 
T1, Aristotle describes kalokagathia as a whole (ὅλον), and throughout my analysis so far I 
invoked this idea. To conclude my discussion of T1, let me draw attention to the way in 
which wholeness relates to completeness. In an enigmatic passage in EE II.1, Aristotle 
mentions complete virtue - aretê teleia.  121
(T2) Since happiness is something complete, and a life can be complete or 
incomplete, and so too virtue (since it can be a whole or a part), and the activity 
of what is incomplete is itself incomplete, it follows that happiness would be the 
activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue.   122
Happiness, Aristotle says, is activity in accordance with complete virtue. Aristotle does 
not specify what complete virtue is and the translation of aretê teleia is controversial. Instead 
of translating “complete virtue,” as I do, we could speak of “perfect” or perhaps even of 
“final virtue.” I take it that, in a side-remark, Aristotle here anticipates ideas to which he turns 
 EE II 1220 a 7-12.120
 On kalokagathia as perfect virtue, cf. A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life (Oxford, 1992), p. 94. Arius 121
Didymus describes kalokagathia as aretê teleia.
 EE II 1219 a 35-40.122
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only in EE VIII.3: he says that virtue can be a whole or a part. This is the thought we 
encountered before, that the virtues can be discussed as particular virtues, and that they can 
be studied as parts of virtue as a whole. I take it, further, that the way in which Aristotle here 
ties together wholeness and completeness means that virtue as a whole is complete virtue. 
That is, complete virtue is kalokagathia.  In EE VIII.3 1249 a 17, Aristotle explicitly says 123
that kalokagathia is aretê teleia. 
Let me sum up my interpretation of T1 in its immediate context toward the end of the 
EE. Kalokagathia is superlative and complete excellence. It is a whole with parts. Its parts are 
all the virtues that were discussed in the EE up to this point—that is, the character virtues as 
well as the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. This is my most general proposal, and 
throughout the chapter I shall invoke T1 in its support. My argument, however, does not end 
here. Though on my reading T1 clearly states the view that I ascribe to Aristotle, more work 
needs to be done. We need to elucidate how precisely Aristotle conceives of superlative 
excellence and, respectively, of the unity of the virtues. 
3. Unity of the virtues and unity of the soul 
Before I turn to the parts of kalokagathia, and of the EE’s unity of the virtues, let me 
prepare the ground with some considerations on how the parts of the soul, and their 
corresponding virtues, relate. The unity of the virtues, as Aristotle conceives of it in the EE, is 
not a unity of virtue in the singular, as we saw. It is not the claim that there is only one such 
thing as virtue, an agent’s unified excellent state of mind. It is also not the claim, later 
 None of the other candidates for the role of complete virtue - phronesis, megalopsuchia, sophia and justice - 123
includes all the virtues in quite the same way in which kalokagathia does.
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defended by the Stoics, that for an agent to have one virtue she must have all the virtues.  124
What, then, is the claim? Though the virtues can be studied individually, and though 
particular agents may have this or that virtue to a greater degree, failing to have other virtues 
to the same degree, there is an ideal case—the case of the kalos kagathos—where the agent 
has all the virtues such that they constitute a whole. My aim in this chapter is to explore this 
ideal case. But I should address briefly why even instances of virtue that fall short of this 
ideal are not entirely fragmented. In other words, even in agents who are not kaloi kagathoi 
the particular virtues cooperate and support each other to some extent. This is, simply and 
fundamentally, because the virtues are excellent activities of parts of the soul, and the parts of 
the soul are de facto—not only ideally—related. In EE II.1, Aristotle says: 
(T3) Next we must consider the soul, since virtue belongs to the soul, and not 
incidentally. Since we are looking for human virtue, let us assume that there are 
two parts of the soul that partake in reason, but do not both partake in reason in 
the same way. One does so by giving commands, the other because it is by nature 
such as to obey and listen.  125
In T3, Aristotle has not yet distinguished between character virtues and virtues of 
thinking. He distinguishes two parts of the soul that partake in reason: the part that commands 
and the part that obeys and listens (πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν). All in all, the soul comprises 
more. It has three parts: two that, each in its own way, partake in reason and one that is 
irrational to the extent that its activities do not relate to reason. For present purposes we can 
set the latter aside. Only those parts of the soul that can be active in better or worse way are 
relevant for an account of virtue; and the part of the soul that is shared with plants and 
animals is not of this kind. The virtues of character, as Aristotle points out later, belong to the 
 On these as well as further options that are stronger than the view I ascribe to the EE, cf. K. Vogt, “The 124
Stoics on virtue and happiness,” in C. Bobonich (ed.), The Cambridge Companion of Ancient Ethics 
(Cambridge, 2017), pp. 183-199.
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part of the soul that obeys and listens; the virtues of thinking belong to the part of the soul 
that commands.  In this description of what the parts of the soul do - command and obey - 126
and in assigning the virtues of character and of thinking to these two parts respectively, 
Aristotle establishes a hierarchical relation. The part that strictly speaking possesses reason is 
by nature such as to command. The part that merely shares in reason via its relationship to the 
former can obey and listen. If a person is virtuous, the parts of the soul engage in these 
activities in excellent ways. That is, in the virtuous person, it is on account of the virtues of 
thinking that reason lives up to its commanding nature. And it is on account of the virtues of 
character that the part that can obey and listen in fact obeys and listens to the commands of 
reason. 
But though he analyzes the activities and the roles of these parts of the soul, Aristotle 
says that they cannot be separated: he compares them to the convex and the concave.  This 127
comparison provides us with a minimal yet fundamental claim about the unity of the virtues. 
We can distinguish among parts of the soul. But we cannot separate the parts of the soul from 
each other. Given their relation qua parts of the soul, their activities are ipso facto 
intertwined. This leaves much room for imperfection, since in a given person the activities of 
some part of the soul may be better than the activities of another part of the soul. However, it 
does mean that in every case of an agent possessing some virtues to some extent, the relevant 
(imperfect) activities in one way or another bear on each other.  
The so-called Function Argument, as it is outlined in book II of the EE, portrays the 
soul as a unity. In NE I.7, Aristotle asks “what is the function of human beings?” In response, 
 EE II 1220 a 10-12.126
 EE II 1219 b 35.127
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he analyzes those activities that are characteristic of humans rather than shared with plants or 
animals.  By analyzing several activities that are characteristic of humans, he prepares the 128
ground for the distinction between the virtues of character, the virtues of practical thinking, 
and the virtues of theoretical reasoning. In the EE, Aristotle asks a slightly different question, 
namely “what is the ergon (function, task, or job) of the human soul?”  By putting things 129
this way, he focusses on the soul as a unity. The function of the human soul, Aristotle argues, 
is living. “Living,” here, is one activity, just as “living well” is what ethics ultimately is 
about. And living, as well as living well, involves all parts of the soul. The difference 
between both arguments is subtle, and deserves deeper treatment than I will provide in 
chapter IV. For now, I only want to draw attention to the fact that Aristotle, though he 
distinguishes between parts of the soul, examines the function of the soul as a whole. 
So far, then, we are considering a minimal unity of the virtues that resides in the unity 
of the soul. We can formulate a richer version of this minimal unity by attending to the soul’s 
hierarchical structure. As we saw, the parts of the soul co-function in a hierarchical manner; 
their relation is as it should be if reason commands and the ruled part listens. This is a theme 
to which Aristotle returns in Book VIII of the EE, that is, the book I am specifically 
concerned with in analyzing kalokagathia (EE VIII.1 1246 b 12 and EE VIII.3 1249 b 5-10). 
Here Aristotle describes the relation in terms of “use”: the virtue of the ruling part uses the 
virtue of the ruled part (ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχοµένου χρῆται). We should live 
depending on the commander (πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν). Aristotle employs the comparison with a 
slave and a master: we should live depending on the commander as a slave depends on the 
 NE I 1098 a 14.128
 EE II 1219 a 23-25. The Greek word, which is usually translated with function, is ἔργον. The Greek term 129
conveys the idea that the ἔργον of something is its job, or its task. 
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master. He points out that human beings are composed of a part which is a commander and of 
a part that is commanded (συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ άρχοµένου).  The commander and 130
the commanded parts are the two parts that partake in reason respectively by commanding 
and by obeying and listening, as they are described in EE II.1.  
Given this relationship, it is a first and fundamental step toward virtue to have one’s 
commanding and obeying parts of the soul indeed in these positions—in other words, to have 
the general normative structure of one’s soul intact, even if imperfectly and inconsistently, as 
in the akratic agent who at given occasions fails to listen to what she recognizes as best. In 
effect, this means that even in agents who are not perfectly virtuous there is some measure of 
cooperation between the parts of the soul. Again, akratic agents can serve as an illustration. 
Though they fail to do what reason tells them is best, it is by reason that they determine what 
is best and they attempt to have affective attitudes that obey reason. Throughout the rest of 
the chapter, I will be interested in excellence that goes beyond this, indeed, in excellence of 
the best kind. This superlative excellence involves the fundamental ruling relation in the soul. 
And it involves more, namely excellent activities with respect to literally all the virtues. 
 ΕΕ VIII 1249 b 10.130
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4. Mutual entailment of practical wisdom and character virtues 
Scholars have been greatly interested in the relation between phronêsis and the 
character virtues.  In EE V.13 1145 a 1, Aristotle explicitly says that when one possesses 131
practical wisdom, one also has all the character virtues. That is, Aristotle seems to propose 
the unity of the character virtues and practical wisdom. This is how the unity of the virtues in 
Aristotle is standardly understood. To describe this relation between character virtues and 
practical wisdom scholars speak of mutual entailment. That is, if an agent has practical 
wisdom, she has also the character virtues. The reverse is also true: if someone has the 
character virtues, she has practical wisdom. This is supported by material that is shared 
between the EE and the NE. Namely, Aristotle argues that habituation of pleasure and pain 
attitudes – say, the habituation relevant to acting courageously – must combine with 
excellence in deliberation for an agent to be fully virtuous, deciding on the right action in any 
given situation.  In one of the so-called common books - books that the EE shares with the 132
NE - Aristotle says: 
 The passage scholars tend to discuss when they defend the unity of character virtues and phronêsis is in the 131
common books: 1144 b 33-1145 a 3. The claim that if one has one virtue, she has all virtues is shared by all 
schools in antiquity (for Plato, see Protagoras 329b–334c, 349a–362a; Gorgias 506d–507c; Republic IV 428a–
444e. For the Stoics, see Arius Didymus, in Stobaeus, Anthology II 5b5; Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII 126; 
Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1046e–f. For Epicurus, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives X 132). Scholars 
understand the unity of the virtues in the NE as the unity of character virtues and phronêsis. Cf. D.C. Russell, 
“Phronêsis and the virtues,” in R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s NE (Cambridge, 
2014), pp. 203-221; T. Irwin, “Disunity in the Aristotelian virtues,” in J. Annas and R. Grimm (eds.), Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1988), pp. 61-78); E. Halper, “The unity of virtues in Aristotle,” in 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XVII, 1999, pp. 115-144). Cf. N.O. Dahl, Practical reason, Aristotle and 
weakness of will (University of Minnesota, 1984);  N. Badhwar, “The limited unity of virtues,” Nous, XXX, 3, 
1996, pp. 306-329; B. Kent, “Moral growth and the unity of the virtues,” in D. Carr, J. Steutel, Virtue ethics and 
moral education (London, 1999), pp. 109-24; C. Natali, The wisdom of Aristotle (Albany, 2001); S. Gardiner, 
Virtue ethics old and new (Ithaca, 2005); D. Russell, Practical intelligence and the virtues (Oxford, 2009); J. 
Annas, “Virtues and the unity of the virtues,” in Intelligent Virtue (Oxford, 2011), pp. 83-100. For a detailed 
discussion of the role of the virtues of thinking, see M. DePaul, L. Zagzebski, Intellectual Virtue (Oxford, 2003); 
A. Kosman, Virtues of thought (Harvard, 2014).
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(T4) In the domain of opinion there are two forms (cleverness and practical 
wisdom), so too in the domain of character there are two: the one is natural virtue 
and the other is virtue proper, and virtue proper requires practical wisdom. That is 
why some people say that the virtues are forms of practical wisdom; Socrates was 
in a way investigating virtue correctly, but in another way he was wrong. He was 
wrong in that the thought that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom, but 
he was right to claim that they require practical wisdom.   133
In the domain of character, Aristotle says, we can distinguish between natural virtue 
and virtue proper. Only virtue proper, or virtue strictly speaking, requires practical wisdom. 
He adds that it is not correct to think of character virtues as forms of practical wisdom, as 
Socrates did by arguing that all the virtues are forms of knowledge. Yet, character virtues 
require practical wisdom. This speaks for entailment, though not yet in favor of mutual 
entailment. So far we only have the claim that the character virtues require practical wisdom. 
Right after T4, however, it becomes clear that there is indeed mutual entailment: 
(T5) It is clear from what has been said that it is not possible to be good in the 
proper sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without ethical 
virtue.  134
Here Aristotle states that the agent who has the character virtues has also practical 
wisdom and vice versa. In other words, there is mutual entailment among character virtues 
and practical wisdom. One cannot be ethically good (that is, good in the sense of the 
character virtues) without practical wisdom, and one cannot be practically wise without the 
character virtues. T4 and T5 invoke a distinction between natural virtue and virtue in a strict 
 EE V=NE VI 1144 b 15-22.133
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sense.  The notion of natural virtues is disputed.  Depending on one’s interpretation, one 135 136
may think of them as the positive traits that individuals have simply by being born with a 
certain temperament, combined perhaps with the impact of living in a given location at a 
given time.  At the other end of a spectrum of interpretations, one may argue that natural 137
virtues are the character virtues as far as they can be possessed by themselves, without 
phronêsis. Either way, an agent possesses character virtues in the full or strict sense only if 
practical wisdom is also present, and the other way around.  I assume that the mutual 138
entailment of practical wisdom and character virtues is shared between the EE and the NE. T4 
and T5 occur in the common books, which I consider an integral part of the EE. I now turn to 
two passages - T6 and T7 - one occurring in the common books and the other at the end of 
EE VIII. T6 and T7 speak in favor of the idea that mutual entailment is defended as a central 
claim also in the undisputed books of the EE:  
(T6) Since we have in fact already said that one must choose the mean, and not 
the excess or the deficiency, and since the mean is as correct reasoning says it is, 
let us make some distinctions here. In all the states discussed, just as in other 
matters, there is a target which the rational person looks to as he intensifies and 
relaxes (ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν), and there is a defining limit (ὅρος) for the mean 
states, which we say lie between the excess and the deficiency, being in 
 EE V=NE VI1144 b 38-1145 a 1.135
 Cf. H.J. Curzer in Aristotle and the virtues (Oxford, 2012). Curzer argues that natural virtues become virtues 136
proper when there is also practical wisdom. J.G. Lennox argues that natural virtues are innate dispositions that 
become full virtues with habituation and with virtues of thinking (cf. J.G. Lennox, “Aristotle on the biological 
roots of virtue,” in D. Henry, K.M. Nielsen (eds.), Bridging the gap between Aristotle’s science and ethics 
(Cambridge, 2015), pp. 193-214). 
 Cf. M. Leunissen, “Aristotle on natural character and its implications for moral development,” Journal of the 137
History of Philosophy, vol. 50, no. 4 (2012), p. 507–530.
 EE V=NE VI 1144 b 30. 138
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accordance with correct reasoning (ὀρθὸν λόγον). Now this claim is true, but not 
at all clear.   139
(T7) Since even a doctor has a limit (ὅρος) to which he refers when determining 
which body is healthy and which not, and the extent to which he should perform 
each procedure (if it is done well the body is healthy, and if it is done too little or 
too much the body is not healthy) – in the same way, when dealing with actions 
and choices about things which are good by nature but not praiseworthy, an 
excellent man must have a certain limit (ὅρος) for the possession, choice and 
avoidance of money (how much or how little) and of the fruits of good fortune. 
Earlier on this was specified as being “as reasoning (λόγος) indicates.” But this is 
like saying in matters of nutrition that it is “as medicine and its reasoning 
indicate”: it is true, but not clear.  140
 T6 and T7 both address the relation between virtues of character and practical wisdom. 
They display a rather striking similarity of formulation and proposal. T6 occurs at the 
beginning of EE V.1 (=NE VI.1). Aristotle points out that there is a horos (limit) that 
determines the right measure, which is what the character virtues are about, and that is 
established by orthos logos, roughly, “correct reasoning” or “right reason” as it is sometimes 
translated. In the paragraph that follows immediately, he argues that it is necessary to discuss 
orthos logos and horos.  Correct reasoning understood as phronêsis is discussed in EE V.5. 141
Aristotle only mentions the limit in EE V.1 (=NE VI.1). Though he signals in T5 that more 
needs to be said. We have to wait until EE VIII.3 for a discussion of the limit. This suggests 
that the two books - EE V and EE VIII - should be considered part of the same treatise (of 
course, this is only one of a number of relevant considerations; but it would lead astray for 
current purposes of pursuing the question of the unity of the EE’s argument). Another sign of 
a relation between EE V.1 and EE VIII.3 - albeit not decisive for deciding whether the books 
 EE V 1138 b 16-24: emphasis GB. On “true but not clear” see K. Vogt, Desiring the good (New York, 2017), 139
chapter 7; J. Moss, “Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: on the meaning of Logos,” Phronesis, 59 (3), 2014, pp. 
181-230.
 EE VIII 1249 a 24-1249 b 6, emphasis GB.140
 EE V 1138 b 35.141
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are part of a continuing text - is the repetition of the same expression (“it is true, but not 
clear”).   142
In T7, Aristotle says that the excellent person adheres to a limit when she deals with 
things like money and good fortune, things which, in the EE, Aristotle considers good by 
nature. For Aristotle, actions and choices that are praiseworthy are beautiful (kala).  They 143
can be pursued without limit in the same way in which virtuous actions and choices are 
praiseworthy and do not require a limit. However, there are other things that are good by 
nature - what Aristotle calls natural goods - even though they are not praiseworthy.  Natural 144
goods - such as money and good fortune - should be pursued with a limit. And this limit is 
established by correct reasoning. 
T6 and T7 speak in favor of a unity of phronêsis and the character virtues insofar as 
Aristotle says that the limit is determined by phronêsis. The two passages add a further 
specification to the relation between character virtues and practical wisdom: practical wisdom 
determines the limit. As Aristotle points out, this limit establishes the mean, which is what the 
character virtues are about. Character virtues and phronêsis cannot be possessed separately. 
Earlier we saw, in T1, that the individual virtues Aristotle takes himself to have discussed 
throughout the treatise and which constitute kalokagathia include the excellences of 
theoretical reasoning. This is what I turn to next: the way in which excellence in theoretical 
reasoning relates to the virtues we already analyzed. I submit that the unity of character 
virtues and of virtues of thinking – that is, practical and theoretical virtues - is essential in 
 EE V 1138 b 25; VIII 1249 b 5-6.142
 EE VIII 1248 b 38. 143
 EE VIII 1248 b 28-31.144
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order to be kalos kagathos. This position – a strict unity of all the virtues – has not yet been 
explored in the literature. 
5. Intelligence as part of the unity of the virtues 
In this section, I provide evidence that the excellent agent does not only have phronêsis, 
but also nous (intelligence).  My argument presupposes the following premise: if it can be 145
demonstrated that the kalos kagathos possesses a given virtue, then this virtue belongs to the 
set of virtues that is included in the EE’s version of the unity of the virtues. This premise 
relies on the idea that I explored in section 1: kalokagathia is a whole and an on-off state. 
Kalokagathia is a unity of such a sort that, if kalokagathia comprises a given virtue, this 
virtue is part of one whole. Once my examination of how the theoretical virtues are parts of 
the unity is concluded, I say more regarding the particular type of unity I am considering. In 
EE V.13 1144 b 12, Aristotle says:  
(T8) Natural states (φυσικαὶ ἕξεις) are present in children and beasts, but without 
intelligence (nous) they are obviously harmful. So much seems a matter of 
observation, that just as a strong body set blindly in motion winds up going down 
hard, since it can’t see where it is going, so too in this case. But if one gets 
intelligence to accompany natural virtues then it makes a difference in one’s 
actions. That is when the state of natural virtue, similar though it is, becomes 
virtue in the proper sense. So just as in the domain of opinion there are two forms 
(cleverness and practical wisdom), so too in the domain of character there are 
two: the one is natural virtue and the other is virtue proper, and virtue proper 
requires practical wisdom (phronêsis).   146
Aristotle speaks about natural states: these natural states include natural virtues. Natural 
states without intelligence are compared to a strong-but-blind body set in motion. A weak 
 Nous refers both to a faculty and to the successful exercise of this faculty. The latter includes the state of 145
mind that a person possesses when she successfully engages in nous-thinking. The expression “possessing 
nous” refers to this excellent state of mind. 
 EE V=NE VI 1144 b 8-16. 146
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body does not do much harm, even if it blindly tumbles along. A strong body, however, will 
“crash and burn,” as we may paraphrase Aristotle’s expression, if it runs through the world 
blindly. Analogously, natural states as it were provide humans with strength. Equipped with 
this kind of strength, a person without intelligence will run into her own demise. Without 
intelligence, natural states are harmful. Intelligence is figuratively elucidated as a way of 
seeing - a way of moving through the world with our (mental) eyes open. Nous supplies 
normative guidance. It helps direct natural states toward the right aim, analogous to the way 
in which our eyes help us direct our movements. With respect to the character virtues, 
Aristotle also mentions practical wisdom. He does not offer much detail regarding the 
division of labor between nous and phronêsis.  But we already saw that, earlier in EE V 147
(1140 a 25-1140 b 30; 1141 a 20-1142 a 30; 1143 b 15- 1144 b 1), Aristotle addresses the 
multifaceted role of phronêsis in detail. 
In T8, Aristotle starts out by speaking generically of natural states, and transitions to 
talk about a certain set of natural states, namely the natural virtues.  This transition is the 148
one clue Aristotle provides for the specification of nous’ and phronêsis’ respective roles. 
Namely, it would seem that intelligence guides natural states in general, including the natural 
virtues, while practical wisdom contributes in distinctive ways to the guidance of natural 
virtues. With respect to natural virtues, Aristotle says that nous “makes a difference.” 
Presumably, however, its contribution does not exhaust the dimensions in which virtue 
strictly speaking differs from natural virtue. It is here that Aristotle invokes practical wisdom, 
 EE V=NE VI 1142 a 26. 147
 On natural virtue, cf. S.A. White, “Natural virtue and perfect virtue” in Proceedings of the Boston Area 148
colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, VIII, J.J. Cleary and W.C. Wians (eds.), 1992; J.G. Lennox, Aristotle on the 
biological roots of virtue: the natural history of natural virtue, in Bridging the gap between Aristotle’s science 
and ethics, D. Henry and K.M. Nielsen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2015.
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in ways that clearly reference his more detailed, earlier discussions. His compressed reference 
to the distinction between cleverness and practical wisdom, for example, is plausibly taken to 
signal that these matters were already explored earlier.   149
One may object that in T8, Aristotle refers to nous and phronêsis in less specific senses 
than my proposal stipulates, perhaps even using both terms as equivalent. However, T8 is part 
of a larger section in EE V=NE VI, which starts at 1143 a 27 and goes on until T8. In 1143 a 
27, Aristotle says that we attribute a set of excellences of thinking - including practical 
wisdom and intelligence - to the same person. In 1143 a 27-1143 b 13, he discusses nous. And 
he turns to a potential objection: someone may wonder what the use of the excellences of 
thinking is that were just analyzed (1143 b 15-30). Contemplation is not about anything in the 
domain of coming-into-being, and yet this is the domain where we aim to lead good lives. 
Phronêsis is about things in the relevant domain; and yet mere knowledge of the just and the 
fine and the good does not make us perform virtuous actions. These are the sorts of 
objections someone may raise against the idea that the virtues of theoretical thinking 
contribute to an excellent human life. T8 is part of Aristotle’s response to this concern. That 
is, we should expect that the difference between the paradigmatically practical excellence of 
thinking—phronêsis—and other virtues of thinking is on Aristotle’s mind. 
On this reading, then, the task of intelligence that T8 highlights is that of, figuratively 
speaking, the illumination of our path in life. In less figurative terms, nous takes on a role of 
normative guidance. Intelligence and practical wisdom differ in their distinctive contributions 
and in their scope. In the practical sphere, intelligence is concerned with natural states 
relevant to human life in general, including the natural virtues. Practical wisdom operates 
 EE V=NE VI 1144 a 25-30.149
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more specifically in the domain of the natural virtues. For present purposes, we can consider 
this hypothesis, one that fits well with Aristotle’s earlier discussions in EE V and that remains 
close to the text in T8, and yet still only a hypothesis, given that T8 does not provide as much 
detail as we may look for.  
The important point, however, is that nous operates not only in the theoretical, but also 
in the practical domain. So much seems clear. Moreover, this upshot is continuous with 
Aristotle’s discussion just a few paragraphs earlier. In his discussion of nous as one of the 
excellences of thinking, he says that nous is “concerned with things that come last in both 
directions” (καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ’ ἀµφότερα, 1143a35-36).  Setting aside how 150
precisely we are to understand nous’ concern with what “comes last,” we can invoke this 
passage as evidence for our demonstrandum, namely that nous is an interrelated part of the 
virtues that the EE’s best person possesses. The two directions Aristotle addresses represent 
nous’ work in the theoretical and in the practical sphere, or in other words, its concern with 
what comes first in demonstrations, and what comes last in practical reasoning. If nous has a 
distinctive role in practical reasoning, it should be uncontroversial that the best agent must 
possess it. 
6. Sophia and epistêmê as part of the unity of the virtues 
By now we have seen that kalokagathia includes not only the character virtues and 
phronêsis, but also nous. To fill out the picture further, in agreement with my reading of T1, 
we need to turn now to the remaining theoretical excellences. We need to consider the roles 
that sophia and epistêmê play in superlative virtue, both in their own right and as they relate 
 In an enigmatic chapter of the Posterior Analytics, II.19, Aristotle says that nous enables us to grasp 150
principles. Nous is the only cognitive disposition or faculty (another question that is too large for now) that is 
truer and more accurate than epistêmê (100b5-17).
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to nous. If my argument so far is compelling, these excellences are also part of kalokagathia 
and hence of the unity of the virtues as Aristotle conceives of it in the EE. To elucidate this 
claim, let me make a fundamental observation. NE VI, the famous book on the virtues of 
thinking, appears in a different light if we read it as an integral part of the EE - that is, if we 
read it as EE V, a book of the EE that builds upon earlier discussions in the treatise and that is 
a stepping stone toward Aristotle’s conclusions in EE VIII. With the preparation of the books 
leading up to EE V, and given the way the EE continues, we have every reason to assume that 
all virtues of thinking that are discussed in EE V are part of kalokagathia. This follows from 
the very first interpretive premise established in this chapter. T1, I argued, says that all 
excellences discussed in the treatise so far are part of kalokagathia. And all excellences of 
thinking, as discussed in EE V, are some of the individual virtues which, at the end of the 
book, are said to be parts of kalokagathia. 
Given this approach, let me offer a minimal characterization of epistêmê and sophia as 
they are discussed in EE V. In EE V.12, Aristotle explicitly states that sophia is part of 
complete virtue. 
(T9) These states [that is, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom; GB] must be 
choiceworthy in their own right, since each is certainly the virtue of its own part 
of the soul, even if neither of them accomplishes anything. Next, they do indeed 
accomplish things, not in the way that medical knowledge brings about health but 
in the way that health does. That is how theoretical wisdom (sophia) causes 
happiness, since theoretical wisdom is a part of complete virtue and by being 
possessed and by being active it makes a person happy.  151
Here Aristotle introduces a distinction between two ways in which something can be 
productive of something, or in other words, accomplish something. His comparandum is, 
again, health. Medicine brings about health in one way; in another way, health brings about 
 EE V 1144 a 2-9.151
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health. What does this mean? If someone is sick, medicine can produce health. If someone is 
healthy, however, then it is in the nature of being healthy that health sustains itself. In that 
sense, health brings about health. This is the very sense, according to T9, in which theoretical 
and practical wisdom are productive. They are ways of being active which sustain 
themselves. And hence it is not just true to say that they bring about themselves; qua 
excellent activities, they bring about happiness. At the conclusion of this line of thought, 
Aristotle makes the claim that interests us here: sophia is part of complete virtue. In other 
words, and in the terms supplied by EE VIII, sophia is part of kalokagathia.   152
In EE V.7 1141 a 19, Aristotle argues that sophia is the most exact form of knowledge 
insofar as it includes epistêmê and nous.  Hence, an agent who has sophia, also has 153
epistêmê and nous. That is, insofar as kalokagathia comprises sophia, it comprises also 
epistêmê and nous. This provides us with the conclusion that, all along, was my 
demonstrandum: superlative virtue as the EE conceives of it comprises the virtues of 
character, practical wisdom, and the virtues of theoretical reasoning.  
Let me sum up what type of unity is the unity of the virtues examined so far. As I have 
already anticipated, there is a minimal way of understanding this unity according to which the 
unity of the virtues is a unity of the parts of the soul. Going beyond this minimal reading, the 
unity of the virtues is a hierarchical structure in which the virtues of thinking command and 
direct the virtues of character. In this hierarchical structure, which is a whole, the interaction 
goes both ways: it is true that the virtues of thinking command and direct the virtues of 
character, but these virtues cannot function at the best if the virtues of character are not 
 Aristotle compares theoretical wisdom to health. Cf. J. Burnet, The ethics of Aristotle (London, 1900), p. 283, 152
and by H.H. Joachim in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, A commentary (Oxford, 1951), p. 216-17. Cf. also 
C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of reason (Oxford, 1992), p. 95. 
 EE V 1141 a 19-20.153
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present. This is clear if we look at the relation of mutual entailment between virtues of 
character and practical wisdom, but also if we examine how intelligence uses and directs the 
character virtues. As I show in the next section, also among the virtues of thinking there is 
cooperation and co-functioning. In this sense, the unity of the virtues is hierarchically 
structured and it is a unity in which the virtues co-function.  
7. Theoretical and practical wisdom 
Finally, let me turn to the relation between sophia and phronêsis. We already know that 
both belong to kalokagathia. Their relation, however, deserves special attention, if only 
because Aristotle famously refers to some early Greek thinkers as theoretically-but-not-
practically wise. Though the evidence examined so far clearly supports that both practical and 
theoretical wisdom are part of kalokagathia, we must consider whether these practically 
unwise early thinkers pose a problem for my interpretation. Consider, then, how Aristotle 
describes the relation between phronêsis and sophia. 
(T10) (Phronêsis) is certainly not authoritative over theoretical wisdom (sophia) 
nor over the better part of the soul, in the same way that medicine is not 
authoritative over health, since it does not make use of it but rather sees to it that 
it should come to be. It gives order for its sake but does not give orders to it.   154
(T11) Since human beings too are by nature composed of a commander and a 
commanded, each person would also have to live with reference to his own 
commanding element. This has two aspects. For the art of medicine and health 
are commanding elements in different ways (the former is for the sake of the 
latter). This is how it is with regard to the theoretical capacity. The divine is not a 
 EE V 1145 a 8-10. Emphasis GB. The passage is controversial. Reeve argues that phronêsis prescribes for the 154
sake of sophia and it aims to bring it about (cf. C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of Reason (Oxford, 1992), p. 97). 
Gauthier argues that the thesis according to which if a capacity governs another capacity, the capacity that 
governs is superior to the capacity governed, may be a platonic thesis (cf. R.A. Gauthier, J.Y. Jolif, Aristote, 
L’éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain-Paris, 1970). Meyer argues that practical wisdom does not give direction to 
sophia qua subordinate capacity. Conversely, it legislates on its behalf (S. Sauvé Meyer, “Living for the sake of 
an ultimate end,” in J. Miller (ed.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 47-65). Cf. N. O. 
Dahl, “Contemplation and Eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in J. Miller (ed.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics (Cambridge, 2011), p. 89. See also EE V 1143 a 8, b 33-35, EE VIII 1249 a 22-b 5; Politics 1334 b 
17-28; MM 1198 b 12-18; 1208 a 9-21.
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commander in the sense of giving orders but as that for the sake of which 
practical wisdom (phronêsis) gives orders.  155
T10 is part of the common books and thus it occurs also in the NE. T11 occurs at the 
end of EE VIII in the discussion of kalokagathia. In both passages, Aristotle says that 
phronêsis gives orders (ἐπιτάττει) for the sake of the capacity of theoretical thought.  156
Phronêsis prepares the ground for the sake of sophia. Phronêsis is excellence in deliberation: 
for example, by deliberating well, the agent succeeds in organizing her life so that she has 
time and energy for contemplation. In this sense, phronêsis orders for the sake of sophia. 
Insofar as these excellences are parts of a whole, for the whole to function well, sophia and 
phronêsis need to interact. T10 and T11 suggest that, when the agent possesses these two 
virtues, phronêsis co-functions with sophia, rather than only with the virtues of character. The 
passages provide evidence of the unity of the virtues of thinking insofar as Aristotle argues 
that sophia and phronêsis work together and are necessary for each other to function at their 
best. This applies, by extension, also to epistêmê, given that Aristotle says in EE V.7 1141 a 
20 that sophia includes epistêmê. In the superlatively excellent agent, sophia-cum-epistêmê 
cooperate with phronêsis.  
This reading meets two criteria. First, it elucidates how the virtues of practical and 
theoretical thinking interact if they do. That is, in the best agent, the agent who possesses 
kalokagathia, phronêsis and theoretical excellences interrelate in the way sketched above. 
Second, it leaves space for the case where this interaction fails to take place, or fails to take 
place to a relevant degree, because the agent has phronêsis, but does not have sophia. Recall, 
 EE VIII 1249 b 10-15: emphasis GB.155
 In T11, Aristotle does not explicitly mention sophia. “Theoretical capacity” translates the Greek term to 156
theoretikon. In Magna Moralia 1198 b 12-18, Aristotle says that phronêsis is the steward (epitropos) of sophia. 
Phronêsis promotes leisure for the master.
!76
the EE’s unity of the virtues as I conceive of it does not say that for a person to have any of 
the virtues, she must have all of them. Instead, the claim is significantly more modest. If a 
person has kalokagathia—if she has superlative virtue—then she has all virtues in such a way 
that they form a unity. This permits a wide range of agents, some of whom will have practical 
wisdom while not developing their capacities for theoretical reasoning to the level of 
excellence. In such a case, phronêsis functions without sophia. That is, in this case not only 
the level of excellence in practical thinking is lower. The very tasks that phronêsis takes on in 
the less-then-perfect agent differs from those it has in the best case, where phronêsis 
cooperates with sophia. If the agent is not theoretically wise, it is not the task of her practical 
wisdom to order for the sake of sophia. That is, there can be cases in which the two virtues do 
not interact because the agent develops and uses one virtue, but not the other. Of course, this 
is not the ideal case and we can see that in this case practical wisdom falls short. For in the 
ideal case, practical wisdom comes up with a conception of a good human life that recognizes 
the high value of theorizing, to the effect that the agent strives to become an accomplished 
theorizer. In the best case, then, when the agent uses both virtues, they co-function and they 
interact in the way described in T10 and T11.  157
But what about the objection I mentioned at the outset of this section? In EE V.7 1141 b 
5-6, Aristotle claims that people say that Anaxagoras and Thales have sophia, but they do not 
have phronêsis. 
(T12) From what has been said it is clear that theoretical wisdom (σοφία), 
knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) and intelligence (νοῦς) have as their objects what is most 
valuable by nature. That is why people say that Anaxagoras, Thales and men like 
them are sophoi but not practically wise, since they see that they are ignorant 
about what is advantageous to themselves, and people say that they know things 
 The same reference to a commanding element that is authoritative and rules on other elements can be found 157
in Plato’s Protagoras 352 a-d. 
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that are exceptional, amazing, difficult and divine - though useless, because what 
they seek are not human goods.  158
 Does the passage suggest that one can be excellent in theoretical thinking without 
having practical wisdom and the virtues of character? First of all, in the passage, Aristotle 
seems to report a common opinion. For this reason we cannot conclude that this is Aristotle’s 
view. Second, Aristotle suggests that Anaxagoras and Thales have sophia in a qualified sense. 
In EE V.5 1140 a 29, Aristotle says that people can be practically wise in relation to a 
particular aspect (πρός τὶ); alternatively, they can be practically wise in general (ὅλος). A 
similar distinction seems to apply here: one can be sophos in relation to a particular aspect - 
and this is the case of Anaxagoras and Thales - and not sophos in general. EE V 1141.7 a 9 
further supports this reading. In this passage, Aristotle states that Pheidias and Polykleitos are 
considered sophoi. He explains that the term sophoi refers in this case to the fact that they are 
excellent in what they do, namely in doing sculptures. Aristotle points out that in this case, 
sophia refers to aretê teknês.  He says that it is possible to distinguish someone who is 159
sophos in relation to a particular aspect (κατὰ µέρος) from someone who is sophos in general 
(ὅλος). When the agent is kalos kagathos, the inter-relation between the individual virtues 
influences the individual activities of the virtues. In isolation, a given virtue functions 
differently from the way in which it functions when it is an integrated part of co-functioning 
virtues that form a whole. For example and as we saw, phronêsis does not have the same 
tasks when it co-functions with sophia and when it functions alone. When it co-functions 
with sophia, phronêsis prescribes for the sake of sophia. 
 EE V=NE VI 1141 b 3-8.158
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My argument regarding the role of the virtues of thinking for the unity of the virtues 
has implications for how we read EE V=NE VI, as I announced at the beginning of this 
section. If my argument is compelling, we should expect that EE V discusses a set of 
interrelated excellences of thinking. EE V is standardly read as a series of discussions of 
virtues of thinking. Nevertheless, I submit that we should call this standard reading into 
question, at least with respect to core virtues of practical and theoretical thought, setting aside 
for now, for example, how technê fits into the picture. If we read EE V together with EE VIII, 
EE V offers more than accounts of individual virtues of thinking. The text lays out how 
excellences of practical and theoretical thought interrelate and co-function. In other words, it 
explains the different parts that form kalokagathia. This view, I propose, is suggested by 
reading EE V conjointly with EE VIII.3 (and in general with the rest of the EE), where 
Aristotle discusses the superexcellence that includes all the virtues discussed in the treatise: 
kalokagathia.  
What is more, once we read EE V in this light a more specific hypothesis emerges: EE 
V can be read as a discussion of the limit of kalokagathia. The notion of limit - ὄρος - is 
introduced at the beginning of EE V.1 1138 b 23 and at 1138 b 34. It is mentioned again in 
EE VIII.3 1249 b 16-25. In EE VIII.3 1249 b 16-25, Aristotle states that the so-called limit of 
kalokagathia is being as little aware of the irrational part of the soul as possible. At the limit, 
the thought goes, kalokagathia is the state of mind that best makes room for and best supports 
excellence in contemplative activity. This requires that the irrational part of the soul does not 
disturb us—that we are not the kinds of thinkers who continually take breaks for yet another 
cup of tea, and so on—and more generally, that the irrational part collaborates in the best 
possible way with the rational part. As Aristotle argues in EE VIII.3 1249 b 16-25, the best 
conditions to contemplate include also the possession of certain natural goods in a certain 
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amount, in addition to the absence of distraction caused by the irrational part of the soul. The 
double occurrence of the notion of limit (ὄρος) at the beginning of EE V.1 and at the end of 
EE VIII.3 suggests that we should explore this line of thought, and read EE V as a continuous 
account of interacting excellences, which in sum constitute the parts of kalokagathia that 
involve excellence in thinking.  160
I take myself to have shown that the kalos kagathos has all the virtues in such a way 
that these virtues interrelate. The texts cited support, in sum, the following reading: each of 
the virtues, if in place, influence the natures and activities of the other virtues. An ever more 
fundamental relation holds between the virtues of character on the one hand and the virtues of 
thinking on the other. As we saw in section 2, their relationship partly resides in the fact that 
the parts of the soul are parts of one soul. Insofar as the parts of the soul are interrelated, the 
activities of their parts interrelate too. Moreover, insofar as the parts of the soul are 
hierarchically ordered, there is a hierarchy between the virtues associated with these parts. 
Given this hierarchy, there is a relation of obedience and command, and in other words, a 
relation of dependence: even in the imperfect case, the character virtues need guidance from 
the virtues of thinking. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that the best agent of the EE is the kalos kagathos. This agent 
differs in fundamental ways from the phronimos, namely from the best agent as standardly 
understood by scholars who focus on the NE. In the EE, Aristotle puts forward a conception 
of superlative excellence: kalokagathia. The best person is the kalos kagathos. Her excellence 
is a unity with parts—the parts are all the virtues as discussed throughout the EE. With this 
 We can assume that technê is part of the unity insofar as Aristotle says in T1 that kalokagathia includes all 160
the virtues discussed so far, and this includes technê. An examination of technê as this virtue is discussed outside 
of the ethical treatises may shed light on the question, but it would go beyond present purposes. 
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proposal, Aristotle defends a version of the unity of the virtues that is stronger and more 
comprehensive than the unity of the virtues in the NE. On the view that I defended in the 
chapter, EE and NE share a commitment: the virtues of character and practical wisdom 
mutually entail each other. In other words, a person only possesses one of them fully if she 
also possesses the other. However, the scope of the unity of the virtues in the EE is larger than 
in the NE. The kalos kagathos possesses all the virtues, comprising also the virtues of 
theoretical thinking.  
With this proposal, I aim to shed light on core aspects of the ethical theory that Aristotle 
develops in the EE. Though scholars have recently started to work on the EE in its own right, 
this treatise is still less widely studied than the NE. Given the argument I advanced, the book 
that is standardly known as NE VI—and that is also part of the EE, namely as book V— 
appears in a different light. EE V analyzes the virtues of thinking. If EE V relates to EE VIII 
in the ways I propose, then EE V does not “simply” offer a series of analyses of particular 
virtues of thinking. Rather, EE V analyzes particular virtues that ultimately are parts of a 
unified superlative excellence. I have not exhausted the implications of this shift in 
perspective. But I hope to have illuminated some of the ways in which the kalos kagathos is a 
distinctive ethical ideal, and a highly ambitious one. 
!81
CHAPTER THREE 
Natural Goods Naturalism in the Eudemian Ethics 
Scholars read Aristotle’s ethics, more often than not, as a form of naturalism. In the 
literature, Aristotle’s ethics is characterized as naturalistic for example because there are 
connections between Aristotle’s ethics and physics.  Others take Aristotle to be a naturalist 161
because his ethics starts from a premise about human psychology, namely that human beings 
desire happiness and happiness is the final goal of human life.  Yet others argue that 162
Aristotle’s ethics is naturalistic because for Aristotle, the human function is connected to the 
human essence, which is a whole and a system;  because of the teleological structure of his 163
ethics, including the claim that human beings have a function;  and because of the idea that 164
there is a life-form proper to human beings, a life-form that can be contrasted with that of 
other animals.  Each of these proposals has some contentious aspects. Moreover, for the 165
most part they are not pursued separately. Instead, philosophers often aim to combine some of 
the ideas relevant to these four lines of thought, while steering clear of others. 
 C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of Reason, Oxford University Press, 2015. 161
 A. Kallhoff, Ethischer Naturalismus nach Aristoteles, Münster: Mentis, 2010. For criticisms of similar 162
positions to the one defended by Kallhoff, see B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: 
Routledge Classics, 1985; T. Nagel, “Review of Williams 1985,” in Journal of Philosophy, 83, pp. 351-360. J. 
Annas, “Naturalism in Greek Ethics: Aristotle and after,” in Proceedings of the Boston area colloquium in 
Ancient philosophy, IV, J. Cleary and D.C. Shartin (ed.), 1989. A. Laks, “Commentary to Annas’ article.”
 T. Irwin, “Aristotle: nature,” in The Development of Ethics, vol. 1 (Oxford: 2015), p 141.163
 J. Cooper, “Aristotle on natural teleology,” in Language and Logos, Studies in ancient Greek philosophy, ed. 164
by M. Schonfield, M. Nussbaum, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
 M. Thompson, Life and action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008. Thompson argues that there is a 165
life-form proper of human beings and this life-form is a measure or standard of good and bad for human beings.
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In this chapter, I ask whether the EE develops an outlook that adds to the routes 
Aristotelian naturalists can explore. In short, my answer is yes. The EE operates with a notion 
of natural goods, and thereby lays out a distinctive naturalist view. This view, which I call 
Natural Goods Naturalism (NGN), shares ideas with other formulations of Aristotelian 
naturalism. NGN endorses basic premises that are familiar from other versions of Aristotelian 
naturalism. Specifically, it shares the appeal to a human ἔργον - something we do, a work or 
job, translated in unsatisfactory and yet deeply ingrained ways as “function” -  and it shares a 
commitment to not appealing to anything supernatural in one’s account of the good and the 
bad. It goes beyond other versions of naturalism, however, by developing these ideas with a 
view to Aristotle’s notion of natural goods (τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά). Natural goods, as I interpret this 
notion, are natural insofar as they are good for human beings as we are by nature; and they 
are good insofar as they help fulfill the function of the human soul at the best, which is living 
a happy life. Natural goods, my argument continues, are good for what I call the human being 
in a standard state - that is, an adult, healthy human being in normal conditions. The notion of 
the agent in a standard state captures desiderative attitudes that are characteristically human: 
human beings in the standard state desire natural goods. At the same time, this notion 
captures a normative dimension that Aristotle expresses in two idiomatic terms: how human 
beings are for the most part and how they are by nature. 
In the Aristotelian corpus, the expression “natural goods” figures only in the EE, where 
it occurs eight times.  Aristotle speaks of natural goods once in the NE  and once in the 166 167
 EE, 1237 b 31, 1238 a 17, 1248 b 27, 1248 b 40, 1249 a 1, 1249 a 7, 1249 a 26, 1249 b 17.166
 NE, 1169 b 20.167
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Rhetoric,  but he does not discuss this notion or employ it in ways that are crucial to his 168
theorizing. In the EE, I submit, the notion of natural goods plays a fundamental role. If there 
were “merely” eight occurrences, this might appear too far-reaching a claim. However, 
natural goods figure prominently in the final part of the EE, where Aristotle discusses 
καλοκἀγαθία, the most complete virtue, and θεωρία, contemplation. That is, Aristotle 
employs the notion of natural goods in a section of the treatise that is of great importance, 
namely insofar as it sums up the EE’s ethical outlook by exploring the highest kind of 
excellence and best kind of activity. Moreover, I argue that natural goods and simpliciter-
goods (τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά) are the same. The notion of simpliciter-goods occurs frequently in 
the text. If simpliciter-goods are identified with natural goods, this is all the more reason to 
attend to the latter notion.  
Far more scholarly work has explored the NE than the EE and its particular ethical 
outlook. Aristotle’s conception of natural goods in the EE is exemplary of this trend; so far, 
there is little analysis devoted to it. Moreover, the EE’s conception of natural goods is 
especially hard to understand. Other themes of the EE at least have parallels in the NE. 
Aristotle’s conception of natural goods cannot be reconstructed by comparing it to 
corresponding discussions elsewhere. Thus, though scholars such as Sarah Broadie recognize 
that this is an interesting notion, it is still largely unexplored.  169
The first step in my argument is to posit an hypothesis: that natural goods are 
simpliciter-goods (section 1). I then discuss what natural goods are (section 2), and for whom 
they are good (section 3). Next I explore the distinction between relative goodness and good-
 Rhetoric, 1366 b 38.168
 S. Broadie, “The good, the noble and the theoretical in Eudemian Ethics VIII.3,” in Mind, Method, and 169
Morality, J. Cottingham (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2010.
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for (section 4) and propose a minimal account of the notion of the agent in a standard state 
(section 5). To elucidate the idea of a standard state, I introduce the technical notion of “for 
the most part regularities” and explain how it relates to Aristotle’s notion of something being 
“by nature” (section 6). In conclusion and based on these analyses, I offer a comprehensive 
formulation of Natural Goods Naturalism (section 7).  
1. Natural goods are simpliciter-goods 
The first step in my analysis of the notion of natural goods is to posit an hypothesis, 
namely that we can identify τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά - natural goods - and τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, which I 
translate as simpliciter-goods. The notion of simpliciter-goods is familiar to the reader of the 
NE, though its interpretation is contested. However, simpliciter-goods are mostly mentioned 
in the so-called common books, books that the NE shares with the EE (NE V-VI-VII= EE IV-
V-VI). They show up only two times in the NE outside of the common books.  That is, even 170
though this notion is familiar via the study of the NE, it is plausibly considered an integral 
part of the EE. Together with a growing number of scholars, I consider the common books as 
originally written for the EE. As we will see toward the end of the chapter, close analysis of 
the passages that discuss natural goods and simpliciter-goods shows that the two expressions 
are used equivalently. In effect, this means that the reconstruction of the EE’s conception of 
natural goods can help us understand a notion that has been controversial in the context of 
interpreting the NE.  
 τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά appears eleven times in the Eudemian Ethics (1235 b 32, 1236 b 37, 1236 b 39, 1237 a 5, 170
1237 a 13, 1237 a 17, 1237 a 32, 1238 b 7, 1249 a 12, 1249 a 18, 1249 b 25), five in Magna Moralia, six in the 
common books of the Nicomachean Ethics (1129 b 3,  1129 b 5, 1134 a 34, 1134 b 4, 1134 b 27, 1137 a 26, 
1152 b 27), two times in the NE outside of the common books (1155 b 25, 1157 b 27), once in the Rhetoric 
(1366 a 23), and once in the Politics (1332 a 23).
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The passages that show that Aristotle uses the two expressions interchangeably, 
however, are dense and speak to a number of issues that I will unpack step by step as I go 
along. Aristotle explicates both notions - natural goods and simpliciter-goods - by specifying 
for whom these goods are good, or in another formulation, for whom they are beneficial. 
Though in other contexts we may want to address the nuances of both notions, for current 
purposes I shall stipulate that the good is the beneficial.  In the passages that interest us, 171
Aristotle often speaks of what is good for some people, and he expresses this idea in a range 
of interrelated terms, including terms that are well-translated as “beneficial” (συµφέρον). 
Once we look more closely at who is the agent for whom these goods are good, we realize 
that simpliciter-goods and natural goods are the same: namely, these goods - simpliciter-
goods and natural goods - are good for human beings as human beings are by nature. In EE 
VII 1235 b 33-1236 a 3, Aristotle says that what is simpliciter-good is what is good for a 
healthy body, for someone who is not drunk, and for adults. These are the conditions in which 
the agents need to be in order for natural goods to be good for them. Though I postpone 
discussion of other texts, let me adduce one passage from EE VII.2 where Aristotle explicitly 
identifies simpliciter-goods and natural goods. 
(T1) What is not good for oneself is nothing to oneself, but what we are seeking 
is this, that what is good simpliciter should be good in this way. For what is good 
simpliciter is worth choosing and what is good for oneself is worth choosing for 
oneself. These things should harmonize and that is what virtue brings about. 
Political expertise is in charge of this process, so that those not yet in this state 
will acquire it. As a human being, one is well placed to make progress (for things 
good simpliciter are by nature good for a human being).  172
 Cf. R. Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 210. 171
 Eudemian Ethics, 1236 b 36- 1237 a 4: καὶ τὸ µὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστιν ὃ 172
ζητεῖται, τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἔστι γὰρ αἱρετὸν µὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν: 
ἃ δεῖ συµφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ: καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς µήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. εὐθέτως δὲ 
καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὤν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά). 
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Before we address the larger claims in this passage, let me restate the last phrase. 
Simpliciter-goods are by nature good for human beings, and that is, they are natural goods. In 
a sense, the rest of the passage does not matter for present purposes. I will elucidate it only to 
the extent that is needed here, namely, to support the idea that we can invoke T1 as evidence 
for the identity of simpliciter-goods and natural goods.  
Aristotle says that what is not good for a given agent is “nothing for her.” Minimally, 
this confirms the relational nature of goodness. When we ask what is good, we are concerned 
with what is good for agents. What we are seeking, then, is not the sort of thing that does not 
stand in any kind of relation to us. Instead, we are seeking that which is good for us, and that 
is, what Aristotle takes to be good-simpliciter. The identity of what is good for us and what is 
good-simpliciter is supported, in Aristotle’s next sentence, by the fact that both are what is 
worth choosing. Note further that Aristotle conceives of what is and isn’t something “for us” 
in desiderative terms. What is nothing for an agent is not worth choosing for her; what is 
something for us—or good for us—is the kind of thing that is worth choosing. 
And yet people can be in conditions where what is good-simpliciter is not good for 
them. One of the aims of political expertise is to make the good-simpliciter good for the 
individuals in the community. We need to be in certain conditions in order for the good-
simpliciter to be good for us. Political expertise takes into account these conditions and how 
human beings are: Aristotle says that human beings are “well placed” to make this kind of 
progress. This is so because goods-simpliciter are natural goods, namely because these goods 
are goods for human beings provided that we are in certain conditions. All this is in great 
need of further elucidation. But for now we should only note that Aristotle seems to identify 
natural goods and goods-simpliciter. 
!87
2. Natural goods, dependent goods and external goods 
 My hypothesis so far is that natural goods are the same thing as goods-simpliciter. In 
order to establish what natural goods are, we need a list. This list need not be exhaustive, but 
it should be sufficiently complete to provide us with paradigmatic examples. We also need to 
ask how the goodness of these goods is to be understood; what, in other words, their 
metaphysics is. Let’s look first at the list. In EE VIII.2, Aristotle says that honor, wealth, 
bodily excellences, good fortune and power (dunameis) are natural goods.    173
(T2) For the goods we fight for and those which are thought to be greatest (honor, 
wealth, the bodily excellences, good fortune and power) are good by nature, but 
they can be harmful to some people because of their dispositions.  174
Assuming that the goods listed here are paradigmatic natural goods, we can ask how we 
should think of the metaphysics of these goods. Not any kind of good is a natural good. In 
T2, Aristotle ascribes two desiderative properties, as we may put this, to natural goods: we 
fight for them, and we consider them the greatest. These two specifications offer criteria for 
detecting what counts as a natural good: a natural good is typically desired by human beings 
to the point that we even fight for them. And it belongs to the goods characteristically 
considered to be the greatest goods for a good human life. This desiderative side of natural 
goods will occupy us in detail later. For now, I want to make a minimal observation. What 
counts as a natural good has to be determined via a relation between the particular good we 
are considering - honor, wealth, and so forth - and the motivations and attitudes of the agent. 
It is thus fundamental to understand what features this agent has.  
 The Greek term is plural. However, the translation in the singular better captures the Greek term. Cf. Inwood 173
and Woolf translate “power;” Donini translates “la potenza.” 
 Eudemian Ethics, 1248 b 29: τὰ γὰρ περιµάχητα καὶ µέγιστα εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά, τιµὴ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ 174
σώµατος ἀρεταὶ καὶ εὐτυχίαι καὶ δυνάµεις, ἀγαθὰ µὲν φύσει ἐστίν, ἐνδέχεται δ᾿ εἶναι βλαβερά τισι διὰ τὰς ἕξεις.
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This brings us to the metaphysics of natural goods. In brief, their metaphysics is 
relational. This means that non-relational reconstructions are not compelling. It also means 
that the crux of my interpretation will lie in how precisely the relevant relation is to be 
understood. Let me introduce six ways in which one may conceive of natural goods. (1) and 
(2) may come to mind because they are familiar from discussions of Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
ethics. (3)-(5) have been defended with respect to the NE. And (6) is the interpretation that I 
propose:  
(1) What is good-simpliciter, and that is, the natural good, is good only if used with 
wisdom. 
(2) What is good-simpliciter, and that is, the natural good, is what Aristotle calls 
external good. 
(3) What is good-simpliciter, and that is, the natural good, is the absolute good, and that 
is, the good in a sense that is not relative to any person or kind of person, but that is good 
insofar as, using an expression of Korsgaard, it “makes the world a better place.”  175
(4) What is is good-simpliciter, and that is, the natural good, is the good for the 
particular individual (τινί). 
(5) What is good-simpliciter, and that is, the natural good, is the good as seen by the 
phronimos or by the kalos kagathos, and thus, the good-for or good relative to the best agent. 
(6) What is good-simpliciter, and that is, the natural good, is the good for the human 
being in a standard state, namely for an adult, healthy individual in normal conditions. 
 C. Korsgaard, “Two distinctions in goodness,” Philosophical Review, 92, 1983, p. 169. Shields argues that as 175
Aristotle conceives of goodness, there is intrinsic goodness. C. Shields, “The Summum Bonum in Aristotle’s 
Ethics,” in The highest good in Aristotle and Kant, J. Aufderheide, R.M. Bader (eds.), Oxford University Press, 
2015, pp. 84-110.
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Options (1) and (2) draw on traditional conceptions familiar from the discussion of 
Greek ethics; I discuss them in this section. Options (3), (4), (5) and (6) have an important 
common feature: they ask whether the simpliciter-good and natural good (assuming both are 
the same) are good for specific persons; I discuss these options in the next section. (3) is not a 
serious option, simply because the notion of natural goods involves a good-for relation. What 
natural goods are is determined, in part, by who they are good for. And yet it is helpful to 
consider (3), because natural goods are goods of a quite fundamental kind, and here it might 
be tempting to think of absolute goodness—but we shall see that this would be a 
misunderstanding. (4) is easily refuted as Aristotle says that what is good-simpliciter is not 
what is good for the particular individual, but I say more below. (5) and (6) are, as we will 
see, the most serious contenders for getting things right. Here the thought that natural goods 
are good for certain agents is explored. The crucial question, then, will be to specify how we 
ought to conceive of these agents. 
Let us start, however, with option (1). Given the list of goods in T2, and in the light of 
modes of argument that are familiar from Plato, one may suspect that natural goods are 
conditions or states of affairs that can be both good and harmful. For example, according to 
the Euthydemus, so-called goods are only good and beneficial when used with wisdom.  176
Applied to Aristotle’s notion of natural goods, this would mean that natural goods are 
beneficial and harmful in a derivative and conditional fashion - if used with wisdom, or if 
used foolishly. Call this the Dependent Goods Interpretation. However, Aristotle does not say 
that natural goods are harmful if not used with wisdom. Instead the criterion he advances is 
that these things can be harmful for someone in a given disposition (and once we see, below, 
 Euthydemus, 278e3–281e.176
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how he conceives of the standard state, we also see what would be involved in significant 
departure from this state).  
Alternatively, at least some items on the list may suggest that what Aristotle discusses 
here are what are elsewhere called external goods (2). The Peripatetic tradition considers 
Aristotle’s division among external goods, goods of the soul, and goods of the body a 
cornerstone of his ethics.  Goods of the body are goods that pertain to one’s physical 177
condition: for example, health, bodily excellence, and strength. Goods of the soul include the 
virtues and knowledge, and arguably all activities of the soul relevant to a well-lived human 
life. External goods are goods that do not belong to our body or to our soul. Wealth and 
political power can count as examples.  In spite of the prevalence of this tripartition in later 178
Aristotelian authors, Aristotle himself is rather tentative in his classifications. Some goods 
seem to show up in two classes. For example, friendship can appear to be a good of the soul 
on the one hand, and an external good on the other hand. From the point of view of Aristotle’s 
theorizing, this seems just fine, for he distinguishes between kinds of friendship. However, it 
just does not seem that it is a primary concern of his to neatly categorize each good as falling 
into one of the three classes. Moreover and more importantly, the notion of natural goods cuts 
across the distinction among external goods, goods of the soul, and goods of the body. 
The proposal that natural goods are external goods, however, can also be developed by 
reference to a bipartite (as opposed to tripartite) distinction. On this approach, we take all 
goods to fall into two classes. Everything soul-related counts as “internal,” and everything 
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1098 b 13; T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics, OUP, 2007, p. 144; B. 177
Inwood, “The tria genera bonorum in ethical theory,” in M. Lee, Strategies of argument: ancient ethics, 
epistemology and logic, OUP, 2014, pp. 256-279.
 NE 1099 a 31–b 8, 1100 a 18–21, 1123 b 17–22. See also Rhetoric I 5–6.178
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that is not soul-related as external. Broadie argues that natural goods are external goods in 
this sense.  This interpretation, however, undersells the very notion of nature that Aristotle 179
applies. Natural goods, as I shall argue, are such that they speak to our nature; we have 
characteristic desiderative attitudes to them. If we put things this way, it becomes clear that 
not only the internal-bodily-external distinction, but also the internal-external distinction is an 
ill fit for the notion of natural goods. Our nature as human beings includes physiological and 
psychological dimensions. And insofar as natural goods are defined as relative to our nature, 
their domain cuts across the internal-external distinction. 
In addition to these arguments that specifically refute the Dependent Goods 
Interpretation and the External Goods Interpretation, here is a consideration that speaks 
conjointly against both. Neither of them is plausible if, as hypothetically proposed, Aristotle 
identifies what is naturally good and what is good simpliciter (ἀπλῶς). This should suffice to 
show that natural goods are not dependent or derivative. Moreover, simpliciter-goods are a 
mix of external goods, goods of the body and soul-related goods. T2 shows that wealth - a 
paradigmatic external good - is a natural good, as well as bodily excellence and honor - 
which may be considered goods related to the body and to the soul. Natural goods include 
goods of all these kinds: bodily-related goods, soul-related goods, and natural goods. But 
 If we stipulate a bipartite (rather than tripartite) distinction, according to which everything soul-related falls 179
into one class and everything that is external to the soul into another class, natural goods may seem to be 
external goods. Cf. S. Broadie, The good, the noble and the theoretical in Eudemian Ethics VIII.3, in Mind, 
Method, and Morality, J. Cottingham, Oxford University Press, 2010. But as will become clear, even though this 
classification is possible, Aristotle does not discuss natural goods as we would expect him to discuss external 
goods, precisely because natural goods include also goods of the soul and goods of the body.
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what are the natural goods if they are not, either, mere dependent goods in the sense familiar 
from Plato, where health used with wisdom is good; or, alternatively, external goods?  180
3. Who are natural goods good for? 
Now that we have excluded options (1) and (2), let’s look at options (3)-(6). They are 
more fundamental than (1) and (2), for they ask a question that is crucial for the interpretation 
of Aristotle’s ethics: they ask who these goods are good for. According to (3), natural goods 
are absolute goods. That is, (3) asks who these goods are good for in the negative sense that, 
according to (3), there is no such restriction. “Absolute” here contrasts with relative, though 
not with “relative” in the sense of relativism; rather, it contrasts with the idea that there is a 
relatum, to the effect that what is good is good by being good for someone or something. 
Absolute goods, the thought goes, are good in every circumstance and for everyone (for 
further discussion of the distinction between absolute good on one hand, and good-for and 
relative goodness on the other hand, see section 4). However, there is evidence that natural 
goods are not good in every circumstance and absolutely. First of all, Aristotle says that 
natural goods can be harmful for certain people (T2). Hence, whatever else needs to be said it 
is clear that they are not good for everyone. The agent must meet certain conditions in order 
to benefit from natural goods. Second, Aristotle says that natural goods are a particular kind 
of good-for insofar as they are good for human beings (T1). This provides a preliminary 
account of the relevant relatum: natural goods are good for human beings. This is in need of 
further specification, as we will see in a moment, because natural goods are good for human 
beings in certain conditions. One thing, however, is clear: natural goods are not absolute 
 In Nicomachean Ethics 1098 b 12-17, Aristotle divides the goods in external goods (wealth, power, honor, 180
friends,…), goods of the body (health, physical strength, beautiful appearance,…) and goods of the soul (virtue, 
knowledge,…). Monan (1968) argues that EE VIII 3 is an effort to express the relationship between external 
goods and the goods of the soul, namely both character virtues and virtues of thought, which form kalokagathia.
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goods because they are not good for an animal or for a divine being, but they are good only 
for specific relata.  
Let’s move to (4), the option that natural goods are good for a particular individual. 
This option has prima facie little plausibility. The very notion of “natural” goods indicates 
that we are talking at a greater level of generality or of fundamentality, or both. For reasons 
of completeness, however, I consider also this option. After all, the aim here is to think 
through the range of conceivable relata of the natural good. (4) is, as it were, a minimal step 
away from (3), the absolutist reading. Rather than move immediately to the ideal person (5) 
or some group of persons (6), (3) stipulates that natural goods are good relative just to any 
particular person. Along the same lines, Aristotle seems to be interested in thinking through 
the various relata one can imagine for a relative notion of goodness; he addresses the contrast 
between what is good for a particular person (τινί) and what is good-simpliciter in EE VII.2: 
(T3) For what is good for an individual and what is good-simpliciter are distinct, 
and it is the same for states of character as it is with the useful: what is useful 
simpliciter is different from what is useful for particular individuals, just as 
training is different from being treated by drugs. So too for the state of character 
(human virtue). Suppose that human beings are excellent by nature; the virtue of 
someone who is excellent by nature is good-simpliciter, but the virtue of someone 
who isn’t is good only for himself. It is also the same for the pleasant.  181
The passage occurs within the discussion of the different types of friendship (friendship 
based on utility, pleasure or virtue) and it presents a number of interpretative challenges.  182
What is most relevant for my analysis is that Aristotle says that what is good for a particular 
 Eudemian Ethics, 1237 a 13-19: διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῳδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. καὶ ὁµοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ 181
ὠφελίµου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὠφέλιµον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον (obelized by Bonitz 1844, 
62-63, Apelt 1894, 731, Jackson 1900, 11-12, Arnim 1927, 105) γυµνάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ φαρµακεύεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ 
ἡ ἕξις ἡ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετή. ἔστω γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων: ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου ἀρετὴ 
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ µὴ ἐκείνῳ. ὁµοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
 Cf. F. Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, Akademie-Verlag: Berlin, 1962, p. 394.182
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individual and what is good-simpliciter are not the same. (4), then, is not a serious contender. 
But its consideration establishes some distinctions that we need as we go along.  
Aristotle argues that we can compare virtue with the useful insofar as both virtue and 
the useful are in some way goods. In order to make sense of this claim, I follow Dirlmeier’s 
interpretation. Dirlmeier starts from the observation that goods can be ἀπλῶς (simpliciter) or 
τινί (for a particular individual). This distinction applies to any good. That is, the useful is a 
good and therefore it can be good-simpliciter or good for a particular individual. Virtue too is 
a good and it can be good-simpliciter or good for a particular individual. According to 
Dirlmeier, virtue and the useful can be compared insofar as they can be good-simpliciter or 
good for a particular individual.   183
For someone who is excellent by nature, virtue is good-simpliciter. It is conceivable that 
Aristotle speaks of virtue in a loose sense here, referring to what is best for the individual. In 
a similarly loose sense, he speaks of the individual who is excellent by nature: this individual 
seems to be the agent who has all the natural virtues. According to this minimal sketch, the 
idea is that what is best for the individual who is not excellent by nature seems good only for 
her. It seems good for her, but it is not good by nature. Setting aside the specifics of what it 
means to be excellent by nature, for present purposes T3 shows that what is good-simpliciter 
 Another interpretive challenge concerns the supposition, seemingly simply presupposed in T3, that some 183
individuals are excellent by nature. To readers of the NE, this is an unfamiliar claim. In the NE, as in the EE, 
Aristotle distinguishes natural virtues from virtues proper. However, in the NE, there is no reference to being 
excellent by nature. One may think that the agent who has natural virtues is excellent by nature. In the EE, I 
submit, an agent is excellent by nature if she has natural virtues. Cf. the discussion of natural virtue in the 
common books: EE V=NE VI 1144 b 5. In EE III 1234 a 27, Aristotle explains how natural virtue becomes 
virtue in the true sense. Regarding the NE, there is much scholarly interest in the idea that the virtues of 
character are acquired by habituation. In NE 1113 b 6-20, Aristotle considers the hypothesis that there is a 
natural disposition in human beings to choose what is good. Aristotle says that whether one’s view of the end is 
partially determined by nature or not, virtue is still voluntary. However, this seems the only reference to the idea 
of excellence by nature in the NE. It is noteworthy, and indeed surprising, that there is no explicit discussion of 
virtue acquisition via habituation in the EE. The only reference to habituation occurs in EE II 1220 b 1, where 
Aristotle says that character develops from habituation. This reference to habituation is not further explored in 
the treatise. Cf. P. Donini, Abitudine e saggezza. Aristotle dall’Etica Eudemia all’Etica Nicomachea, 
Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2014. 
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is not what is good for the particular individual. The difference between the particular 
individual and the agent for which the simpliciter-good is good is further elucidated by the 
comparison with the body that needs training and the body that needs drugs. As Aristotle 
says, training is good-simpliciter or useful simpliciter in the sense that it is good for human 
beings as human beings generically are, namely healthy. Conversely, being treated with drugs 
is not good-simpliciter or useful simpliciter insofar as it is good or useful only for the 
particular sick individual. 
Let’s turn to (5), the view that considers the best agent as the relevant relatum of 
goodness. Given that much of the relevant scholarly debate is about the NE, this position has 
not been specifically proposed as a reading of the EE. Before discussing how it applies to the 
EE, let me provide a minimal sketch of the debate on this issue in the NE. The debate focuses 
on the claim that the virtuous person is the measure of how we should act.  This position 184
has been put forward by McDowell as well as others. McDowell asserts that Aristotle is what 
he calls an internal realist, by which he means, among other things, that there is such a thing 
as what “really” is good, even though what really is good involves the attitudes of an agent.  185
What is truly good is what the virtuous person finds good.  My aim here is not to explore 186
this position, either in its own right or as an interpretation of the NE. My claim is limited to 
the interpretation of natural goods: in relation to natural goods, I depart from the type of 
 The terminology of “measure” is specifically explored by Vogt, who calls her position Measure Realism 184
(2017); cf. I. McCready Flora, “Protagoras and Plato in Aristotle: Rereading the Measure Doctrine,” OSAP, 49, 
2015, pp. 71-127. Other scholars speak in terms of how the world looks to the best agent, of the perceptions of 
the best agent, and so on. 
 J. McDowell, “Some issues in Aristotle’s moral psychology,” in Ethics, Companions to ancient thought 4, ed. 185
by S. Everson, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 107-129.
 This kind of position is at times called Aristotelian realism. For critical assessment of a purely epistemic 186
version of this position, according to which what really is good is constituted by what the ideal agent sees as 
good, cf. Vogt (2017) ch. 4.
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account McDowell puts forward. Namely, I argue that the virtuous agent is not the measure 
for the goodness of natural goods. 
Scholars who defend the view that the virtuous agent is the measure of how we should 
act often find support for their view in NE 1113 a 23-35. In this passage, Aristotle argues that 
the good agent is the standard and measure (κανὼν καὶ µέτρον) of things beautiful and 
pleasant. NE 1113 a 23-35, however, does not establish reading (5). Instead, it permits two 
interpretations. Either, and this is how the passage tends to be read, we assume that all value 
is on par. If the good (and that is, here, best) agent is the measure of the beautiful and 
pleasant, the thought goes, she is also the measure of the good. Alternatively, we keep an 
open mind with respect to Aristotle’s views on different kinds of value. In this case, it is 
possible that the best agent is the measure of the beautiful and pleasant without thereby being 
the measure of the good. Notably, in NE 1113 a 23-35, Aristotle does not say that the good 
agent is the standard and measure of good things.  This observation is important for the 187
difference between the NE and the EE. The EE is explicitly concerned with three kinds of 
value, the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant; the question of how these values relate to 
each other is flagged as a main theme right at the start of the treatise. That is, the reader of the 
EE is primed for a type of consideration that is not in the forefront of the NE: how the good, 
the beautiful, and the pleasant may come apart. Within this context, it is conceivable that 
someone is the measure of the beautiful and the pleasant, and someone else is the measure of 
the good. A fortiori, it is conceivable that someone else is the measure of a specific class of 
goods, namely natural goods. Aristotle does not mention simpliciter-goods or natural goods in 
the passage. That is, the passage provides no evidence for the view that the good agent is the 
 Cf. K.V. Wilkes, “The good man and the good for man in Aristotle’s ethics,” Mind, 87, 1978, pp. 553-571.187
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measure of natural goods. Further reason to doubt that the virtuous agent is not the measure 
of simpliciter-goods is provided by a passage in EE III.1: 
(T4) Perhaps, then, the fearful, like the pleasant and the good, has two senses. 
Some things are pleasant and good-simpliciter, and others are such to some 
individual, but not simpliciter; on the contrary they are bad and unpleasant, like 
the things that are beneficial to wicked people or pleasant to children insofar as 
they are children. Similarly some things are fearful simpliciter, others to some 
individual. Of the things that are fearful to the coward qua coward, some are 
fearful to no one, others mildly so. What is fearful to most people, and to human 
nature, we say is fearful simpliciter, and it is with regard to this that the 
courageous person is fearless, and these are the kind of fearful things that he 
endures. In one sense they are fearful to him, in another not; they are fearful 
insofar as he is a human being, but not fearful, or slightly so if at all, insofar as he 
is courageous.  188
Aristotle says that what is fearful, pleasant or good for the individual differs from what 
is fearful, pleasant, or good-simpliciter. He then focuses on what is fearful. He explicitly says 
that what is fearful for human nature is the fearful simpliciter. Human nature (however we 
understand this: I will say more below) is the measure of things that are fearful simpliciter. In 
a similar way, human nature is the measure of what is good-simpliciter. In T4, Aristotle 
argues that what is pleasant for children is not pleasant simpliciter. He then says that what is 
fearful for the courageous is not fearful simpliciter insofar as things that are fearless for the 
courageous may be fearful for human nature. This suggests that the virtuous agent - in this 
case, the courageous agent - cannot be the measure of things that are fearful simpliciter. 
Fighting in battle is fearful for human nature. And yet, it is not fearful for the courageous 
agent. As the courageous agent is not the measure of the fearful simpliciter, the virtuous agent 
is not the measure of what is good-simpliciter. 
 EE III 1228 b 18-30: ἀλλ᾿ ἴσως τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ µὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, 188
τὰ δὲ τινὶ µὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς 
ὠφέλιµα, καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ᾗ παιδία. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τὰ µὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστί, τὰ δὲ τινί· ἃ µὲν δὴ 
ὁ1 δειλὸς φοβεῖται ᾗ δειλός, τὰ µὲν οὐδενί ἐστι φοβερά, τὰ δ᾿ ἠρέµα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ 
ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ᾿ ἁπλῶς φοβερὰ λέγοµεν. ὁ δ᾿ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ᾿ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑποµένει τὰ τοιαῦτα 
φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι µὲν ὡς φοβερὰ αὐτῷ ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς οὔ, ᾗ µὲν ἄνθρωπος φοβερά, ᾗ δ᾿ ἀνδρεῖος οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλ᾿ἢ 
ἠρέµα, ἢ οὐδαµῶς.
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Assume, then, that the good agent is not the measure of natural goods. This is 
compatible with a weaker claim: natural goods are good for the best agent, insofar as the 
good agent belongs to a larger set of agents. They are good for, but not only good for the best 
agent. This is how I reconstruct the relation between natural goods and the good person. In 
EE VIII.3 1248 b 27, Aristotle says: “A good person is one for whom the natural goods are 
good.”  The relation between the best person and goodness, as Aristotle conceives of it, is 189
sometimes construed as if the best person’s attitudes were constitutive of it; in other words, as 
if goodness was in some sense constituted by the best person’s perspective and set of 
attitudes. It is conceivable that some such account applies to what, according to Aristotle, 
truly is beautiful and truly is pleasant. However, if natural goods are good for the best agent 
as well as for (to be specified) others, then this type of account cannot apply to natural goods. 
Instead the good person is the person who finds natural goods good, but the goodness of 
natural goods does not depend on this.  
This interpretation has the virtue to accommodate what may otherwise appear to be 
inconsistent strands in Aristotle’s view. Namely, on the one hand, Aristotle says that if we 
move toward virtue we attain a condition where the simpliciter-good is what is worth 
choosing for ourselves; we saw this in T1. Here it would seem that simpliciter-goods, and 
hence (according to my hypothesis) natural goods are associated with either a virtuous 
condition, or at any rate a condition that approaches virtue. 
On the other hand, in T2, Aristotle says that natural goods are goods for which we fight 
(τὰ γὰρ περιµάχητα καὶ µέγιστα εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά). Natural goods, it seems, are 
competitive goods, goods that typically people desire to possess. This seems true not only for 
 EE VIII 1248 b 27: ἀγαθὸς µὲν οὖν ἐστιν ᾧ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθά. This statement occurs also in the 189
Politics, in a passage where Aristotle refers to the Ethics.
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the virtuous or almost-virtuous agent. Instead there seems to be a shared perspective among 
agents regarding the goodness of natural goods. We may even say that perceptual, 
desiderative and cognitive attitudes that are characteristic for human beings make natural 
goods appealing to us.  Again, this shared perspective need not encompass literally 190
everyone. Aristotle says that the natural goods are bad for some people because of their 
dispositions. However, he does not say that they are bad for almost everyone, excluding the 
virtuous. Rather, it seems that they are good, and desired as such, typically, which is 
compatible with there being exceptions. 
It is a desideratum for a compelling interpretation that it accommodates these two 
dimensions of the account: natural goods (simpliciter-goods) are good for the virtuous 
person; and they are good for a larger group of persons. This is what my proposal, option (6), 
says. More precisely, natural goods are good for human beings in a standard state. It is not 
sufficient to be a human being in order to benefit from natural goods. One needs to be in a 
standard state in order to desire natural goods and to benefit from them. The standard state is 
not to be confused with the particulars about given persons that Aristotle discusses elsewhere, 
for example, when he observes that a moderate amount of food for the athlete differs from a 
moderate amount of food for a beginner.  Everyone is in some condition or other in myriad 191
respects at a given moment, and these conditions matter for the minutiae of what is, at a given 
moment, the right thing to do. When we ask what it means to be in a standard state, however, 
 Berryman (S. Berryman, “On a curious passage in EE ii 6,” Ancient Philosophy, 38, 2018, pp. 137-150), 190
emphasises, as I do here, the role of conceptions of a good life. However, my position differs from hers insofar 
as she argues that human nature cannot be the standard to determine what is good for human beings, and that 
human beings control the normativity of action. In this chapter, I argue that there is a distinctive psychological 
human nature: this psychological nature is the standard of what is good for us in the sense of the natural good. 
Already the characterization of natural goods as “goods for which we fight” speaks in favor of this. On 
psychological human nature, cf. Vogt 2017. 
 NE 1106 b 6.191
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we are concerned with conditions of a more general sort. For example, and as we will see in 
more detail, it counts as non-standard to be sick; this is compatible with a wide range of states 
that are “more or less” healthy, and that fall, broadly speaking, into the range of what is 
“standard.” However, before I explore this further, let me focus on one relevant aspect, 
namely the kind of relativity-to-agents that is involved in the notion of natural goods. 
4. Good-for vs relative goodness 
With respect to the NE, scholars tend to hold one of two views about Aristotle’s notion 
of simpliciter-goods. They either take it that simpliciter goods are absolute goods (3), or that 
they are good for the excellent individual (5).  The idea that simpliciter goods are good 192
absolutely is sometimes also expressed in terms of their intrinsic quality: what is absolutely 
good is good by itself, or intrinsically. According to Vogt, scholars have often interpreted the 
distinction between good-simpliciter and good-for as a distinction between non-relative 
goodness and relative goodness. However, this is misleading given that Aristotle conceives of 
the good-simpliciter as also good-for.  193
In a passage in the NE often referred to by scholars who defend naturalism, Aristotle 
argues that healthy and good are different for human beings and for fish.  This is not a 194
relativist claim. According to relativism what seems good to X is what is good for X. As Vogt 
 Scholars tend to interpret simpliciter-goods as good without qualification. They understand “good without 192
qualification” along the same lines as Kant’s good will, which is good without qualification. In Kant, the good 
will has intrinsic goodness. Cf. J. Aufderheide, R.M. Bader (eds.), The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, 
Oxford University Press, 2015; N.P. White, ‘Goodness and Human Aims in Aristotle’s Ethics’. In Studies in 
Aristotle, edited by D. J. O’Meara, Washington: The Catholic University Press of America, 1981, pp. 225–46. 
 On good-for cf. K. Vogt, Desiring the Good, OUP 2017, ch. 2 and 4. D. Jacquette, “Aristotle’s Refutation of 193
the Universal Good,” Journal of Value Inquiry 32, 1998, pp. 301–24; in favor of intrinsic goodness see C. 
Shields, “The Summum Bonum in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in J. Aufderheide, R.M. Bader (eds.), The Highest Good 
in Aristotle and Kant, pp. 84-110. 
 NE 1141 a 23.194
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argues this is not quite the same as the claim that what seems to X is how the world is for 
X.  The latter claim captures a real phenomenon. Say, when one freezes, one is cold.  But 195 196
all we are saying here is that seemings—perceptions, impressions, and so on—are the states 
of minds they are. If one is attracted to something, one is attracted to something. If one is 
amused, one is amused. If something seems good to one, it seems good to one. In an 
Aristotelian framework, this does not mean that the object really is attractive, amusing, or 
good. 
That is, the formulation that what seems to X is how things are for X leaves room for 
the possibility that one’s own seeming, or in other words one’s own belief, can be false.  197
This makes all the difference: according to relativism, all “seemings” or beliefs are true; each 
of them is true for the subject who holds it. For a position to differ from relativism it must 
permit falsity. Falsity shows up from a third-person perspective. We are able to say that it is 
false if someone thinks the moderate amount of food for her is three plates of tiramisu three 
times a day. Absent some highly uncommon conditions (or extraordinarily small plates), this 
is too much.  
Falsity also shows up from a first-person perspective. It may appear good to a person 
with a cold to stay in bed all day. The agent herself can be aware that what appears good to 
her appears good to her qua someone who has a cold. Suppose further that what seems good 
to her actually is good for her; for her, staying in bed all day is an effective way to recover. 
 Cf. K. Vogt, Desiring the Good, OUP 2017, ch. 4, p. 95; Theaetetus 152 a 7-9; I.C. McCready-Flora, 195
“Protagoras and Plato in Aristotle: Rereading the Measure Doctrine,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49, 
2015, pp. 71-127
 Like Vogt (2017), I here stay close to Plato’s Theaetetus, which explores Protagorean relativism and nearby 196
positions. That the person who is freezing really is cold is one of Plato’s main examples.
 For a discussion of seemings as beliefs see K. Vogt, Desiring the good, p. 95.197
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Still, “staying in bed all day is good” is by her own lights false, insofar as this is considered a 
general claim. This gap between what seems to a person and what the person assumes is 
actually the case matter to my interpretation of the notion of simpliciter-goods. Namely, a 
person may be aware that she is not in a standard condition. What appears good to her and 
what she desires is not simpliciter-good. There is an intuitive sense in which “not having a 
cold” is standard. By the lights of the sick person, this is how she usually is and how lots of 
people around her are. For the most part, people don’t have colds. Note, however, that the 
contrast is not between how things are for the sick person on the one hand, and how things 
are in a non-relative manner. Instead, the contrast is one between two different relata: 
between how things are for the sick person (or person in some other non-standard state) on 
the one hand, and for people in standard conditions on the other hand. 
More could be said regarding relativism and its different formulations, but for present 
purposes this minimal sketch suffices. According to this minimal sketch, the claim that I am 
considering here - the simpliciter-good is what is good for the human being in a standard state 
- is not a relativist claim. Good has a relatum, and is relative in that sense. But the simpliciter-
good is not relativist, where this would mean that whatever appears good to someone really is 
good. To return to the example of health, not everything that appears tempting to a sick 
person is actually good for her. It may seem good to someone whose hand has caught fire to 
put the hand in cold water in order to extinguish fire. And yet the agent shouldn’t, or so, she 
takes it, experts say. She must extinguish the fire with a piece of cloth in order for her burned 
skin to recover faster. The distinction between a standard and a non-standard state permits 
both kinds of cases: (i) where what seems good to the person, say, staying in bed, really is 
good for her; (ii) where what seems good to the person, say, put a burning hand in cold water, 
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is not good for her. This is another way of saying that goodness is relative to a person in a 
given state, but it is not relativist. 
5. A minimal notion of the standard state 
So far, I argued that the notion of a standard state is broad enough to encompass the 
best agent as well as many others. I also argued that natural goods, by being good for people 
in a standard state, have a relatum without thereby being relativist. In this section, I add four 
further features to my account of natural goods and the standard state. First, I elaborate on an 
idea we encountered earlier, namely that natural goods are goods of great generality. Second, 
I argue that the standard state involves characteristic desiderative attitudes. Third, I discuss 
Aristotle’s claim that the standard state involves health, and unimpeded perceptual and 
cognitive capacities. Fourth, I turn to the proposal that the standard state involves adulthood. 
This makes Natural Goods Naturalism a diachronic theory—a theory that attends to different 
life stages in order to establish what it is that is good for human beings.  
First, then, consider the level of generality involved in Aristotle’s proposals. Suppose 
that someone who is tired from a long day is on the whole in a standard state. She is a 
reasonably healthy adult person. Nevertheless, a whole range of different things may appear 
good to her. To one agent, baking a cake appears adequate to help her relax after work. To 
another person, chatting with her friend on the phone seems restorative. According to 
Aristotle, these agents may be right or wrong about what actually is good for them. And yet, 
these matters do not pertain to his notion of natural goods. For these two options are within a 
range of fairly standard things that may be relaxing to those who are on the whole in standard 
conditions, and yet tired from work. The notion of natural goods does nothing to help us 
decide among them. Rather, the notion of natural goods is fairly minimal. According to T2, 
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natural goods are goods for which we fight and are considered to be the greatest good for a 
good human life. Baking a cake or talking to a friend do not count as natural goods. A given 
agent may desire to bake a cake or to talk with a friend, but in our example these are 
dependent goods. Honor and wealth are natural goods, and activities that help restore honor 
and wealth derive their value from this relationship. But it is honor, wealth, and so on, that we 
fight for and that we consider the greatest, as Aristotle puts this in T2. This provides us with 
one basic feature of natural goods and the standard state: natural goods have a high level of 
generality; they are good for people who are, with respect to the particulars of their condition 
and attitudes, in a wide variety of states. 
Second, another feature of natural goods, I submit, resides in the desiderative attitudes 
that human beings typically have to them. What does it mean that we “fight for” these goods 
and consider them “the greatest”? In the previous step in my argument, I proposed that 
natural goods are not made good by the attitudes of agents; they are good for agents in a 
standard state, whether or not they appear good to them (this is the rejection of relativism). 
But while it is not true that the simpliciter-good is good by virtue of a given person finding it 
good, Aristotle does think that the natural good appears good to us. Natural goods are goods 
to which we respond and to which we are attracted, if only we are in standard states. If the 
agent is in a standard state, what seems good to her is the simpliciter-good. 
This is compatible, however, with a wide range of more specific seemings. Say, 
depending on the circumstances and specifics regarding the agent, baking a cake or chatting 
with a friend may be ways in which the natural goods of strength and health seem desirable—
these are, for a given agent, ways of relaxing, regaining strength and maintaining health. 
Moreover, agents can be wrong about the specifics and yet the natural good appears good to 
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them. That is, someone may desire to be wealthy, and yet in a given situation desire to buy an 
expensive dress rather than saving money, though in fact saving would make her wealthy. 
The fact that agents often make these kinds of mistakes does not mean, however, that the 
natural goods do not appear good to them. A standard state, then, is not a state where agents 
get the specifics of what is and what is not good for them right; this would be far too 
demanding. Rather, a standard state is a state where agents desire natural goods. That is, they 
desire what typically human beings desire and these are goods such as wealth and honor, 
namely goods that are considered the greatest.  
I turn now to my third and fourth proposals, which attends to health and unaltered 
capacities on the one hand, and the diachronic dimension of Aristotle’s view on the other 
hand. Aristotle addresses these dimensions of the standard state conjointly. The following 
passage in EE VII clarifies that the human being in a standard state is an healthy individual in 
normal conditions, who is adult: 
(T5) Some good things are good simpliciter, and others are good for a particular 
person but not simpliciter; and the same things are good simpliciter and pleasant 
simpliciter. For we say that what is beneficial for a healthy body is good 
simpliciter for a body, but we do not say this about what is good for a sick body 
(for example, medication and surgery). Similarly, what is pleasant for a healthy 
and sound body is pleasant for a body simpliciter, for example, seeing in light, 
not in darkness is pleasant for someone with healthy eyes, yet, it is the opposite 
for someone with eye disease. And it is not the wine enjoyed by someone whose 
palate has been ruined by excessive drinking that is more pleasant (since those 
people adulterate it with sour wine) but rather the wine which is pleasant to 
uncorrupted tastes. The situation is similar with the soul, and it is not what 
children and wild beasts find pleasant but rather what mature people find 
pleasant, at least, when we remember both we choose the latter. The relationship 
of a base and foolish people to a decent and wise one is like the relationship of a 
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child or a wild beast to a mature human being. What is pleasant for them is what 
matches their states - and for the latter that is good and beautiful things.  198
Aristotle distinguishes the good-simpliciter (ἁπλῶς) from the good for the particular 
individual (τινί). I discussed this distinction as option (4). Aristotle says that the same things 
that are good-simpliciter are also pleasant simpliciter. Then he introduces a comparison with 
healthy and sick bodies. Some things are good-simpliciter for the body: these things are good 
for the healthy body. However, they are not good for the sick body. Similarly, the things that 
are good-simpliciter for the healthy body are also pleasant simpliciter for this body. But they 
are not pleasant for the sick body. The good-simpliciter and the pleasant simpliciter go hand 
in hand when the body is healthy. The comparison with the healthy body suggests that what is 
good-simpliciter is not what is good for an ideal or exceptional individual. Conversely, the 
comparison with the healthy body suggests that what is good-simpliciter is good and pleasant 
for the individual in a standard state. Being healthy is not an exceptional state.   199
Aristotle also considers the case of the drunk person: what is good for this person is not 
the good-simpliciter. This supports the idea that what is good-simpliciter is good for an agent 
when her perceptual and cognitive capacities are not altered. This dimension of the standard 
state seems continuous with health. Extreme alterations of our capacities—say, through 
strong drugs—seem comparable to illness. Finally, Aristotle says that we are not considering 
 EE VII, 1235 b 30- 1236 a 6: τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ µὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὔ. καὶ τὰ 198
αὐτὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ µὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαµεν σώµατι συµφέροντα ἁπλῶς εἶναι σώµατι 
ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάµνοντι οὔ, οἷον φαρµακείας καὶ τοµάς. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἁπλῶς σώµατι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι 
καὶ ὁλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει: καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλµιῶντι ἐναντίως. καὶ οἶνος 
ἡδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρµένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἰνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὔτε ὄξος παρεγχέουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ 
αἰσθήσει. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἃ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν. ἀµφοτέρων 
γοῦν µεµνηµένοι ταῦθ᾽ αἱρούµεθα. ὡς δ᾽ ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθεστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ 
φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιµον. τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις: ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ 
καὶ τὰ καλά. 
 In the view that I defend, the agent in a standard state is healthy. Health itself is not a natural good. Rather, 199
for the agent who is healthy, natural goods are good. Aristotle claims that bodily excellences are natural goods. 
Examples of bodily excellences are strength, having athletic capacities, and so forth. 
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what is good for children or wild beasts, but what is good for mature individuals. Again, this 
is presented as continuous with the earlier dimensions. Presumably, being adult is also a 
physical and mental condition, a state in which we are, say, strong in ways in which children 
aren’t and in which our capacities for perceiving and thinking are developed in ways in which 
they are not during childhood. The notion of natural goods, then, takes a diachronic 
perspective. It does not identify features of human beings that would manifest differently 
throughout life. Rather, it identifies features of human beings that culminate and are 
especially manifest during adulthood. 
In sum, T5 says that the agent in a standard state as an adult, healthy individual in 
normal conditions, where normal conditions captures the conditions in which our perceptual 
and cognitives attitudes are when they are not altered (we are not drunk, we are not under the 
influence of drugs, and so forth). So far we encountered six features of natural goods. They 
are good for a large class of people including the best agent. Their goodness is relative, not 
relativist. They have a high level of generality. Human beings relate to them with 
characteristic desiderative attitudes. And their account involves attention to health, unaltered 
capacities and adulthood. These findings may leave us with the following question. What 
notion of human nature is at work in Natural Goods Relativism? More specifically, how does 
the relevant notion of human nature permit the focus on adulthood, setting aside other phases 
of human life, and how does it permit inclusion of very many, but not all, human beings? 
6. For the most part and by nature 
To address this question let me invoke two of Aristotle’s technical terms: “for the most 
part” (ὠς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) and “by nature” (φύσει). As I wish to show in this section, the human 
being in a standard state is representative of how human beings are for the most part or how 
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they are by nature. In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes what is for the most part 
from what is necessary: 
(T6) The expression “to be possible” is used in two senses: (1) to describe what is 
for the most part, but falls short of being necessary, e.g., a person’s becoming 
grey-haired or growing or wasting away, or in general that which belongs to 
someone in virtue of being brought forth by nature.  200
In the passage, what is for the most part is described as what is not necessary, but what occurs 
with a certain regularity. Aristotle uses the example of grey hair to illustrate the notion of “for 
the most part:” by nature human beings have grey hair when they age. However, not everyone 
has grey hair.  Aristotle says that what is “for the most part” is what can be “by nature” 201
applicable to the subject. In a similar fashion, in talking about the agent in a standard state, I 
refer to how human beings are “for-the-most-part.” As others have argued, for the most part is 
not a statistical notion.  The proposal is not that, quantitatively, most human beings are 202
healthy adults in normal circumstances. When Aristotle employs the notion of “for the most 
part,” he discusses the kinds of regularities we find in a given field. In metaphysics, say, we 
are concerned with necessary regularities. In the domain of ethics, however, we only find for 
the most part regularities. In her account of this feature of Aristotelian ethics, Vogt picks up 
Aristotle’s notion of the “sublunary” sphere: like the lives of trees and animals, human lives 
play out in a sphere that doesn’t display necessary regularity.  The life of a human being, 203
 Prior Analytics 32 b 4-9, trans. by H. Tredennick with changes by GB: Διωρισµένων δὲ τούτων πάλιν 200
λέγοµεν ὅτι τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι κατὰ δύο λέγεται τρόπους, ἕνα µὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διαλείπειν τὸ 
ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον τὸ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ πεφυκὸς ὑπάρχειν.
 On the notion of being “for the most part,” see D. Henry, “Holding for the most part: the demonstrability of 201
moral facts,” in D. Henry, K.M. Nielsen, Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp. 169-191. 
 For an analysis of natural phenomena as phenomena that occur for the most part, see M. Segev, “Aristotle on 202
nature, human nature and human understanding,” Rhizomata 5, 2, 2017, pp. 177-210.
 K. Vogt, Desiring the Good, 2017, p. 167.203
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then, has a life cycle comparable to that of other natural entities. This is one dimension of the 
notion of nature Aristotle brings to bear when he talks about natural goods. In book II.8 of the 
EE, Aristotle defines how, for present purposes, he understands the expression “by 
nature” (φύσει):  
(T7) We pretty much define what is by nature with reference to these two 
criteria, that is, whatever arises for everyone as soon as they are born, and 
whatever comes about for us when our development is allowed to continue on, 
including grey hair, old age, and so forth.  204
On this account, two kinds of features of human beings count as natural. First, features 
we have at birth. An example might be having two legs. Second, features that come about as a 
human being grows up and ages, such as grey hair. These features are “by nature.” Of course, 
some human beings may be born with only one leg, and some human beings may not come to 
have grey hair when they age. Human life, according to Aristotle, belongs to a for-the-most-
part domain. Whether one’s hair grows grey, say, is contingent; nevertheless, it is natural 
insofar as it is for the most part the case.  This diachronic notion of human nature matters to 205
ethics, it would seem, because human agents change over time. A plausible kind of naturalism 
should capture this dimension. The notion of nature, then, is normative in the sense that we 
prioritize one life phase over others. Now—in adulthood—the human being is in standard 
state, or so the claim goes.  
 Eudemian Ethics, 1224 b 31-35, tr. by B. Inwood and R. Woolf: σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζοµεν, 204
τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθὺς γιγνοµένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωµένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίγνεται ἡµῖν, οἷον 
πολιὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. All translations of the EE are by B. Inwood and R. Woolf with changes 
by GB.
 For a discussion of for-the-most-part domain see L. Judson, “Chance and always or for the most part in 205
Aristotle,” in L. Judson (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: a Collection of Essays, Oxford, 1991, pp. 71-100; M. Segev, 
“Aristotle on nature, human nature and human understanding,” Rhizomata, 5, 2, 20, 2017, pp. 117-209; K. Vogt, 
Desiring the Good, OUP, 2017, ch. 7, pp. 166-190. Vogt argues that the metaphysics of the sphere of action is 
characterized by a for-the-most-part regularity. NE 1094 b 11-27, 1104 a 4 -10. 
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The relevant notion of nature, however, is normative also in a more familiar sense, a 
sense that scholars of ancient philosophy often explore. What is natural for some being, here, 
is a matter of what this being is—in more technical terms, the “what it is” or essence of this 
being. To see in which sense “for the most part” is not a statistical notion, we also need to 
appeal to this way of thinking about nature (or natures, in the plural). Namely, according to 
Aristotle human beings are a certain kind of being. For present purposes, this is best 
illuminated by drawing on the function argument and the account of the soul that comes with 
it. We are beings for whom such-and-such activities are characteristic. On this conception, it 
is conceivable that human beings who live in greatly deprived circumstances—say, after a 
severe disaster—do not perform those activities that are characteristic of human nature. In the 
terms of the Politics there are conditions where all we want is survive, rather than live a good 
human life.  Insofar as it is conceivable that very many people live under greatly deprived 206
circumstances, it is conceivable that very many people are not active in ways that are 
characteristic for human beings. 
The role of for the most part regularities in NGN brings to light an important dimension 
of the theory. Namely, though a number of features of the standard state can appear to be 
descriptive, ultimately we are considering a theory where seemingly descriptive features are 
tied up with a normative framework. Throughout, Aristotle is concerned with what is 
characteristic for human beings, in a sense that relates to a normative notion of human nature. 
7. Formulation of Natural Goods Naturalism 
Before moving to a comprehensive formulation of NGN, we should return to the 
hypothesis that I posited at the beginning of the chapter: natural goods are simpliciter-goods. 
 Politics, 1252 b 32.206
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Has this hypothesis been substantiated? Let us examine first occurrences in which Aristotle 
explicitly says that what is good-simpliciter is good by nature. First of all, in T1, Aristotle 
says that simpliciter-goods are by nature good for a human being. In T3, he says that the 
virtue of someone who is excellent by nature is good-simpliciter. In T4, he states that what is 
excellent by nature is good-simpliciter. And in T8, Aristotle explains that what is fearful 
simpliciter is fearful for human beings. These four passages provide evidence that Aristotle 
uses the two expressions interchangeably. This identification is not limited to how Aristotle 
uses these expressions: if we ask what natural goods are and for whom they are good, we see 
that natural goods are the same things as simpliciter-goods (see T3-T5). Natural goods and 
simpliciter-goods are one way to think about what is good for human beings as we are by 
nature.  
Once elucidated what natural goods are and for whom they are good, we can offer a 
comprehensive formulation of NGN. According to NGN, the natural good is what is good for 
human beings in a standard state. The agent in the standard state is adult, healthy and in 
normal conditions; this agent desires to possess natural goods. NGN does not exhaust what is 
good for human beings. Accordingly, it does not exhaust Aristotelian naturalism. But it 
attends to a fundamental kind of good, natural goods, and argues that these goods—qua 
goods we desire—are basic to human life. 
NGN does not address the relationship between virtue and nature, and it does not rank 
lives as better or worse, as other reconstructions of Aristotelian naturalism do. As far as I 
reconstruct NGN, it is compatible with such stronger forms of naturalism. But the attraction 
of NGN, as I see it, is that by itself it is a theoretically more modest position. It does not 
commit us to considering one kind of life as the best. NGN is worth reconstructing, I submit, 
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as part of the larger exegetical project of understanding the outlook of the EE. In this context, 
the observation that the EE contains nothing less than a distinctive kind of naturalism should 
interest us. In addition, if as ethicists today we do not aim for a complete exegetical account, 
but instead aim to unearth theoretical options that may interest us, NGN deserves our 
attention. It is a form of naturalism that, if developed further, aside from Aristotle exegesis, is 
compatible with pluralism about good human lives.   207
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I offered an interpretation of the distinctive Eudemian notion of natural 
goods and the agent for whom they are good. Conjointly, this amounts to the reconstruction 
of a kind of naturalism which I call Natural Goods Naturalism or, in short, NGN. I argued 
that the notion of natural goods cuts across the distinction among external goods, goods of the 
body, and goods of the soul. According to NGN, honor, wealth, bodily excellences, good 
fortune and power are genuine goods. These goods have a particular relation to human nature. 
NGN is so far entirely unexplored. Though there are some recent papers on passages or 
notions relevant to it, my observation that the EE contains an approach that can enrich 
discussions of Aristotelian naturalism is new. As I hope to have shown, natural goods are 
what are better known as simpliciter-goods. The two expressions pick out the same goods. 
The expression simpliciter-goods occurs two times in the NE, but it is not fundamental for the 
distinctively Nicomachean proposals. In the Eudemian account of goods, however, 
simpliciter-goods play a fundamental role. I considered six options to interpret the notion of 
natural goods: natural goods are external goods, natural goods are dependent goods, natural 
 This is where McDowell’s and Vogt’s realism come apart. McDowell’s Aristotelian realism is committed to 207
considering the life of the phronimos as the best life; Vogt’s realism admits variability albeit recognizing that 
there are core common features in good human lives.
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goods are good absolutely, they are good for the particular agent, they are good for the the 
best agent, and they are good for the agent in a standard state. I provided evidence in favor of 
the last claim. The conception of a standard state and its relation to natural goods, my 
argument continued, has the following dimensions. The best agent as well as many other 
agents are in the standard state. Though natural goods have a relatum, there is nothing 
relativist about Aristotle’s account of natural goods. Natural goods are goods of great 
generality. The standard state involves characteristic desiderative attitudes, namely, ones of 
desiring natural goods. The standard state involves health, unimpeded perceptual and 
cognitive capacities, and adulthood. In sum, NGN cuts across the distinction between the 
descriptive and the normative. Some features of the standard state are seemingly entirely 
descriptive, such as being an adult or not drunk. Other features are more evidently normative, 
such as having characteristic human desiderative attitudes. Ultimately, the dimensions of the 
theory blend the normative and the descriptive, for the reason I explore at the end of the 
chapter. Aristotle’s theory is one about how human beings are for the most part. This, 
however, is not a statistical notion, but one that latches on to Aristotle’s thought about the 
natures of things, and thereby to normative notions of what it is for something to be what it is.   
!114
CHAPTER FOUR 
Function Argument, human nature and contemplation in the EE and in the NE 
The FA figures both in the Eudemian Ethics (EE)  and in the Nicomachean Ethics 208
(NE).  The Nicomachean Ethics-Function Argument (NE-FA) has received a lot of attention 209
by scholars who study Aristotle’s ethics. T. Nagel criticizes Aristotle’s proposal that rational 
activity is the distinctive function of human beings. Nagel argues that our function should 
involve all our capacities, rather than only rational capacity, as the FA suggests.  B. 210
Williams famously criticizes the isolation argument. The isolation argument is the argument 
that Aristotle proposes to show that the human function is something uniquely human. 
Williams aims at investigating whether there are activities exclusively human other than 
rational activity.  R. Nozick shares Williams’s critique and suggests that, if our function 211
should be something exclusively human, having a sense of humor is uniquely human as much 
as rational activity.  In addition to these critiques concerning the content of the FA, many 212
scholars stressed that the FA is not truly an argument but rather an analogy. 
My aim in the chapter is to offer an interpretation of the FA in the Eudemain Ethics 
(EE-FA), and of its relation with the FA in the NE and with the Platonic version of the 
 EE II 1218 b 30- 1219 a 25. 208
 NE I 1097 b 29- 1098 a 14. 209
 T. Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in A.O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, Berkeley: University 210
of California Press, 1981, pp. 7-14.
 B. Williams, Morality: an introduction to ethics, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 59-68.211
 R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 515-517.212
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Function Argument in the Republic (Republic-FA).  The differences in the FAs, as they 213
appear in the three works, are such that we can speak of three FAs. I argue that the 
Aristotelian FA sheds light on the discussions of the best life that occur at the end of the two 
ethics - respectively in NE X and in EE VIII. In the NE, the function (ἔργον) of the human 
being is defined as activity according to reason; its best fulfillment is contemplation. This is 
the best life: happiness. In the EE, the function of the human soul is living; I argue that the 
best fulfillment of this function is activity according to all the parts of the soul that share in 
reason (λόγος). In other words, the best life - which is happiness - is activity according to the 
virtues of thinking and according to the character virtues. 
In the EE, Aristotle says that the ergon (function, task or job) of the human soul is 
living. In the NE, he points out that the ergon of human beings is activity according to reason. 
At first sight, it seems that the two questions that Aristotle is asking in the two treatises - what 
is the function of the human soul? What is the function of human beings? - amount to the 
same. However, in this chapter, I argue that the two FAs are different. They are indicative of a 
different focus in the approach to the soul and to happiness in the two treatises. In both 
treatises, Aristotle seems to work with a notion of the soul that has early Greek ancestors. 
Roughly, according to this early notion the soul is what makes something alive. For this 
reason, vegetative activities belong to the soul. The growth and decay of cells (as today we 
put this) is one way in which we are alive. Affective and desiderative activities as well as 
reasoning are also ways of being alive, and they are more distinctively human. Despite this 
common ground, there are differences, perhaps not regarding fundamental premises, but at 
least regarding emphasis. Namely, in preliminary terms, the EE attends more to the ways in 
 Republic I 353d-354a.213
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which all dimensions of the soul that are distinctively human form a unity; and the NE attends 
more to the specific ways of being alive when we exercise one set of capacities rather than 
another. 
In the EE, Aristotle speaks in the singular: he is concerned with “the soul.” I take this to 
be indicative of his focus on the unity of distinctively human soul-activities. That is, the 
virtues of character and of thinking are interwoven as virtues of the soul. In line with this 
unified notion of the soul, there is one excellent life, which involves all the virtues of 
character and all the virtues of thinking. Of course, the NE does not reject that the human soul 
has unity, and at times Aristotle also speaks of the soul in the singular. But in the NE, 
Aristotle’s focus on human beings relies on an implicit identification of human beings with 
the part of the soul capable of thinking. The NE-FA lays out a distinction that figures 
throughout the NE: the distinction between doing well in terms of the virtues of character on 
the one hand, and doing well in terms of the virtues of thinking on the other hand. In effect, 
there seems to be two kinds of excellent lives. In my analysis, I show that the EE-FA has 
stronger connections than the NE-FA to the Republic-FA. 
In what follows, I propose and explain a chart that compares the three FAs as they 
appear in the EE, in the NE, and in the Republic (section 1). I examine the distinctive features 
of each argument: that is, I examine the subject and purpose, the structure, the role of virtue 
and of use in relation to the FAs (sections 2-7). I offer an analysis of how the EE-FA is 
connected to the discussions of the divine and of the best fulfillment of the human soul’s 
function in EE VIII (section 8 and 9). I compare this discussion in the EE with the 
corresponding discussion of the best life - the best fulfillment of the human function - in NE 
X (section 10). 
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1. The Function Arguments 
As I mentioned, the NE-Function Argument has been at the center of the attention of 
scholars who study Aristotle’s ethics. Both its structure and its content are disputed.  The 214
Greek word, which is usually translated with function, is ἔργον. The Greek term conveys the 
idea that the ἔργον of something is its job, or its task. In other words, it is what something 
does when it is active in its characteristic and distinctive fashion. As Aristotle thinks of it, the 
ergon of something realizes its true nature. The notion of nature includes the process of 
development that occurs spontaneously in an individual as she grows up and ages.  215
Accordingly, “function” is not an ideal translation. At the worst, it may suggest that human 
beings have a function in such a way that someone is using us for something; this idea must 
be explicitly set aside. However, to translate ἔργον differently would ultimately be confusing, 
simply because the translation as “function” is so very well established. The Function 
Arguments in Aristotle’s NE and EE share some aspects with Plato’s Function Argument in 
the Republic. In the following chart, I propose a comparison of the three arguments in NE, EE 
and in the Republic. I discuss each point of comparison in what follows. 
 R. Barney, Aristotle’s Argument for a Human Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; R. Kraut, 214
“The peculiar function of human beings,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9, 1979, pp. 467-478; J. Whiting, 
“Aristotle’s function argument: a defense,” Ancient Philosophy, 8, 1988, pp. 33-48; D. Achtenberg, “The role of 
the Ergon Argument in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, IV, J.P. Anton, 
A. Preus (eds.), Albany: SUNY Press, 1991, pp. 59-72. C.M. Korsgaard, Aristotle’s Function Argument, in The 
Constitution of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; G. Lawrence, Human Good and Human 
Function, in R. Kraut, The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 
 This seems to be how phusis is understood in Aristotle’s ethics. It is also how nature is understood when it is 215
very rarely used in Homer. Cf. G. Naddaf, The Greek concept of nature, New York: SUNY Press, 2005.
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Nicomachean Ethics  
I.7
Eudemian Ethics II.1 Republic 353 e-354 a
Subject Function of human 
being
Function of the soul Function of the soul
Function Activity of the soul 
according to reason
Living Living
Purpose of the FA Prepare the ground for 
the discussion of 
happiness
Prepare the ground 
for the discussion of 
happiness
Understand whether 
just people are happier 
and live better lives 
than unjust people (FA 
is introduced in Rep. 
335 d, where Plato 
says that the function 
of goodness is to 
benefit)
Rhetorical Argument Yes Yes (Aristotle makes a 
stronger claim than in 
the NE and in Rep: he 
said that by induction 
it works in all cases).
Yes
Comparanda Flute-player, sculptor, 
craftsman, shoemaker, 
carpenter, eye, foot, 
parts of the body
Cloak, boat, house, 
shoemaker
Horse, eyes, ears, 
knife
Premises - the good of 
something is in its 
function 

- other things have 
functions, human 
beings should have a 
function too

- if the parts of X have 
a function, there 
must be a function of 
the whole

- function of X and of a 
good X is the same in 
kind

- a function is fulfilled 
in an excellent way if 
it is fulfilled in accord 
with virtue
- all things that have 
a virtue, have a 
function or use

- the state and the 
better state are 
related

- the function and 
the better function 
are related

- the better state has 
a better function

- the function is the 
end

- the function is 
better than the 
state 

- a thing has the 
same function as 
its virtue
- function of 
goodness is to 
benefit; the good is 
useful (335 d)

- the function is that 
which one can do 
only with it or best 
with it

- all things that have a 
virtue, have a 
function or use

- in order to perform 
the function well, 
one needs the 
corresponding virtue
Isolation Argument Yes No (it occurs in 
relation to virtue)
Yes
Elimination Argument Yes No No
Function is the end No Yes No
Virtue is what allows 




2. Subject and purpose of the FAs 
In the NE-Function Argument, Aristotle aims at finding the function of human beings. 
The EE-Function Argument and the Republic-Function Argument examine the function of the 
human soul rather than the function of human beings. At first sight, speaking of the function 
of human beings and of the function of the human soul seem to be the same. However, in 
what follows, I show that this difference reveals a distinct emphasis on what constitutes a 
human being and on happiness.  
The NE-FA prepares the ground for the definition of happiness. In NE 1097 b 27, the 
good of human beings - happiness - is said to reside in the function that human beings have. 
In other words, happiness is the best fulfillment of the human function. Yet, what is the 
function of human beings? The focus on human beings rather than on their soul suggests that 
Aristotle is considering what constitutes a human being as a whole, which is the compound of 
body and soul. In NE 1097 b 30, Aristotle talks indeed about the body, and he points out that 
bodily parts have functions. Two questions come to mind: is there a function of the body as a 
One needs a function 
in order to have virtue
No Yes No
Two senses of 
function
No One is over and 
above the use: 
example of art of 
house building and 
house, medicine and 
health

The other is the use: 




The use as function is 
mentioned in Republic 
601 e 
Function is what one 
is designed by nature 
to do
Yes No Yes (Republic 601 e)
Nicomachean Ethics  
I.7
Eudemian Ethics II.1 Republic 353 e-354 a
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whole? What is the relation of this function to the function of the individual body parts? In 
the text, there is no answer to these questions. In the FA, Aristotle does not make any 
reference to the compound of body and soul, or to the soul as a unity with parts: 
(T1) What remains is an active life of the element that possesses reason. (Of this 
element, one part has reason in being obedient to reason, the other in possessing it 
and engaging in thought.)  216
Aristotle says that the function of human beings is an active life of the element that possesses 
reason. A few lines later he proposes a slightly modified definition of the function as: 
(T2) Activity of the soul in accordance with reason or at least not entirely lacking it.   217
The function of human beings concerns human beings as a whole; but it resides only in 
that part of the soul that engages in thought, or at least in the part that obeys reason. For a 
human being to do well is to engage in the activities of our highest capacities. Indeed, there 
seem to be two formulations of what the function is: according to T1, the function is activity 
of the part of the soul that possesses reason including the part that obeys reason; according to 
T2, it is activity of the part of the soul that possesses reason or at least of the part that does 
not lack reason. I will discuss the parts of the soul in a dedicated section of this chapter. For 
now, let me anticipate some of the fundamental ideas. In NE 1102 b 38- 1103 a 5, Aristotle 
divides the soul in two parts: one part has reason and the other is alogon. However, within the 
alogon part, the vegetative part lacks reason entirely, while the desiderative and appetitive 
part shares (µετέχει) in reason by listening and obeying to reason. At times, Aristotle calls the 
 NE 1098 a 4-6.216
 NE 1098 a 10.217
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part that listens and obeys reason alogon and at times, he says that it shares in reason without 
fully possessing it.  218
In the EE, as in the NE, the FA leads up to the definition of happiness. The EE-FA aims 
at establishing that the function of the human soul is living: 
(T3) Let the function of the soul be to make a thing be alive […] Hence, given 
that the function of the soul and of its virtue must be one and the same thing, its 
virtue’s function would be an excellent life. This, then, is the complete good, 
which is what happiness is.   219
Living, which is the function of the human soul, involves all the parts of the soul. That 
is, it includes also the part of the soul that does not share in logos (which fulfills the 
vegetative, nutritive and generative functions). In the EE, Aristotle divides the soul in two 
parts that share (µετέχειν) in logos - one that commands and the other that listens and obeys - 
and a third part that does not share in logos.  Correspondingly to the function of living, 220
there is the best function - in other words, the function of the virtue of the soul. Aristotle says 
that this best function is complete good: happiness. I will discuss the relation between the 
function of the soul and of its virtue in section 5. 
In the Republic, the FA occurs in the discussion of justice and not in a discussion of 
happiness, as in the NE and in the EE. The Republic-FA shares with the EE-FA the focus on 
the function of the human soul rather than on the function of human beings. The FA is 
introduced by Socrates’ question of whether people who are just live a happier and better life 
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than people who are unjust.  As Plato argues later on in the dialogue, justice is the virtue 221
that results from the harmony in the soul.  In other words, it results from each part of the 222
soul doing its job.  In the Republic, Plato says that virtue is what allows an artifact or an 223
individual to perform its function at the best.  In other words, justice is the virtue that 224
allows the human soul to perform its function at the best. Yet, what is this function? There 
seem to be two accounts of what the function is: 
(i) Taking care of things, deliberating and ruling is the function of the human soul.  225
(ii) Living is the function of the human soul.  226
Socrates asks Thrasymachus whether living is the function of the soul. Thrasymachus 
answers that it certainly is. The function as described in (i) is soon set aside in favor of (ii). 
Socrates says that justice is the virtue that allows the human soul to perform its function well. 
Function as described in (ii) plays a more important role in the argument than the function of 
taking care of things, ruling, and deliberating. We can even say that it has a broader scope and 
it includes (i). This is evident in the conclusion of the argument that aims at elucidating who 
 Republic 352 d. 221
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lives well. Plato says that the just person lives well and lives a better life than the unjust 
person. 
3. Structure of the Function Arguments 
Let us turn to the structure of the three arguments. Scholars discuss whether the NE-
Function Argument has the structure of an argument or is simply an analogy.  Indeed 227
Aristotle seems to proceed inductively from the idea that some things have a function to the 
claim that human beings have a function. The NE-FA is often called a rhetorical argument 
insofar as the argument presupposes premises that are not explicitly stated. Aristotle says that 
a sculptor, a flute-player and an artist all have functions. Similarly, bodily parts have 
functions. Since sculptors, flute-players, artists and even bodily parts have functions, by 
extension there should be a human function.  Insofar as Aristotle jumps from stating that 228
some things have a function to claiming that humans have a function, scholars say that this is 
not an argument, but it is an analogy.  
In the chart, I distinguish what I call the elimination argument from the isolation 
argument. The elimination argument is an argument in which we consider different options 
and we eliminate options progressively until there is only one option left. The isolation 
argument differs from the elimination argument insofar as it aims at isolating the function that 
is uniquely human. In the NE, Aristotle proposes an isolation argument: he aims at 
 T. Angier in Techne in Aristotle’s Ethics: crafting the moral life, London-New York: Continuum, 2010, argues 227
that this is not an argument but an analogy. As Angier argues, Aristotle does not develop an argument in this 
specific passage, but he proceeds by analogy with the function of the flute-player, the sculptor, the artist and the 
bodily parts. T. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. C.D.C. Reeve, 
Practices of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955. Reeve argues that it is an indirect argument. S. 
Broadie argues that the argument taken inductively is weak in S. Broadie, C. Rowe, “Commentary” in Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 M. Nussbaum argues that for Aristotle only parts of the body or of the soul have functions, but there is no 228
function of the whole. Cf. M. Nussbaum, Nature, function and capability:Aristotle on political distribution, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
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distinguishing the function of human beings from the rest, namely he wants to find the 
distinctive (ἲδιον) function of human beings. At the same time, he puts forward an elimination 
argument: he excludes nutrition, growing and perception as functions of human beings 
insofar as also animals participate in those activities. Aristotle says that the proper function of 
human beings is an activity of the soul according to reason.  Yet, even though he proposes 229
an isolation argument, Aristotle is far from saying that we are the only ones performing 
rational activity: the divine engages in rational activity as well. In this sense, rational activity 
is not enough to distinguish or to isolate human beings from other beings. However, our 
rational activity differs in degree and in its object from the activity of the divine: human 
beings cannot contemplate continuously as the divine does, and they do not contemplate the 
same object as the divine. Nonetheless, Aristotle emphasizes that he is considering the human 
function and the good for humans, and not for other beings. He calls happiness the human 
good (ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν). The human good is “activity of the soul in accordance with 
virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete.”  The 230
excellent person fulfills the function at the best by engaging in activity of the soul according 
to the best and most complete virtue.  
In the EE-FA, Aristotle explicitly says that he is proceeding by induction: he observes 
that in all cases in which there is a virtue, there is also a function.  He uses the examples of 231
a cloak, a boat, a house, and a shoemaker as all cases of things that have a function. In the 
EE-FA, Aristotle does not aim to isolate what is distinctive of human beings. He points out 
 NE 1097 b 24-1098 a 16.229
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that the function of the human soul is living. This function is shared by all living things. On 
similar grounds, there is no elimination argument. Rather, Aristotle focuses on what makes 
the human soul part of nature and continuous with nature: living.  This difference between 232
the EE and the NE concerns the very notion of ἔργον. With respect to the NE, scholars are 
used to conceive the ἔργον as that which is peculiar or distinctive of human beings, as 
opposed to that which is shared with other living beings. But if living is the ἔργον of the 
human soul, as Aristotle says in the EE, then our ἔργον is not peculiar to us. Instead, we 
would seem to share our ἔργον with everything that has a soul, for it would seem that in other 
living beings, the same line of thought applies. The ἔργον of the bird’s soul and of the tree’s 
soul too would seem to be living. That is, ἔργον here seems to mean simply job or task, rather 
than identifying or characteristic job or task. 
Let us move to the Republic-FA. In the Republic-FA, Plato discusses the functions of 
horses, eyes, ears, and knives.  As in the NE and in the EE, the argument proceeds by 233
analogy between the function of these things and the function of the human soul. Plato does 
not propose an argument by elimination: he does not exclude all the activities that are shared 
by other living beings. Yet, Socrates asks whether there is a function that is peculiar to the 
human soul. In other words, there is an isolation argument. Plato aims at isolating the 
function that is distinctive only of the human soul. Socrates considers taking care of things, 
ruling, and deliberating as possible functions of the human soul. However, none of these 
activities, with perhaps the exception of deliberating, seems uniquely human. Certain animals 
 On human nature see P. Brüllman, “Good (as) human beings”, in Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary 232
Perspective, J. Peters (ed.), New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 97-113, P. Foot, Natural Goodness, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, R. Hursthouse, “Human nature and Aristotelian virtue ethics,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement, 70, 2012, pp. 169-188, M. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on human nature and the foundations 
of ethics,” in World, Mind, and Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 86-132.
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- we can think about ants and bees - take care of their environment and of each others, and 
some non-human individuals rule over others. In the Republic, the question of whether there 
is a function that is exclusively human is left unanswered. That is, Plato does not discuss 
whether the activities considered are shared also by other living beings. If my earlier analysis 
is along the right lines, and we are ultimately left with the view that the function of the 
human soul is living, then it seems that the isolation argument of the Republic fails. Either we 
concede that Plato identifies a function that is shared among all living beings. Or, we may say 
that we are left with the task of finding a compelling isolation argument, to the effect that the 
notion of the ἔργον entails the idea of what is distinctive of a given being, but that so far we 
have not found this distinctive ἔργον.  
4. Parts of the soul and the human good 
In the EE, when Aristotle discusses the virtues, there is some version of what I call the 
isolation argument - the argument that aims at isolating what is distinctive of human beings. 
In EE II 1219 b 27, Aristotle looks for human virtue and not for some virtue that is shared 
also by animals or by divine beings. 
(T4) Since we are looking for human virtue, let us assume that there are two parts 
of the soul that share in reason, but not both share in reason in the same way. One 
does so by giving commands, the other because it is by nature such as to obey and 
listen. Let us exclude any part that is irrational in some other sense. It makes no 
difference if the soul is or is not divisible into parts; it still has different 
capacities, including those we have mentioned - just as the convex is not 
separable in a curve from the concave, nor is the straight from the white in a line. 
Yet the straight is not white, except incidentally and not in its own substance. Any 
other part of the soul, for example the vegetative, has been excluded. The parts 
we have mentioned are peculiar to the human soul. Hence the virtues of the 
nutritive and generative part are not human virtues. For if virtues belong to a 
human being qua human, reasoning must inhere, as principle of command and 
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action must inhere too; but reasoning commands not to reasoning but to desire 
and the affections, so a human must have these parts.  234
The passage is fraught with difficulties. Let us analyze it step by step. First of all, as 
Aristotle says, the vegetative part of the soul is of no interest for his analysis. Whatever 
virtues there might be of the nutritive and the generative parts, they are not distinctively 
human virtues, because these parts of the soul are not exclusively human. Aristotle says that 
we should not linger over the irrational parts of the soul.  We should focus on the parts of 235
the soul that share in reason.  Second, he considers two parts of the soul that share in 236
reason: the part that gives commands and the part that obeys and listens. We can distinguish 
between these parts conceptually, and we should do so, because their tasks differ. It is not 
possible to physically or literally divide these parts of the soul. Aristotle says that they are as 
the convex and the concave in a curve, or as the straight and the white in a substance. The 
second example is obscure: the main idea seems to be that straight and white are two aspects 
or powers of the substance. The case is similar for the concave and the convex: they are two 
aspects or powers of the curve. In the same way in which we cannot separate the concave and 
the convex in a curve, the parts of the soul cannot be separated one from the other. 
T4 can be compared to the parallel passage in the NE, where Aristotle discusses human 
virtue and the parts in which the soul is divided. In NE 1102 a 10, Aristotle points out that we 
are focusing on human virtue and on the human good, and not on any other kind of virtue or 
 EE II 1219 b 27- 1220 a 2.234
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good. In order to have a better understanding of human virtue, we need to examine the parts 
of the human soul. 
(T5) It is said, for example, that one element of the soul has reason, while another 
lacks it. It does not matter for the moment whether these elements are separate 
like the parts of the body or anything else that can be physically divided or 
whether they are naturally inseparable but differentiated in thought, like the 
convex and concave aspects of a curved surface.  237
There are similarities between T4 in the EE and T5 in the NE. In both passages, 
Aristotle says that there are two parts of the soul in addition to the vegetative part: in the EE, 
he states that they both share in reason; in the NE, he says that one part has reason and the 
other lacks it. However, a few lines later, in NE 1102 b 10 and in 1102 b 35, Aristotle points 
out that the part that lacks reason in a way shares in it insofar as it listens and obeys reason. 
Aristotle clarifies that these two parts of the soul that share in reason cannot be truly divided. 
They are rather one way in which we distinguish or categorize the parts of the soul on the 
basis of their tasks. The example of the convex and the concave comes up in T4 as well as in 
T5. Conversely, the example of the white and the straight occurs only in the EE. Aristotle 
distances himself from any literal talk about parts. He signals that talk about parts is 
shorthand for something more complicated, namely that we can distinguish different 
capacities and their activities. In order to do so, we need not postulate parts in a robust sense. 
But we can talk about parts because this is a convenient way of discussing the various things 
that the human soul does. In NE 1102 b 35-40, Aristotle describes the part that shares in 
reason without properly possessing reason: 
(T6) So the element without reason seems itself to have two parts. For the 
vegetative part has no share at all in reason, while the part consisting in appetite 
and desire in general does share in it in a way, in so far as it listens to and obeys 
it. So it has reason in the sense that a person who listens to the reason of his father 
 NE 1102 a 30-40, trans. by R. Crisp.237
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and his friends is said to have reason, not reason in the mathematical sense 
(οὐχὥσπερ τῶν µαθηµατικῶν). That the element without reason is in some way 
persuaded by reason is indicated as well by the offering of advice, and all kinds of 
criticism and encouragement. And if we must say that this element possesses 
reason, then the element with reason will also have two parts, one, in the strict 
sense, possessing it in itself, the other ready to listen to reason as one is ready to 
listen to the reason of one’s father.  238
In NE 1102 b 38- 1103 a 5, Aristotle says that there is a part of the soul that lacks 
reason. This is the appetitive/desiderative part. In T6, he describes the same part as able to be 
persuaded by reason. This part listens and obeys as a son does with his father. On similar 
grounds, this part does not have reason “in the mathematical sense,” as Aristotle says. The 
comparison is obscure: what does it mean “in the mathematical sense”? It is not even clear 
that the translation is what Aristotle had in mind. Perhaps the expression τῶν µαθηµατικῶν 
refers to the objects of learning. One way to understand the passage is the following: Aristotle 
seems to suggest that this part of the soul does not have reason in it; it does not have the 
capacity of reasoning. It has only the capacity of following reason. Aristotle’s conclusion 
closely resembles what he says in the EE: the appetitive/desiderative part of the soul shares in 
reason by listening and obeying reason. 
5. Virtue in the Function Arguments 
The definition of virtue figures prominently at the beginning of the EE-FA: “(virtue) is 
the best disposition or state or capacity of each of the things that have some use (χρῆσις) or 
function.”  In order for something or someone to have virtue, there needs to be a function or 239
a use.  According to Aristotle, this holds also for artifacts. In the case of artifacts, virtue is 240
 NE 1102 b 38- 1103 a 5.238
 EE II 1218 b 38-39.239
 I postpone the discussion of use to the following section. 240
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their best state.  Aristotle uses the example of the cloak to explain this point: the cloak has a 241
function – we can say that it has the function to cover or to keep warm. Its virtue is being in 
its best state to fulfill this function, namely being an excellent cloak. In other words, its virtue 
is to be in such a way that the cloak covers and keeps someone warm in the best way. It 
would not be possible for the cloak to be an excellent cloak, if it does not cover or keep 
warm. 
(T7) A cloak has a virtue, since it has a function and use, and its best state (hexis) 
is its virtue. The same applies to a boat and a house, and so on, and hence to the 
soul, since it has some function. Let us assume that the better state has a better 
function. And, just as states are related to one another, let the functions that arise 
from them be so related. And let the function of each thing be its end. So it is 
evident from this that the function is better than the state. For the end, being the 
end, is the best thing, since it has been laid down that what is best and ultimate is 
the end, and all the other things are for its sake. So it is clear that the function is 
better than the state and the disposition.  242
The relation between function and virtue - that is, the idea that in order to have virtue, 
one needs to have a function - is essential in the context of the EE-FA. Let us sum up what 
Aristotle puts forward in the passage: 
(i) In order to have virtue, we need a function. 
(ii) The best state of something is its virtue. 
(iii)The better state has a better function. 
(iv)The state and the better state of something are related. 
 Not only objects and individuals have functions, but also processes and activities. Happiness is the best 241
activity and the best function for human beings. Aristotle distinguishes two types of functions in relation to 
processes and activities. Processes have an end-product. Conversely, activities do not have an end-product. The 
function is the end-product of the process, such as the house in the case of building, or health in the case of 
medicine. For activities, the activity itself is its function, such as seeing in the case of sight or studying in the 
case of mathematical knowledge. For example, in the case of building, the virtue is an excellent house. 
 EE II 1219 a 1-13.242
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(v) The function and the better function of something are related. 
(vi)The function is the end (τέλος). 
(vii) The function is better than the state and the disposition (διάθεσις) insofar as it is 
the end. 
First of all, the relation between function and virtue provides a reason why Aristotle 
assigns a function to the human soul rather than to human beings. That is, in EE VIII.3, 
Aristotle discusses the most complete virtue of the soul - kalokagathia (the virtue of being-
beautiful-and-good). He cannot discuss the virtue that results from all the other virtues 
without establishing a function of the soul: as he said, there is no virtue of something if there 
is no function.  Insofar as the virtue is the best state of something, he needs to discuss how 243
the state relates to the virtue. According to the EE-FA, being completely virtuous and happy 
is being excellent at fulfilling the human soul’s function. As Aristotle says (iii), the better 
state has a better function. Hence, the agent who has the best state - kalokagathia - has the 
best function. And yet, this best function is related to the function as the better state is related 
to the state. In EE II 1219 a 8, Aristotle proposes an identification: the function is the end 
(τέλος). And the function of the soul and of its virtue is the same: this is good living.  In 244
other words, it is happiness. In this passage, Aristotle aims at stressing that happiness is an 
activity (ἐνέργεια) and not a state (ἕξις) insofar as he has established that the function (an 
activity) is better than the state. And in 1219 a 33, he adds that the activity is better than the 
 Aristotle says that kalokagathia is the virtue that results from all the virtues discussed so far: EE VIII.3 1248 243
b 10.
 EE II 1219 a 27.244
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disposition (διάθεσις). Insofar as to best activity belongs the best state, Aristotle concludes 
that the activity of the soul’s virtue is the best thing and this is happiness. 
Let us turn to the NE. In the NE, the function is activity of the soul according to reason 
(λόγος). In NE 1098 a 8, Aristotle says that the function of a cithara-player and of a good 
cithara-player are the same in kind (τῷ γένει). As Aristotle describes it, being a good cithara-
player is an addition or superiority (ὑπεροχῆς) over the function. However, the function of the 
good cithara-player is the same in kind as the function of the average cithara-player. The case 
is similar for the function of human beings: the function of human beings and of the good 
human being is the same in kind. This suggests that being a good human being adds 
something to the function, but it does not change the function. And yet, according to what 
Aristotle says in NE X, the best activity for human beings is contemplation.  How does 245
contemplation relate to the function of human beings? Can we say that the activity of the 
contemplator goes beyond the activity according to practical wisdom and the character 
virtue? Correspondingly, are the two best lives - the life of contemplation and of politics - the 
same in kind? The examples of the cithara-player and of the good cithara-player seem to 
suggest so. I will discuss a possible objection to this claim in section 7. 
Let us move to the Republic. In the Republic, Plato, as the Aristotle of the EE, points 
out that virtue is what allows someone/something to fulfill her/its function well and that it is 
 NE 1177 a 18. 245
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not possible to fulfill one’s function well without the corresponding virtue.  Plato uses the 246
examples of the eyes and ears and their corresponding virtues to explain this relation between 
function and virtue.  The eyes are not able to see well if deprived of their virtue. The ears 247
are not able to hear well without their proper virtue.  In the case of the soul, the virtue of the 248
soul is justice. Justice seems to include all the other virtues. On similar grounds, all the 
virtues are forms of justice. Virtue is what allows to perform the function well. And the 
function of the soul is living. Hence, no one would be able to live a good and happy life if 
deprived of the virtue of justice.  
6.  Use in the Function Arguments 
In the EE II 1219 a 14, Aristotle says that the term function has two senses. In one 
sense, X’s function is its use (χρῆσις). His examples are seeing as the use or function of sight, 
and studying as the use or function of mathematical knowledge.  In the EE-FA, χρῆσις 249
figures in the definition of the function of the human soul: 
 Kosman says that it would not be possible to perform one’s function without the corresponding virtue and 246
that the function is determined on the basis of the proper virtue, p. 129:  “An appropriate function, then, is the 
function for which a thing is best suited, and that in turn means the function for which it has the appropriate 
virtues. Justice, therefore, is a virtue of any complex and functionally differentiated entity in which function is 
determined on the basis of virtue. It turns out, therefore, that justice is, so to speak, a self-referring virtue. It is 
the virtue that characterizes those entities whose functional differentiation is in accordance with the principle of 
function following virtue. It is, to reveal again why we think of it as justice, the proper adjustment of function 
and virtue.”
 Virtue can be defined as what makes something good at what it does (its function). On good in Plato’s 247
Republic, see D. Lachterman,“What Is ‘The Good’ of Plato’s Republic?” St. John’s Review 39, 1989-1990, pp. 
39–71.
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(T8) Let the function of the soul be to make a thing alive, and let the function of 
being alive be a using and a being awake - sleep is a kind of idleness and rest.  250
Aristotle says that there is a function of the soul, which is making something alive. 
More than that, he points out that there is a function of this function (i.e., being alive), which 
is “a using and a being awake.” In the case of a tool, its function is its use. Let us consider the 
example of the knife: the function of the knife is cutting. And yet, what does it mean that the 
use of sight is seeing? Let us examine the relevant passage: 
(T9) Function has two senses: some things have a function which is different 
from the use. For example, the function of building is not building but a house, 
and the function of medicine is not healing or treating, but health. With other 
things, their use is their function. For example, the function of sight is seeing and 
the function of mathematical knowledge is studying. Hence, where a thing’s use 
is its function, the use is necessarily better than the state.   251
Aristotle seems to propose an analogy with tools. As in the case of tools, the function is 
the use, in the case of sight, the activity of seeing is its function and its use. On similar 
grounds, this analogy holds between the human soul and a tool: as the use is the function of 
the tool, the use of the human soul is being awake.  As Aristotle says in T8, also processes 252
have a function. Aristotle points out that there are processes such as building and medicine in 
which the function is the goal or aim of these processes. Processes have an external aim: this 
is their function. Conversely, activities such as seeing or studying do not have an external 
aim. Their aim is performing the activity. For these activities, their function is their use: in 
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other words, it is performing the activity.  Hence, the use of sight is seeing. The following 253
passage in EE II further supports this reading: 
(T10) To act well and to live well are the same as to be happy, and each of these 
is a use and an activity, both life and action (as also the practical is a capacity of 
using things - the smith makes a bridle, the rider uses it).  254
In T8, Aristotle says that the function of being alive is a use. In T10, Aristotle clarifies 
this claim by saying that life and action have to do with using things. In life, we use the 
virtues, as in action, we use things: for example, the rider uses the bridle when she rides. In 
the EE, the notion of use goes hand in hand with the notion of activity, which plays a central 
role in Aristotle’s account of function and of happiness. A similar approach to the notion of 
use can be found in Plato’s Republic. In the Republic, Plato says that virtue is related to use: 
(T11) Then aren’t the virtue or excellence, the beauty and correctness of each 
manufactured item, living creature, and action related to nothing but the use for 
which each is made or naturally developed (πεφυκός)?  255
In the EE-FA, Aristotle argues that there is no virtue if there is no function or use. In the 
Republic, Plato says that the virtue of a thing or of an individual is related to the use. Plato 
considers tools and also living beings. He says that the virtue of a tool or of a living being is 
the best use for which the tool is made. For example, the virtue of the knife is to cut well. In 
the case of the human soul, the virtue is the fulfillment of the function - in other words, the 
use - of the human soul. The function or use of the human soul is living: as the knife is made 
for cutting, the soul is by nature made for living. Plato uses the perfect participle πεφυκός, 
which derives from the verb φύω - literally “to bring forth.” I translate πεφυκός “naturally 
 Cf. the distinction between processes and activities in J. Beere, Doing and Being, Oxford: Oxford University 253
Press 2012.
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developed” insofar as the verb has the same root of φύσις - nature. Nature refers to what 
grows and develops spontaneously. In this sense, living beings are naturally developed in 
order to fulfill the function of living. And this is the use for which a living being is made by 
nature. In T11, Plato says that the function of the human soul is simply living. However, the 
idea that by nature human beings have more sophisticated functions occurs in many passages 
in the Republic. In 375 c-d and in 410 e, Plato points out that in order to become a guardian, 
one needs to have by nature a certain disposition of character. In 433 a, he explains that each 
one has to perform the task that by nature is more fitted for each individual. In 454 d, Plato 
says that the nature of a doctor and of a carpenter are different. For this reason, they have 
different functions in the city. In the Republic, nature and function are related: the function is 
assigned by nature; it is what one by nature is more fitted to do. The idea of being by nature 
(πεφυκός) made to fulfill a function occurs also in the NE. In NE 1097 b 25, Aristotle asks 
whether of all beings that have a function human beings are the only ones that by nature are 
functionless (ἀργὸν πέφυκεν). However, in the NE, the use is not one of the ways in which 
we understand the function. This seems to be peculiar of the EE and of the Republic.  
7. Fulfilling the function 
Let us dwell for a moment on a passage in the common books. According to the NE-
FA, having the virtues of thinking is essential to fulfill the function of human beings insofar 
as the function is activity according to reason. However, it is not clear whether the virtues of 
character have some role to play in fulfilling the function. Scholars debate on the issue. 
Korsgaard argues that we need both the virtues of thinking and the virtues of character in 
order to fulfill our function well.  She points out that Aristotle’s description of the virtues of 256
 C.M. Korsgaard, Aristotle’s Function Argument, in The Constitution of Agency, Oxford University Press, 256
2008, p. 129-150.
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character aims at showing how the virtues of character make us good at rational thinking. For 
Korsgaard, not only is there no tension between Aristotle’s claim that the human function is 
activity according to reason and the lengthy discussion of the virtues of character in the NE, 
but the FA is essential for explaining Aristotle’s theory of the virtues. Let us look at a passage 
that occurs in one of the common books - NE VI= EE V - in a section where Aristotle is 
explaining why practical and theoretical wisdom are useful. Aristotle says: 
(T12) The function [GB: of the human soul] is fully achieved (ἀποτελεῖται) in 
accordance with practical wisdom as well as in accordance with the virtue of 
character; for virtue makes the aim right, and practical wisdom the things 
leading to it.  257
The interpretation of the passage is controversial. There is a complex scholarly debate 
on the role of character virtues and of practical wisdom in determining the end and the means 
of action. For present purposes we do not need to examine these interpretational 
controversies. What matters for my analysis is that in T12, Aristotle points out that the 
function is achieved - and yet it matters how we translate ἀποτελεῖται - in accordance with 
practical wisdom and with the virtues of character. Let us deal immediately with one possible 
objection: Aristotle uses the term ergon in T12. Someone may say that Aristotle is not talking 
about the function of the soul or of the human being. However, if we look at the sentence 
immediately before T12, Aristotle says that theoretical wisdom causes happiness and that it is 
part of complete virtue.  Hence, the context suggests that Aristotle has in mind the function 258
as described in the FA, and in particular the best fulfillment of this function - happiness. As I 
already argued, there is a distinction, which holds both for the EE and for the NE, between 
fulfilling the function and fulfilling the function at its best (happiness). According to the EE, 
 NE=EE, 1144 a 7-8, trans. by GB: ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν: ἡ µὲν 257
γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. 
 EE V=NE VI 1044 5-7.258
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the function and the best function are related in the same way in which the state (including 
virtue) and the best state are related. According to the NE, the function and the best function 
are the same in kind (recall the example of the cithara-player and the good cithara-player). 
One preliminary question is in order: in T12, is the function living - as described in the EE-
FA - or activity according to reason - as described in the NE-FA? Aristotle says that the 
function is fully achieved in accordance with practical wisdom and the virtues of character. If 
the function is activity according to reason, in a way, Aristotle legitimizes the role of the 
virtues of character in fulfilling the function. If we read T12 within the context of the EE, 
Aristotle says that practical wisdom and the virtues of thinking are necessary to fulfill the 
function of living fully or at the best. This may sound too far-reaching insofar as the intuitive 
idea is that we do not need practical wisdom and the virtues of character in order to fulfill the 
function of living. As I understand it, there are at least three ways of reading T12 depending 
on how we interpret the Greek verb ἀποτελεῖται. These three ways take into account the 
distinction between the function and the best function discussed in the two treatises. 
(a) If we translate the verb ἀποτελεῖται “achieve,” practical wisdom and character 
virtues seem necessary to fulfill the function of the human soul even on a basic level (i.e. 
not at the best).  259
(b) If we translate ἀποτελεῖται “fully achieve,” or “achieve at its best,” (as the prefix 
ἀπο suggests) in order to achieve the function at its best, the agent needs practical wisdom 
and character virtues. However, this is compatible with the idea that in order to fulfill the 
 The term is translated as “achieve” by Ross’s (revised by L. Brown). Barnes translates “is achieved.” Irwin 259
translates “we fulfill our function in so far as we have intelligence and virtue of character.” Broadie-Rowe 
translate “the product is brought to completion by virtue of a person’s having wisdom and excellence of 
character.”
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function on a basic level, practical wisdom and character virtues are not required. They 
are necessary only to fulfill the function at the best. 
(c) A third possibility is to admit that the function of the human soul is achieved 
according to practical wisdom and the virtues of character. One may not fully develop 
practical wisdom and the virtues of character. And yet, she may still retain the potentiality 
of developing them. According to the EE, the soul of every agent fulfills its function of 
living, no matter whether the agent has fully developed practical wisdom and the virtues 
of character or not. 
According to (b) and (c), T12 is compatible with the reading of the EE-FA that I put 
forward in this chapter. Conversely, if we admit that the function of the human soul includes 
the full development of practical wisdom and the virtues of character, only the agent who has 
developed practical wisdom and the virtues of character fulfills this function.  This means 260
that if the agent is not virtuous, the soul of this agent does not fulfill the function. According 
to (b) and (c), if the agent does not have practical wisdom and the character virtues, the soul 
of this agent does not fulfill the function at the best; it does not develop the virtues that it is 
by nature fitted to develop. And yet, the soul of the non-virtuous agent still fulfills the 
function. With regard to the NE, only option (a) is compatible with the claim that the function 
is activity according to reason. 
8. Human function and the divine in the EE 
I turn to an analysis of how these two Function Arguments prepare the ground for the 
discussions of the best fulfillment of the function, that is, the best life, that occur at the end of 
 Cf. J. Whiting, “Human nature and intellectualism in Aristotle,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 68, 260
1986, pp. 70-95. 
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the two treatises - respectively in EE VIII and in NE X. In particular, I focus on the following 
question: what is the relation between fulfilling the function of the human soul and fulfilling 
its function at the best? Let us consider first the EE. Recall that in EE II 1219 a 6, Aristotle 
says that as the state and the better state are related, the function and the better function are 
related. And in EE II 1219 a 26, he adds that the function of the soul and of its virtue are the 
same. Once we have secured these two premises, let us look at EE VIII.3:  
(T13) One must, then, as in other domains, live with reference to the commander 
and with reference to the disposition and activity of the commander, as a slave 
must live with an eye to that of his master and each must live with reference to 
the appropriate commanding element. Since human beings too are by nature 
composed of a commander and a commanded, each person would also have to 
live with reference to his own commanding element. This has two aspects. For 
the art of medicine and health are commanding elements in different ways (the 
former is for the sake of the latter). This is how it is with regard to the 
contemplative. God is not a commander in the sense of giving orders but as that 
for the sake of which practical wisdom gives orders. And that for the sake of 
which is double (the distinction has been made elsewhere), since god is in need of 
nothing.  261
The passage is fraught with difficulties. Aristotle says that we have to live with 
reference to the state and activity - ἓξις and ἐνέργεια - of the commander - τό ἄρχον - literally 
“that which governs.” This seems to be the best life; in other words, it is the best fulfillment 
of the human function. In order to understand the passage, we need to clarify what the 
commander is. Once this is done, I turn to an analysis of what the state and the activity of the 
commander are. 
 Eudemian Ethics, 1249 b 7-18, translated by B. Inwood, R. Woolf with changes by GB: δεῖ δὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν 261
τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς 
δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ 
ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχοµένου, καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή: ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ 
ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια: ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη): οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων 
ὁ θεός, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει (διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα: διώρισται δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ κεῖνός γε 
οὐθενὸς δεῖται.
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Let us consider two interpretations: the interpretation of Taylor and Gosling and the 
interpretation of Kenny. According to Taylor and Gosling, the commander is the divine. 
Taylor and Gosling’s interpretation of the commander relies on the section of the EE that 
occurs immediately before T13, where Aristotle discusses natural goods. In EE VIII 1248 b 
29, Aristotle offers a paradigmatic list of natural goods: honor, wealth, bodily excellences, 
good fortune and power. In chapter III, I argue that natural goods are a mix of external goods, 
goods of the soul and goods of the body. For present purposes, let us assume this as a 
minimal account of what natural goods are. Taylor and Gosling argue that natural goods 
promote θεωρία.  They promote the contemplation of the divine. And this divine is the 262
commander. However, there seem to be at least two things that are called “commander.” First, 
Aristotle says that human beings are composed of a commander and of a commanded. And he 
says that each person must live according to his commander.  This commander cannot be 263
the divine since it is part of the human soul. Second, Aristotle proposes a comparison: 
medicine and health are compared to practical wisdom and god. In the context of this 
comparison, Aristotle says that god is a commander. Only this second occurrence of the 
commander refers to the divine. 
Kenny translates τό ἄρχον as “one’s superior” and as “raison d’ être.”  According to 264
Kenny, it is possible to distinguish two parts of human reason that are related to one another 
as the superior to the inferior. On his view, the superior part is a “broad intellectual 
faculty” (θεωρητικόν) and the inferior part is practical wisdom (φρόνησις). Kenny interprets 
 J.B.C Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 262
342-344.
 In manuscripts P, C, and L, we have ἑαυτῶν, Susemihl reads αὑτοῦ.263
 A. Kenny, The perfect life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 95. 264
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T13 in the light of the comparison with health and medicine that Aristotle puts forward 
immediately before T13: in EE VIII.3 1249 a 22-29.  Health is the raison d’être of 265
medicine and both are ἄρχαι (causes or principles). In the soul, there are two principles that 
resemble medicine and health. One can compare practical wisdom (φρόνησις) to medicine; 
the “speculative part of the soul” - as Kenny calls it - is its raison d’être. On similar grounds, 
as health is what medicine is for, god is what practical wisdom is for. There are two ἄρχαι: 
god who does not issue commands, and practical wisdom that does issue commands. In this 
sense, god is not like a master with a slave (the soul). According to Kenny, practical wisdom 
is more suited to this analogy since it commands to the soul as a master commands to a slave. 
My proposal is close to Kenny’s insofar as I agree that Aristotle’s focus on τὸ θεωρητικόν in 
EE VIII.3 1249 b 13 is fundamental to understand the passage. Insofar as Aristotle speaks 
about τὸ θεωρητικόν in the same section where he discusses the commander, the part of the 
soul to which the virtues of theoretical thought belongs is the archê of the human soul. 
Aristotle says that practical wisdom prescribes for the sake of theos.  At the same 266
time, he says that each person has its own commander. And right after the comparison with 
medicine and health, he adds that so are things in relation to the theoretical capacity. This 
suggests that there are theoretical virtues involved, and that the commander cannot be only 
practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is simply not the virtue of theoretical contemplation. For 
these reasons, it seems more plausible to read τό ἄρχον as the part of the soul that commands 
A. Kenny, The perfect life, p. 97.265
 Gabbe (“Aristotle on the starting points of motion in the soul,” Phronesis, 57, 4, 2012, pp. 358-379) puts 266
forward the view that in EE VIII.2, god is the archê in the sense that it is the final cause of thoughts and desires: 
god explains the nature of the desiderative and rational faculties in human beings. In other words, god explains 
why we desire what we take to be good. In EE 1248 a 28, Aristotle says that God is the cause of motion in the 
soul. I focus on a different passage, albeit occurring close in the text to the passage that Gabbe considers, and I 
argue that in T13, archê cannot refer to god insofar as Aristotle says that human beings are composed of an 
archontos. 
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and to which all the virtues of thinking belong, including practical wisdom and theoretical 
wisdom. As discussed above, in EE.II 1219 b 30, Aristotle divides the soul into parts. In this 
section of the text, Aristotle uses the same verb ἐπιτάττει - “to command” - to describe the 
task of the part of the soul to which the virtues of thinking belong. The same verb appears 
also in T13. This may suggest that the commander is the part of the soul that gives orders. 
This idea is further confirmed in EE VIII 1249 b 11, where Aristotle says that human beings 
are by nature composed of a commander and of a commanded. The part of the soul that gives 
commands is by nature constitutive of human beings. In order to fulfill the function of the 
human soul at the best - that is, in order to be happy - we need to follow the commands of this 
part of the soul. The commander orders to the commanded, which is the part of the soul that 
shares in reason by obeying and listening, and to which the character virtues belong.  267
In order to explain the relation between the commander and “that for the sake of which” 
(οὗ ἕνεκα) the commander gives order, Aristotle introduces the comparison with health and 
medicine. There are two ways to understand οὗ ἕνεκα: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τινός is the aim for which 
we do something; τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τινί is the beneficiary of what we do.  As medicine is for the 268
sake of health, practical wisdom is for the sake of the divine (EE VIII 1249 b 13). Aristotle 
says that “the art of medicine and health are commanding elements in different ways […] this 
is how it is with regard to the contemplative (θεωρετικόν).”  As medicine commands for the 269
sake of health, practical wisdom commands the part of the soul that listens and obeys. And it 
commands for the sake of the divine. This last claim is obscure. At first sight, it may seem 
 EE II 1220 a 10. 267
 Cf. Physics 194 a 32-36; De Anima 415 b 2-3; Metaphysics 1072 b 2. Cf. S. Gastaldi, Bios Hairetotatos. 268
Generi di vita e felicità in Aristotele, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2003, p. 80. 
 EE VIII 1249 b 14. 269
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that practical wisdom is the virtue of contemplation. And this is in contrast with how the 
virtues are understood in the rest of the text. One possible reading is that practical wisdom 
commands ultimately for the sake of the divine in the sense that it commands for the sake of 
the theoretical capacity mentioned in EE 1249b 13. The theoretical capacity concerns the 
divine.  
A glance over the next lines sheds further light on the expression οὗ ἕνεκα: Aristotle 
says that “god is not a commander in the sense of giving orders, but as that for the sake of 
which practical wisdom gives orders.” Practical wisdom - together with all the other virtues 
of thinking - is a commander because it gives order to the part of the soul that listens and 
obeys. However, also god is in some way a commander insofar as it is “that for the sake of 
which” practical wisdom gives orders. The expression οὗ ἕνεκα suggests that god is the end 
and the object of contemplation. Aristotle specifies that the human activity of contemplation 
does not benefit in any way god insofar as god is in need of nothing.   270
Let me turn to two interpretations of θεός (god) as this term occurs in T13: (1) 
Dirlmeier says that θεός is νοῦς;  (2) Verdenius argues that god is not an internal divine 271
principle - what we may call “god in us,” but it is the divine being described in Metaphysics 
Lambda.  Scholars are divided between those who support the so called internal reading and 272
those who prefer the external reading of the divine: according to the internal reading, the 
 On οὗ ἕνεκα be the end of something cf. Metaphysics 1072 b 1-4 and in On the soul 415 b 2-4.270
 Von Arnim defends this interpretation. 271
 Cf. Buddensiek (F. Buddensiek, Contemplation and service of the god, in P. Destrée, M. Zingano, Theoria, 272
studies on the status and meaning of contemplation in Aristotle’s ethics, Louvain: Peeters, 2014) argues that 
“god” refers to the best possible object of contemplation. Von Arnim (1924) interprets theos as nous. This 
interpretation is shared by Gouthier and Jolif (1970). Needler (1926) interprets it as internal god.
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divine is human intelligence (νοῦς) - the so-called divine principle in us.  According to the 273
external interpretation, it is the god described also in the Metaphysics as the prime mover.   274
Dirlmeier argues that in EE VIII.3, θεός is the “god in us” - namely, intelligence (νοῦς). 
Νοῦς is not only considered divine, but it is even called god (EE 1248 a 26-29, NE 1177 a 
16). Dirlmeier argues that god is the Endzweck (goal) of φρόνησις. As Aristotle points out in 
EE V=NE VI, φρόνησις is not the faculty of the soul suited for the contemplation of god. 
Aristotle says that practical wisdom commands for the sake of god. According to Dirlmeier, 
in order to understand this claim, we have to interpret θεός as νοῦς. Dirlmeier argues that 
only in this way, the passage is consistent with what Aristotle says on the role assigned to 
νοῦς and to φρόνησις in the NE.  However, Aristotle does not say that practical wisdom is 275
the virtue that allows us to contemplate the divine. He says that practical wisdom prescribes 
for the sake of god. That is, the final aim is the divine. On Dirlmeier’s view, for Aristotle, 
φρόνησις is the inferior part of the soul and νοῦς is the superior part. In order to substantiate 
his reading, Dirlmeier points out that already in the fifth century the idea of νοῦς as the “god 
in us” was widespread (as he points out, in Pindar and in Euripides, we find similar 
formulations of this idea).  However, Aristotle explicitly mentions the theoretical capacity a 276
few words before mentioning god. God seems to be the object of this capacity. When 
 Cf. J.D. Monan, Moral knowledge and its Methodology in Aristotle, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968.273
 See Kenny and Jaeger. L. Jost argues that the service of the god consists in attending to our own moral 274
development. L. Jost, “Theos, Theoria, and Therapeia in Aristotle’s Ethical Endings,” in Theoria, pp. 287-213. 
 Defourny (P. Defourny, Contemplation in Aristotle’s ethics, in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.), 275
Articles on Aristotle 2: ethics and politics, London: Duckworth, 1977) argues that φρόνησις in EE VIII 3 means 
practical wisdom, while Buddensiek (2014) argues that it is prudence. Rowe (1971) claims that there is no 
distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom in the EE.  
 F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles: Eudemische Ethik, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1984, p. 502. 276
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Aristotle says that god is a commander, this commander is not the commander that is 
described as a part of the soul a few lines before. Verdenius proposes a different reading of 
theos.  He argues that even if Aristotle says that νοῦς is divine, he never calls it “god.”  277 278
Verdenius explains that god is self-sufficient. And in T13, Aristotle says that god is self-
sufficient and in need of nothing. For this reason, it would be impossible to read θεός as νοῦς 
insofar as intelligence is not self-sufficient as god. According to Verdenius, god is the end of 
contemplation; it is that for the sake of which φρόνησις gives orders.  The reading proposed 279
by Verdenius seems more plausible given how Aristotle describes the tasks of practical 
wisdom in the rest of the treatise, and how he conceives of the divine in particular in the 
Metaphysics.  
Further evidence in favor of the interpretation of theos as the divine is provided by the 
repetition of theos in EE VIII.3 1249 b 17. This reading is compatible with the idea that θεός 
is the divine principle as Aristotle describes it in the Metaphysics, which is self-sufficient and 
in need of nothing.  In EE VIII.3 1249 b 16, Aristotle says that the commander is in need of 280
nothing, which seems to suggest that the commander is the self-sufficient principle of the 
Metaphysics.  
 W.J. Verdenius, Human reason and God, in P. Moraux, D. Harlfinger, Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen 277
Ethik, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971, p. 291: “It is extremely unlikely that Aristotle should have used the term 
o teos to denote the human nous. It is true that he calls reason “the divine” and even “the most divine”, but that 
makes all the difference […] The fact that Aristotle regards human reason as divine but not as God is not 
difficult to explain. God is too perfect to think anything else beside himself. This level of self-sufficiency is 
beyond the reach of man.”
 Cf. A. Kenny, The perfect life, cit., p. 97.278
 In MM 1198 b 7, φρόνησις is called the steward of nous, and it procures leisure for the “master.”279
 Cf. Metaphysics, 1072 b 14 and followings.280
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To sum up, T13 is relevant for present purposes insofar as the passage clarifies what the 
best life is for the Aristotle of the EE. As I suggested, fulfilling the function at the best - best 
living - is living according to the part of the soul that commands. To this part of the soul 
belong the virtues of thinking. Based only on these passages one may think that the best 
fulfillment of the function is the life of contemplation. However, as Aristotle says in the FA, 
the function of the human soul is living. He stresses that the soul is a unity with parts. In line 
with this idea, the best fulfillment of the function involves the soul as a unity, and not just the 
part of the soul that commands.  The alogon part of the soul does not contribute in 281
significant ways to the best life insofar as Aristotle says that we need to be as less aware of 
this part as possible. However, the part of the soul that shares in reason by obeying and 
listening is a constitutive and contributing part of the best life. There cannot be a commander 
without a commanded. Further support to this idea is brought by the references to natural 
goods that Aristotle repeatedly makes before and after T13. If the best life solely consists in 
contemplation, why are natural goods so important? The discussion of natural goods suggests 
that the best fulfillment of the human soul does not consists uniquely in contemplation, but it 
involves the activities of the two parts of the soul that share in reason and their respective 
virtues: the virtues of thinking and the character virtues. In this sense, the proposal of the EE 
does not include two best lives, but a unified notion of happiness, which includes the 
activities of the virtues of thinking and of the virtues of character. Even though other aspects - 
the idea of a commander and of a commanded, the importance of practical wisdom for 
contemplation - are close to the proposal of the NE, the notion of one best life that includes 
all the virtues seems prominent only in the EE.  
 EE VIII 1249 b 10-12.281
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9. Function, limit and contemplation 
Insofar as the discussion of natural goods adds important elements to the idea that the 
best life does not uniquely consist in contemplation, let us look more closely at one salient 
passage. In EE VIII 1249 b 18-25, Aristotle says: 
(T14) Whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods will most effectively 
produce the contemplation of the divine, either goods of the body or money or 
friends or other goods, that choice is the best and this acquisition is the most 
beautiful limit, and whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods impedes, 
either by deficiency or by excess, our cultivation and contemplation of the divine, 
is base. And this applies to the soul, and it is the best limit for the soul when one 
is least aware of the irrational part of the soul as such. Let this be our account of 
the limit for being-beautiful-and-good and of the aim served by simpliciter-
goods.  282
Aristotle says that the choice and the acquisition of natural goods that most effectively 
promote the contemplation of the divine are the most beautiful limit. This claim is not clear 
and it is in need of careful analysis. First of all, it is not clear how the choice and acquisition 
of natural goods relate to the contemplation of god. Second, Aristotle uses an enigmatic 
expression: κάλλιστος ὅρος - literally “the most beautiful limit.” There are four references to 
the limit in VIII.3, and they are obscure: (i) in EE 1249 a 22, Aristotle compares καλοκαγαθία 
- being-beautiful-and-good - to medicine, and he states that the doctor must have a limit 
(ὅρος). This limit helps us understand for example, what is good for health and what is not. 
(ii)  In EE 1249 b 19, Aristotle says that the choice and acquisition of natural goods that best 
promote the contemplation of the divine is the most beautiful limit; (iii) In EE 1249 b 21, he 
 EE VIII 1249 b 18-25: ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει µάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θείου 282
θεωρίαν, ἢ σώµατος ἢ χρηµάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος. ἥτις 
δ᾽ ἢ δι᾽ ἔνδειαν ἢ δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸ θεῖον θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, 
καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, ὃταν ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου µέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾗ τοιοῦτον. τις µὲν 
οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρηµένον. Dirlmeier translates 1249 b 
16-20: “Jene Wahl nun und jene Erwerbung der natürlichen Güter, seien es kӧrperliche oder Geld oder Freunde 
oder die sonstigen Güter, welche am maisten das betrachtende Verhalten des Gottes ermӧglich, die is die beste 
und dieser Maßstabis der schӧnste.” 
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says that being aware as little as possible of the irrational part of the soul is the best limit of 
the soul; (iv) In EE 1249 b 25, ὅρος is the limit of καλοκαγαθία.  
Either the limit is the same in all these occurrences, or we are talking about different 
limits. There are at least two strands of scholarship. According to the first strand, the limit 
does not specify the norm of action, but it specifies the norm for the choice of natural 
goods.  According to the second strand, the limit does indeed concern actions.  Kenny 283 284
explains that for Aristotle, the limit is the criterion of perfect virtue. According to Kenny, 
natural goods are the subject matter of virtues discussed in EE III, namely magnanimity, 
magnificence and liberality.  Passions and the irrational part of the soul are the subject 285
matter of virtues such as courage, temperance and meekness. On his view, practical wisdom 
sets the mean for each of these virtues and for the sake of the contemplation of the divine.  286
In this sense, for Kenny, ὅρος is the criterion of perfect virtue. A similar interpretation is 
defended by Gosling and Taylor. According to Gosling and Taylor, the limit concerns actions 
and not only natural goods.  The reading defended by Kenny, and by Gosling and Taylor, is 287
supported by the claim that the limit is a limit of the soul and of kalokagathia, and not only of 
natural goods. Of course, this presupposes that Aristotle is talking about the same limit in all 
the occurrences. 
 Monan, pp. 129-31, Cooper, pp. 137-141, Rowe, p. 110, Broadie, p. 385.283
 Kenny, pp. 182-183, Gosling and Taylor, pp. 342-344. 284
 Eudemian Ethics, 1231 b 28.285
 A. Kenny, Aristotle on the perfect life, cit., p. 100.286
 Gosling and Taylor, p. 343.287
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Broadie believes that there are at least two limits: the limit of natural goods and the 
limit of kalokagathia. She argues that kalokagathia is the limit of natural goods. On her view, 
this idea is necessary for Aristotle to introduce θεωρία as a noble activity. According to 
Broadie, Aristotle’s audience would not take for granted that θεωρία is a noble activity 
equally valuable as other noble activities: contemplation does not contribute to the polis. 
Aristotle introduces kalokagathia to convey the idea that contemplation has value.  As she 288
explains, contemplation is the most beautiful activity and it is the best limit for the soul: 
while engaged in this activity, the soul perceives the irrational part as little as possible.  289
According to Broadie, θεωρία is the limit of kalokagathia; kalokagathia is in its turn the limit 
of natural goods. Broadie interprets ὅρος as “moral safeguard:” virtue allows the agent to 
choose and acquire natural goods with a view to what would contribute to a good life. 
However, if we follow Broadie’s reading, we have two notions of limit in the passage: the 
limit of natural goods, and the limit of kalokagathia. 
Let us assume as a premise what I demonstrated in chapter III, that natural goods are a 
mix of external goods, goods of the soul, and goods of the body. If this is a plausible account 
of natural goods, they benefit us in different ways. That is, they do not concern only our soul: 
bodily excellences and wealth satisfy the needs of our bodies; friends, honor and power 
provide for our social needs, and so forth. However, all these are for the sake of something. 
 S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 385.288
 S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, cit., p, 385: “Aristotle first invokes a notion of nobility in which his 289
audience would see noble practical deeds as the only kind of limit; and then implies that pursuit and use of 
natural goods are not adequately limited by it alone [...] Aristotle has insinuated the thought that nobility 
(kalokagathia), which is said to be complete virtue, is not complete unless endowed with more than is required 
for noble practical deeds: it needs more by way of natural goods to use and more, too, by way of a further goal 
in the light of which to use them. And along with this he has also insinuated the thought that without that goal, 
but with the extra goods, nobility is not stably noble. Theoria is not only glorious in itself, but is a moral 
safeguard: it preserves practical nobility in superfluity much as practical nobility preserves sheer basic 
goodness.”
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They are for the sake of the best activity of our soul: contemplation. As Aristotle says, the 
best limit of the soul is what “makes us less aware of the irrational part of our soul.”  For 290
present purposes, it seems sufficient to say that natural goods make us less aware of the 
irrational part of the soul insofar as they fulfill the need of this part. Insofar as we do not need 
to attend to this irrational part, we are better off for contemplation. And not only this: we are 
indeed in the best conditions to attend to virtuous actions. For example, insofar as we have 
wealth, we can be generous; insofar as we have bodily strength, we can be courageous, and 
so forth. The discussion of ὅρος that occurs in EE V 1138 b 20-35 speaks in favor of this 
reading.  In EE V=NE VI, Aristotle says:  291
(T15) Since we have in fact already said that one must choose the mean, and not 
the excess or the deficiency, and since the mean is as correct reasoning says it is, 
let us make some distinctions here. In all the states discussed, just as in other 
matters, there is a target which the rational person looks to as he intensifies and 
relaxes, and there is a limit for the mean states, which we say lie between the 
excess and the deficiency, being in accordance with correct reasoning 
(ὀρθὸν λόγον). Now this claim is true, but not at all clear.   292
In this passage, Aristotle says that there is a limit (or a criterion) for the mean states. 
This limit determines what the measure is. In other words, it establishes the middle point 
between excess and deficiency. What is more, the limit is regulated by correct reasoning, 
which seems to be practical wisdom. This idea appears also in EE VIII.3 1249 a 22, where 
Aristotle says that the doctor has a limit when he determines which body is healthy and which 
is not. The comparison with medicine and health comes up in EE V, as well as in EE VIII.
 EE VIII 1249 b 23. 290
 Rowe argues that EE VIII.3 narrows down the application of horos that was introduced in book V. C.J. Rowe, 291
The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A study in the development of Aristotle’s Thought.
 EE V=NE VI 1138 b 20-35.292
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3.  In both passages, the limit is the criterion of something; in other words, it establishes the 293
measure of something. As the example of the doctor mentioned in EE VIII.3 1249 a 22 
suggests, the limit establishes the right measure to say that the body is healthy. In EE VIII.3 
1249 b 1 and in 1249 b 19, the limit establishes the quantity of natural goods. Once again, the 
limit is between excess and deficiency, as in the case of the mean states. 
To further clarify the nature of the limit, let us dwell for a moment on the Greek text of 
EE VIII.3 1249 b 17-19: ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει µάλιστα τὴν 
τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἢ σώµατος ἢ χρηµάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ 
οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος.  The passage can be translated literally as follows: “whatever 294
choice and acquisition of natural goods will most effectively produce the contemplation of 
the divine, either goods of the body or money or friends or other goods, that choice is the best 
and this acquisition is the most beautiful limit.”  As the Greek text reveals, it is not clear 295
what the antecedent of oὗτος is. Broadie argues that it is contemplation; my hypothesis is that 
it is the acquisition of natural goods. The grammatical structure of the passage allows both 
readings. Let us suppose that the acquisition of natural goods is the limit. This account of the 
limit is in line with what Aristotle says at the very end of the treatise. In EE VIII.3, Aristotle 
says that it has been discussed - and he seems to look back to the discussion of natural goods 
- what the limit of kalokagathia is.  The choice and acquisition of natural goods is the most 296
 Book V is one of the so-called common books and the parallelism between book V 1138 b 20-35 and EE 293
VIII 1249 a 22- 1249 b 5 may be an additional argument in favor of the fact that the common books were 
originally part of the EE.
 EE 1249 b 16-18. 294
 Trans. by GB.295
 EE 1249 b 24-25. 296
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beautiful limit insofar as it promotes the most beautiful activity, namely contemplation.  297
Natural goods provide the best conditions to perform virtuous actions and to engage in 
contemplation. At the same time, they are not essential or constitutive of virtuous activity. In 
this sense, natural goods are the limit of kalokagathia. 
10. Function and contemplation in the NE 
I turn now to the discussion of the best life at the end of the NE. Two questions should 
be addressed: is the account of the best life similar in the NE and in EE VIII? If yes, how 
does it relate to the NE-Function Argument? In NE X, Aristotle says that the fulfillment of the 
function at the best is contemplation. Two elements suggest that the discussion of the best 
lives in NE X is strongly connected to the FA in NE I. First of all, in NE X, Aristotle discusses 
again two features of happiness that he introduces in the NE-FA: self-sufficiency and 
finality.  He explicitly sums up the argument outlined in book I by saying that it has been 298
established that happiness does not consist in pleasure. What is more, it would be absurd to 
posit pleasure as the end of our lives.  Instead, happiness is self-sufficient and final because 299
it consists in contemplation. Contemplation is self-sufficient and final insofar as it is an 
activity that does not need anything and that it is pursued for its own sake. Second, Aristotle 
clarifies the best and most complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness in NE 
1098 a 23: 
(T16) If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable to expect 
that it is in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be the virtue of the 
best element. Whether this best element is intelligence (nous) or something else 
 F. Buddensiek argues for a similar interpretation. F. Buddensiek, Contemplation and service of the god, in P. 297
Destrée, M. Zingano, Theoria, studies on the status and meaning of contemplation in Aristotle’s ethics, Louvain: 
Peeters, 2014.
 NE 1097 b 20; NE 1176 b 5-6.298
 NE X 1177 b 30. 299
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we think naturally rules and guides us and has insight into matters noble and 
divine, and whether it is divine or just the most divine element in us, its activity, 
in accordance with its own proper virtue, will be complete happiness.   300
This best and most complete virtue is the best element in us. Yet, what is it? Aristotle 
considers two options: either this best element is intelligence (νοῦς), or it is something else 
that has two characteristics, namely it rules and guides us, and it has insight into matters 
noble and divine. This second option seems to look back at the division of the parts of the 
soul that occurs at the end of book I.  In the division of the parts of the soul that Aristotle 301
proposes in book I, there is a part of the soul that rules and another that obeys and listens. 
T16 is consistent with this division insofar as Aristotle says that the highest virtue is the 
virtue of what rules and guides us. To this part of the soul belong the virtues of thinking. 
What is more, this part of the soul is divine. More precisely, it is the most divine element in 
us. It is divine or similar to the divine because the activity of the divine is contemplation. 
According to what I argued in chapter I, in the NE, completeness is understood as inherent 
value. In this light, the most complete virtue is the virtue of the activity that most of all has 
inherent value. That is, this virtue is sophia. 
Aristotle proposes an argument by elimination in order to establish what the activity of 
the divine is: in 1178 b 25, he says that we can exclude that the gods are always asleep, that 
they do not act, and that they do not produce anything. What is left is contemplation. The 
human activity most similar to this is the most conducive to happiness: 
(T17) Such a life is superior to one that is simply human, because someone lives 
thus, not in so far as he is a human being, but in so far as there is some divine 
element within him. And the activity of this divine element is as much superior to 
that in accordance with the other kind of virtue as the element is superior to the 
compound. If intelligence (nous), then, is something divine compared with the 
 NE 1177 a 15-20.300
 NE 1102 a 27-1103 a 2. 301
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human being, the life in accordance with it will also be divine compared with 
human life.  302
T17 suggests that the happiest life, the life of contemplation, is the closest we can get to 
the divine life. It provides also a hierarchy of best lives: the best life is the life according to 
intelligence, and the second best is the life in accordance with the virtues of character and 
with practical wisdom.  Here, intelligence seems to refer generically to the virtues of 303
theoretical thinking. This is different from the conclusion that we have in EE VIII, where 
there is no “second best” human life and where the best fulfillment of the function of the 
human soul includes all the virtues. In the NE, there are two possible ways to fulfill the 
function of the human being at its best: the best way is leading a life of contemplation, the 
second best is the life according to practical wisdom and to the virtues of character. These 
two lives correspond to the functions described in T1 and T2.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I proposed a chart that compares the Function Arguments as they appear 
in the Eudemian Ethics, in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Republic. I examined the 
structure of the arguments, their similarities and differences. In the EE, there is a different 
emphasis on the soul as a unity of parts, while in the NE, Aristotle focuses on rational 
activity. In line with this difference, in the NE, the function of the human being is defined as 
activity of the soul according to reason. In the EE and in the Republic, the function is 
performed by all the parts of the soul and it is simply living.  
 NE 1177 b 30-35. 302
 NE 1178 a 10. In NE 177 b 31-34, Aristotle says that we should aim at becoming immortal. The Greek verb 303
ἀθανατίζειν is an hapax in the Corpus Aristotelicum. Cf. S. Gastaldi, Bios hairetotatos. Generi di vita e felicità 
in Aristotele, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2003, p. 110.
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Aristotle compares the function of various things to the function of the human being/
human soul. Differently from what he does in the NE, the Aristotle of the EE, as well as Plato 
in the Republic, compares the function of the human soul to the function of artifacts. On 
similar grounds, they speak about the use as one of the senses of function. I focused not only 
on the relation between function and use, but also on the relation between function and 
nature. In all the works considered, the function is what by nature one is more fitted to do. 
Aristotle says that the best state has the best function. In the EE, Aristotle conceives of the 
best virtue - kalokagathia - as including all the other virtues. Corresponding to this virtue, 
there is a best function, which is activity according to all the virtues.  
In the NE, Aristotle says that there is a virtue that is divine and a corresponding 
function - the life of contemplation - which is better than the life according to practical 
wisdom and the virtue of character. I argued that the NE-FA and the EE-FA shed light on the 
discussions of the best life that occur in NE X and in EE VIII. In both treatises, there is a 
distinction between fulfilling the function and fulfilling the function at the best, which is 
living the good life. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Pleasure in the Eudemian Ethics 
Against the view that pleasure is the apparent good 
The nature of pleasure and its role in the good life are much debated topics among 
Aristotle scholars. In recent decades, the following view has been defended by a number of 
interpreters: pleasure is a pre-reflective way, similar to perception, of how something seems 
to be good.  Aristotle scholars who defend this view tend to emphasize the illusory and 304
deceptive nature of pleasure. They argue that something may seem good to the subject though 
it is indeed bad. In a recent contribution, Jessica Moss offers a detailed version of this view. 
She argues that pleasure is, in general and in its nature, the apparent good.  This claim goes 305
beyond weaker claims, namely that the pleasant can appear good or that something bad can 
appear good by being perceived as pleasant. Moss departs from a starker claim, according to 
which pleasure is in no way a guide to value. Against this, Moss argues that pleasure is an 
indicator of value in the sense that, if things go well, the pleasant actually leads us to the 
good. However, according to her position, the good and the pleasant are not independent 
properties: the pleasant is a derivative property insofar as it is how the good appears to us. 
 Irwin, T.,  Aristotle’s first principles (Oxford, 1988), Urmson, J.O.,  Aristotle’s ethics (Blackwell, 1988), 304
Broadie, S., Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1993), Tuozzo, T., “Conceptualized and Unconceptualized Desire in 
Aristotle”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32, no. 4 (1994), 525–49, Achtenberg, D., Cognition of Value in 
Aristotle’s Ethics (Albany, 2002), Segvic, H., From Protagoras to Aristotle: essays in Ancient moral philosophy 
(Princeton, 2009).
 Moss, J., Aristotle on the apparent good: perception, phantasia, thought and desire (Oxford, 2012). On 305
pleasure as the apparent good, see Broadie 1993, Achtenberg 2002, Tuozzo 1994, 525-549. According to these 
authors pleasure is a primitive, not conceptualized way in which things seem good to us (Olfert 2013, 35-51). 
Broadie (1993) and Moss (Moss, J., “Aristotle’s non-trivial, non-insane view that we always desire things under 
the guise of the good,” in S. Tenenbaum (eds.), Desire and the Good (Oxford, 2010) argue that pleasure refers to 
something that is good for us in that particular condition. Segvic (2009) explores the illusory effects of pleasure.
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Moss is primarily concerned with the NE. Her argument, however, starts from a passage in 
the EE.  306
In this chapter, I situate the passage that functions as starting point for Moss’s argument 
in the context of the EE. I argue that Aristotle’s account of pleasure in this treatise, including 
the passage that Moss considers, aims at proving what I call the Pleasure Thesis (PT). 
According to PT, happiness, being best and most beautiful, is also the most pleasant thing of 
all. PT is the most contested aspect of the thesis with which the EE starts. According to this 
thesis, happiness is best, most beautiful and most pleasant (I call this thesis the Superlative 
Thesis - ST).   307
Contrary to Moss, I am not primarily concerned with the NE. Instead I aim to 
reconstruct the account of motivation in the EE, and that is, in the text from which Moss’s 
analysis takes its departure. If the passage that Moss starts out from is read in its original 
context of the EE, I argue, it has a different upshot. Namely, and this is the view I defend, it is 
part of the argument that supports PT. On the account that Aristotle begins to lay out with the 
very first sentence of the EE, the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant each play a distinctive 
role in motivation.  Throughout the chapter, I argue in favor of three claims regarding 308
pleasure in Aristotle’s EE:  
 EE VII, 1235 b 25-28. “The object of desire and wish is either the good or the apparent good. That is why the 306
pleasant is an object of desire (for it is an apparent good); some people believe that pleasure is good, while to 
others it appears good even if they believe that it is not, since appearance and belief are not in the same part of 
the soul.”
 EE 1214 a 7-8.307
 A detailed account of the situation of the common books in the manuscripts is given in D. Harlfinger, Die 308
Uberlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik (Symposium Aristotelicum 1970). G. Lieberg (Die Lehre von 
der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles (München, Beck, 1958) argues that the common books were originally 
part of the EE. P. Webb (Philip Webb, “The relative dating of the accounts of pleasure in Aristotle’s 
Ethics,”Phronesis, 22 (1977): 235-262) claims that the common books were added later to the EE and they were 
originally part of the NE.
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- Metaphysical Claim: the pleasant is a non-derivative value-property; 
- Psychological Claim: pleasure has a distinctive presence in the mind of the agent; 
- Ethical Claim: pleasure plays important roles in the virtuous person’s life. 
I defend these three claims conjointly insofar as for Aristotle, they are intertwined. As 
far as the metaphysics of value is concerned, the very fact that Aristotle offers a definition of 
pleasure—and is concerned with the nature of pleasure—supports the idea that the pleasant is 
non-derivative. Hence, it seems reductive to construe pleasure, as Aristotle thinks of it in the 
EE, as a pre-reflective way of tracking the good.  
According to the distinctive kind of realism that scholars ascribe to Aristotle, value is 
neither anti-realist nor realist in the sense that these terms have in 20th century metaethics. 
That is, value is neither explained simply via attitudes, nor is it attitude independent. Instead, 
value is to be explained via a relation between the agent’s psychology and how things are 
going ‘in the world’.  On my view, this kind of realism applies both to the pleasant and to 309
the good. In order to argue in favor of this idea, I explore the distinction between the pleasant 
and what appears pleasant. In principle, it is uncontested that there is such a distinction. I 
argue, however, that a position according to which pleasure simply is the apparent good does 
away with one of the disjuncts: that which is pleasant. There is a distinction between how 
something is and how it appears. This distinction comes up within dimensions of evaluation. 
Say, something may appear good while it really is bad. The distinction also comes up across 
dimensions of evaluation. Say, something appears X, while it is Y. This is the type of mistake 
Moss thinks we systematically make with respect to pleasure and the good. As I will show, 
other properties, and in particular the beautiful, can also appear to be something other than 
 J. McDowell, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical 309
Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009b) 23–40. For a recent version of Aristotelian realism 
cf. Vogt, Desiring the good, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, ch. IV.
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what they inherently are. Say, the beautiful can appear pleasant. This does not entail, 
however, that the pleasant really is an appearance of the beautiful. 
With respect to the psychological and the ethical claims, I argue that Aristotle assigns a 
positive role to pleasure in motivation and in the good life. He claims that happiness, the 
highest good, is the most pleasant;  and he proposes that an excellent agent and even god 310
enjoy pleasure.  I argue that, whereas there are different types of pleasure and some of them 311
are excessive or derive from bad objects, there are pleasures that are choiceworthy in 
themselves. These pleasures are essential components of the happy life. The good, the 
beautiful, and the pleasant each have a distinctive presence in the happy person’s life. Thus, I 
end up disagreeing with Moss on three counts. First, her position is not compelling as far as 
interpretative matters go, because the EE passage cannot justify the reading of the NE that she 
puts forward. Second, on my account of pleasure, the pleasant is non-derivative. While Moss 
thinks that pleasure is a kind of surface property of the good, I propose that the pleasant and 
the good are two properties. Third, the pleasant plays a distinctive role in motivation.  
I start by presenting the Superlative Thesis (ST) and the Pleasure Thesis (PT) (section 
1). I explore some views in the literature on what pleasure is (section 2). I examine the 
different ways that Aristotle proposes for categorizing pleasure. I focus in particular on the 
claim that there are natural pleasures (section 3). I move to the contingent identity between 
pleasure and happiness (section 4).  Next I turn to Moss’s view (section 5) and to my 312
 EE I, 1214 a 8.310
 EE VI, 1154 b 26. On my view, NE VII was originally part of the EE, where it appears as EE VI. The 311
discussion of pleasure in this book, gains in plausibility if read in the context of the argument that Aristotle aims 
at demonstrating in the EE. 
 Happiness translates here the Greek eudaimonia. I borrow the expression “contingent identity” from C. 312
Rapp. I will discuss further in the chapter what I refer to with this expression.
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argument in favor of the pleasant being non-derivative. I explore the connection between 
pleasure and the good (section 6) and the relation between apparent and true pleasure (section 
7). I conclude by saying that pleasure is connected to the best life and to best agency: I 
analyse the role of pleasure in the life of the best agent (section 8) and I show that also god, 
for Aristotle, enjoys pleasure (section 9).  
1. The Superlative Thesis and the Pleasure Thesis 
Scholars often proceed as if the analysis of pleasure that occurs in NE VII, as well as in 
EE VI was originally written for the NE.  They read it in the context of this treatise and 313
argue that Aristotle proposes two accounts of pleasure in the NE, one in NE VII and the other 
in NE X.  Contrary to this assumption, I examine the account of pleasure that appears in NE 314
VII on the hypothesis that it was originally written as EE VI. I argue that the account of 
pleasure in NE VII=EE VI is better understood within the project that Aristotle develops in 
the EE of proving the Superlative Thesis and the Pleasure Thesis. If read in the context of the 
EE, this account of pleasure elucidates the positive role of pleasure in a good human life 
insofar as (1) pleasure occurs when there is perfect activity and best agency; (2) pleasure 
makes us aware of perfect activity and it renders us similar to the best agent and even to god. 
Elucidating the positive role of pleasure is an essential part of the Pleasure Thesis that 
Aristotle aims at demonstrating. At the beginning of the EE, Aristotle argues as follows: 
(T1) (Theognis) wrote: “Most beautiful is what is most just, best is being healthy, 
most pleasant of all is to attain what one desires.” We should not agree with him. 
For happiness, being most beautiful and best, is the most pleasant of all things.   315
 NE VII=EE VI, 1152b 1-1154b 35. 313
NE VII 11-14 and NE X 1-5. One of the first to discuss these two accounts is G.E.L. Owen, “Aristotelian 314
Pleasure,”Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, 71 (1971): 135-152.
 EE 1214 a 5-8.315
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Aristotle, right in the first paragraph of the EE, seems to elevate the pleasant: the 
pleasant is connected to the most important kinds of value in Greek ethics, καλόν (the 
beautiful) and ἀγαθόν (the good).  Aristotle aims to carve out a positive role for pleasure in 316
a virtuous life. And throughout the EE, Aristotle devotes much space to the question “what is 
pleasure?” In these discussions, he seems to explore something that is non-derivative, and 
that plays a distinctive role in human psychology; and he seems to concede that it has positive 
valence, though it is not the goodness – let alone virtue – he discusses in other places in the 
ethics.   317
2. What pleasure is 
Let’s turn to the question of what pleasure is. Philosophers try to explain what pleasure 
is by arguing in favor of different claims. For example, they argue that it is what feels good 
 The translation of kalon is controversial. Irwin and Rowe translate “the fine” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 316
translated by T. Irwin, Hackett, 1999. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by C. Rowe and S. Broadie, 
Oxford University Press, 2002). Ross and Crisp translate “noble” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by D. 
Ross, Oxford University Press, 1925. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by R. Crisp, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). According to D. Konstan, there is a difference between kallos and kalon. Konstan argues that kalon 
can express physical beauty, but this usage is rare, while kallos refers primarily to physical beauty. (D. Konstan, 
Beauty: the fortunes of an Ancient Greek idea, Oxford University Press, 2015). For the relevant semantic range 
in Aristotle, see Eudemian Ethics, 1230 b 20-39, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 b 3-11, Physics, 246 b, Politics, 
1254 b 38-1255 a 6, Sophistical Refutations, 164 b 20 -26, Rhetoric, 1372 a 12-18. For a discussion of kalon in 
Aristotle, see K. Rogers, “Aristotle’s conception of to kalon,” Ancient Philosophy, 13, 1993; R. Kraut, “An 
aesthetic reading of Aristotle’s ethics,” in V. Harte, M. Lane, Politeia in Greek and Roman philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013; G.R. Lear, “Aristotle on moral virtue and the fine,” in R. Kraut, Blackwell 
guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell Publisher, 2015; R. Crisp, “Nobility in the Nicomachean 
Ethics,” Phronesis, 59, 2014, pp. 231-45; J. Tutuska, “Aristotle on the noble and the good: philosophical 
imprecision in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Ancient Philosophy, 33, 2013; T.H. Irwin, “The sense and reference of 
kalon in Aristotle,” Classical Philology, 105, 4, Special Issue on Beauty, Harmony and the Good, 2010, pp. 
381-396; T. H. Irwin, “Beauty and morality in Aristotle,” in J. Miller, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a critical 
guide, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp.239-53. J. Cooper, “Reason, moral virtue and moral value,” in M. 
Frede, G. Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford University Press, 1999); J.D. Monan, Moral 
knowledge and its methodology in Aristotle (Oxford University Press, 1968). 
 In the NE, Aristotle argues that happiness is what is best, most beautiful and most pleasant and he disagrees 317
with what the inscription in Delos says (1099 a 24-30). However, ST does not appear to be a programmatic 
claim. See Chapter One.
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and it is desired,  it is a feeling,  it is a mental state,  it is a supervenient end that feels 318 319 320
good to us,  and so on. It seems uncontested to say that Aristotle considers pleasure an 321
activity.  Activity translates the Greek term ἐνέργεια.  Aristotle defines pleasure as 322 323
unimpeded activity according to our natural state.  Ryle and Anscombe are among those 324
who try to reconstruct what pleasure is in an Aristotelian framework. Ryle argues, being 
inspired by Aristotle’s notion of pleasure, that it is an activity and that to do something with 
pleasure is to do it wholeheartedly.  Festugière provides the first study of the accounts of 325
 H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., London: Macmillan, 1907.318
 J.C.B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 319
1969.
 S. Kagan, “The Limits of Well-being”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 9: 169–89, 1992.320
 R. Crips, Reasons and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.321
 Cf. S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1993); W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford, 322
1980).
 The discussion of pleasure as an activity and of the distinction between activity and process (genesis) 323
exceeds the scope of this article. For a detailed account of this, see D. Bostock, “Pleasure and activity in 
Aristotle’s Ethics”, Phronesis, 33 (1988): 251-71, A. O. Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle’s distinction between energeia and kinesis”, in 
New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, R. Bambrough ed. (London: Humanities Press, 1965), J. Beere, Doing and 
being: an interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009). Genesis is a 
particular type of kinesis. On the distinction between energeia and kinesis, see also: M. Burnyeat, “Kinesis vs 
Energeia: a much read passage in (but not of) Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
34 (2008): 219-291.
 EE VI=NE VII, 1153 a 14-15.324
 G. Ryle, “Pleasure”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 28 (Supplementary Volume): 135–146, 1954. 325
Anscombe connects pleasure and the good by arguing that to say that someone experiences pleasure involves 
understanding what it is for a subject to behave toward something as good. G.E.M. Anscombe, “Will and 
Emotion”, in The Collected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, 3 vols., Oxford: Blackwell.1981, Vol. I, pp. 100–107. 
C. Shields in Perfecting pleasures: the metaphysics of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X, in J.Miller, Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics: a critical guide, Cambridge University Press, 2011, disagree with Anscombe’s view that 
Aristotle’s account of pleasure is incoherent. Anscombe argues that Aristotle claims that pleasure is not a 
process insofar as he disagrees with Plato’s account of pleasure as a replenishment. Aristotle argues that pleasure 
is an activity and it is supervenient in the sense that it inherently belongs to an activity. Aristotle claims that 
pleasure arises in the activities of perception and thought when our faculties are functioning at their highest level 
and pleasure perfect those activities. 
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pleasure in EE, NE and Magna Moralia.  Scholars such as J. Warren points out that what 326
Warren calls the pleasures of reason play an important role in Aristotle’s ethics. Even though 
these pleasures “feel good,” they cannot be reduced to a feeling.  C. Olfert argues that 327
pleasure is an important element in ethical development, and that we learn from pleasure.  328
C. Shields stresses that pleasure is an indispensable element that arises when our faculties 
function at the best.  K. Corcilius and H. Lorenz explore the connection between pleasure 329
and desire.   330
As it appears from the analyses of pleasure in these works, for Aristotle, there is vast 
support in favor of the idea that pleasure cannot be just a feeling. The feeling is the way in 
which we are aware of pleasure and in which we experience it. Considering pleasure just as 
“feeling good” would be reductive. Perhaps it is even a tautology, close to saying that 
pleasure is pleasurable. In the EE and in the NE, Aristotle seems to conceive of pleasure as a 
cognitive and affective state. D. Charles stresses the cognitive, affective and conative 
 A.J. Festugière, Le plaisir, Librairie Philosophique, 1946. 326
 J. Warren, The pleasures of reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists (Cambridge, 2014).327
 C. Olfert, “What we learn from pleasure”, History of philosophy quarterly, 30 (2013), 35-51.328
 C. Shields in Perfecting pleasures: the metaphysics of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X, in J.Miller, 329
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a critical guide, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
 K. Corcilius, “Aristotle’s Definition of Non-rational Pleasure and Pain and Desire,” in J. Miller (ed.), 330
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 117–43; H. Lorenz, The brute within 
(Oxford, 2006).
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dimension of pleasure.  Aristotle’s definition of pleasure speaks directly in favor of the view 331
that pleasure is more than a perceptual phenomenon that detects the good, or a feeling.   332
Before laying out my argument in favor of the pleasant being non-derivative, let us look 
at some preliminary evidence in the EE that the pleasant is indeed something distinct from 
the good. In this text, Aristotle says that both the pleasant and the good are philoi - loved or 
desired.  And he claims that the pleasant and the good are different.  333
(T2) There is also a puzzle about whether what is loved is the pleasant or the 
good. If we love what we have an appetite for (and passion is most like this, for 
every “passionate lover always feels love”) and appetite is for the pleasant, than 
in this respect the object of love is the pleasant; but if what we love is what we 
wish for then it is the good. And the pleasant and the good are distinct.  334
Aristotle says that what we love is either the pleasant or the good. Insofar as Aristotle 
distinguishes the two, we can say that the pleasant and the good are indeed different and 
independent properties: the subject can love something because it is pleasant or because it is 
good.  If they were the same property, namely if the pleasant was an appearance of the 335
good, or if the good was a property of things in the world, and the pleasant a psychological 
property, we would love something either because it is good or because it appears good. 
Differently from Moss, Charles argues that perceptual pleasure is cognitive, affective and conative. Finding 331
something pleasant always has an effect on the subject who responds in certain ways. Cf. D. Charles, Aristotle’s 
desire in Vesa Hirvonen, Toivo J. Holopainen and Miira Tuominen (eds.), Mind and Modality, Brill, 2006.
 EE V, 1153 a 14-15.332
 EE VII, 1235 b 30.333
 EE, 1235 b 19-24: ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ φιλούµενον. εἰ µὲν γὰρ φιλοῦµεν 334
οὗ ἐπιθυµοῦµεν, καὶ µάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον (oὐθεὶς γὰρ“ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ) ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυµία τοῦ 
ἡδέος, ταύτῃ µὲν τὸ φιλούµενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ ὃ βουλόµεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν: ἔστι δ᾽ ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
 In the EE, Aristotle argues that there are three properties that motivate us and that are components of the 335
good life. This perspective seems to be in line with the theory of the three desires that we find in De Anima. This 
theory of desire seems rather at odds with the view in the NE, where the good plays a central place and there is 
no mention of the beautiful or of the pleasant as motivating properties that elicit desire.
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Conversely, as the passage suggests, we wish to possess the good and the pleasant (and also 
the beautiful according to ST) in our life.  What is more, Aristotle explicitly says that the 336
pleasant and the good are distinct. 
Let me appropriate one recent argument by Fred Feldman that provides a useful 
example to show that pleasure is non-derivative.  If pleasure was simply the phenomenal 337
side of goodness—the way it feels to take something to be good—taking pleasure would have 
to be proportional to judging something to be good. That is, whenever an agent believes that 
something is good, she would have to experience pleasure in proportion to how, qualitatively 
or quantitatively, she takes something to be good.  
Feldman uses the following example. A person takes pleasure in drinking beer and 
eating peanuts and sees her neighbor doing the same. Let us assume that two situations are 
equal in value: one does not value one’s own experience of drinking beer and eating peanuts 
more than her neighbor’s. If this is so, one would need to take equal pleasure in both. 
However, it happens that the subject takes more pleasure in her own experience rather than in 
seeing her neighbor drinking beer and eating peanuts. In this sense, experiencing pleasure is 
different from believing that something is good. One may object that the example does not 
show the point insofar as it is one thing to experience something directly and another to see 
another person experiencing something. Yet, even if we consider two experiences of the same 
subject, it is clear that the pleasant is different from what appears good. Suppose I think that 
having tiramisù for dessert tonight is equally good as having tiramisù for dessert tomorrow. I 
could think that it has equal value for tiramisù to be the dessert one night or the other; 
 This seems in line with the theory of desire that Aristotle presents in De Anima, where there are three distinct 336
desires: De Anima, 415 a 13. 
 F. Feldman, Two questions about pleasure, in Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Desert: Essays in Moral 337
Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 79-105.
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unfortunately, I cannot afford to have it twice. In terms of goodness both options are equal. 
However, there is a striking difference in terms of pleasure: having tiramisù today seems a lot 
better. Given temporal closeness and typical ways of future discounting when it comes to 
pleasure, nearby pleasure is felt to be larger than the pleasure that is in the distant future, even 
though I judge both to be the same on the level of goodness. In these examples, beliefs about 
goodness and felt pleasure come apart in ways that support the view that pleasure is non-
derivative.  338
3. Pleasure by nature 
In EE VI=NE VII, Aristotle proposes different ways of categorizing pleasure. 
According to these categorizations, there are pleasures that are illusory and come from bad 
sources. However, there are other pleasures that are choiceworthy in themselves and that are 
pleasures by nature. The idea that there are pleasures that are by nature or natural - φύσει - 
brings evidence in favor of the claim that pleasure is non-derivative. That is, there are things 
that are pleasant for human beings: being pleasant is not only a way in which they appear to 
us. Rather, they are pleasures by nature. First of all, Aristotle introduces the distinction 
between pleasures choiceworthy versus necessary: 
(T3) Some sources of pleasure are necessary and others are in themselves 
choiceworthy but admit of excess. Bodily sources of pleasure are necessary (I 
mean the sorts of things that involve nutrition and sexual activity, that is, the 
kinds of bodily sources of pleasure that we claimed were the focus of indiscipline 
and temperance); the others, however, are not in fact necessary, though they are 
choiceworthy in themselves (I mean, for example, victory, honor, wealth and 
these sorts of good and pleasant things).  339
 Cf. J. Annas, “Aristotle on pleasure and goodness,” in Rorty, 1980, pp. 285-299.338
 ΕE VI, 1147 b 23-30: ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ µὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ᾽ αἱρετὰ µὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 339
ἔχοντα δ᾽ ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα µὲν τὰ σωµατικά (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν 
ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωµατικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεµεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), τὰ δ᾽ 
ἀναγκαῖα µὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτά (λέγω δ᾽ οἷον νίκην τιµὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ 
ἡδέων).
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There are pleasures that are necessary because they are connected to activities 
necessary to our survival, either as individuals or as species. These pleasures can be 
excessive. One has to pursue the correct measure of these pleasures. However, there are 
pleasures that are not necessary. Nonetheless, they are choiceworthy. Aristotle uses the 
examples of victory, honor, wealth and similar good and pleasant things. Also these pleasant 
things are good for the individual in a certain measure. However, Aristotle claims that they 
are choiceworthy in themselves. This seems to suggest that they have a positive role in the 
good human life. What does it mean that they are choiceworthy in themselves? As Aristotle 
says, only virtue and virtuous activities are choiceworthy as ends. In other words, they are 
pursued for their own sake and in any amount. All the other things should be pursued with 
moderation and not as ends in themselves. There is a distinction between what is pursued as 
an end in itself and what is choiceworthy for its own sake (αἱρετὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά), but it is not an 
end in itself. Victory, honor, wealth and so forth, and the pleasures connected with these 
goods are choiceworthy for their own sake, but they are not ends in themselves. We wish to 
have these things in our lives. However, they cannot be the final aim of our lives. Aristotle 
adds the intermediate pleasures to the distinction between pleasures choiceworthy and 
necessary: 
(T4) In accordance with our earlier classification, some appetites and pleasures 
are beautiful and excellent in kind (some pleasures being naturally (φύσει) 
choiceworthy, some are opposite to these, and some are in between, as we 
distinguished before) for example, money and profit and victory and honor; and 
with respect to all pleasures, these and the intermediate pleasures, people are not 
blamed just because they experience them or have an appetite for them or like 
them but rather because they do so in a particular way, i.e., to excess. That is why 
we blame all those who are dominated by or pursue something that is naturally 
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beautiful and good, contrary to their reasoning, like those who are more devoted 
to honor than they should be, or to their children and parents.  340
Aristotle divides pleasures in naturally choiceworthy versus non-choiceworthy versus 
intermediate pleasures. Two types of pleasures mentioned in the previous distinction come up 
also in this passage: the pleasures of victory and honor. These pleasures are choiceworthy, as 
we have seen in the previous passage. Profit, victory, honor, and the like, seem to be pleasant 
by nature. This expression - by nature (φύσει) - occurs other times in the EE. In particular, in 
EE VIII 1248 b 28, Aristotle says that there are things that are good by nature. He provides a 
list of goods that are paradigmatically good by nature, and in the list, there are honor and 
wealth. In a nutshell, passages where things good by nature are mentioned show that things 
that are good by nature are things good for human beings as we are by nature or for the most 
part. These things that are good by nature are also pleasant by nature. That is, they are 
pleasant for human beings as we are by nature. The idea that there are pleasures by nature 
suggests that they are pleasant for us qua human beings. In other words, they are pleasant for 
the particular being that we are. The distinction between pleasures by nature versus pleasure 
that are not by nature is further explored in EE VI=NE VII: 
(T5) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these some are pleasant 
simpliciter (ἁπλῶς) and others are pleasant according to the genre being it that of 
animals or that of human beings. Some things are not pleasant by nature, but of 
these some become pleasant as a result of deformities, some as a result of 
habituation, others because of wicked natures; so it is possible to observe, in 
connection with each of these kinds of pleasure, correspondingly similar states.  341
 ΕE VI, 1148 a 23-31: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ µέν εἰσι τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων 340
(τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ µεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλοµεν πρότερον), οἷον 
χρήµατα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιµή: πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ µεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ 
ἐπιθυµεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι µὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ 
διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιµὴν µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ 
γονεῖς. 
 EE 1148 b 15-19: ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔνια µὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ µὲν ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων καὶ 341
ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ µὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ µοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ 
περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις.
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Things pleasant by nature for human beings are different for things pleasant by nature 
for other species. As Aristotle famously said, things healthy or good for human beings differ 
from things healthy or good for fish.  In this sense, things pleasant by nature are not 342
pleasant simpliciter for any kind of being. Simpliciter and by nature seem to be used 
interchangeably when we talk about the same species. The pleasant simpliciter is not the 
pleasant absolutely: conversely, it is pleasant simpliciter for the being considered, for 
example, for fish or for human beings. On similar grounds, things pleasant simpliciter differ 
depending on whether they are pleasant simpliciter for human beings or pleasant simpliciter 
for fish. There are also pleasures that are not by nature and that are pleasant only because of 
the agent’s deformities, wrongly oriented habituation or bad upbringing. These things are not 
pleasant simpliciter or by nature insofar as the being considered is not how human beings or 
animals are by nature or for the most part. In these cases, something occurred that changed 
how the agent is by nature and hence, how she perceives things. As Aristotle says, the wine 
that is pleasant for the drunk agent may not be pleasant simpliciter. Accordingly, if the 
agent’s perceptual capacities are altered, things that are not pleasant simpliciter may be 
pleasant for this agent.   343
To sum up, Aristotle distinguishes pleasures that are necessary, choiceworthy in 
themselves - which are pleasures by nature - intermediate pleasure, and pleasures not by 
nature. Pleasures by nature are pleasant for human beings as human beings are by nature or 
for the most part. Even though these pleasures should be pursued with moderation, they are 
choiceworthy and we wish to have these pleasures in our lives. The idea that there are 
 NE 1141 a 23.342
 EE VII, 1235 b 30- 1236 a 6.343
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pleasures by nature suggests that pleasure is something in its own right. There are also 
pleasures connected to virtue and to virtuous activities. These pleasures are connected to our 
best state as human beings. In this light, it seems plausible to argue, as Aristotle does, that the 
activity of our best state, namely happiness, which consists in virtuous activities however 
understood, is the most pleasant thing of all. 
4. The contingent identity: pleasure and happiness 
Let us examine more closely an essential element for PT and for the ethical claim that I 
am defending in the chapter: the contingent identity. In EE VI=NE VII, Aristotle argues that 
pleasure and happiness are both activities and that happiness happens to be pleasure. This 
“happens-to-be” identification can be described as contingent identity.  Aristotle defines 344
εὐδαιµονία as activity according to complete virtue in a complete life.  Happiness is 345
complete and must be also unimpeded. One may argue that it is perfect, where this means that 
happiness is complete and has its end in itself; it is the best activity a human being can desire 
and can engage in. Aristotle classifies both pleasure and happiness as activities, and he claims 
that happiness is pleasure insofar as it is unimpeded activity according to our natural state. C. 
Rapp argues that “εὐδαιµονία is an activity of certain states and this activity, in virtue of its 
being unhindered happens to be pleasure.”  Rapp argues that in EE VI=NE VII, Aristotle 346
does not aim to explain happiness as pleasure; similarly, he does not aim to say that happiness 
and pleasure are simply the same thing. Their contingent identity, as one may put it 
EE V, 1153 b 13-17. The expression contingent identity is used in C. Rapp, “NE VII. 13-14: pleasure and 344
Eudaimonia,” in  Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, book VII: Symposium Aristotelicum, C. Natali ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 209-237.
EE II, 1219 a 39. 345
 C. Rapp, “NE VII. 13-14: pleasure and Eudaimonia,” in  Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, book VII: 346
Symposium Aristotelicum, C. Natali ed. (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 209-237.
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colloquially, means that when someone engages in the activity of εὐδαιµονία she engages in 
the activity of pleasure, such that the former activities are the very same activities which are 
pleasant. The contingent identity shows that pleasure can make us aware of perfect activity. 
Pleasure, as Aristotle conceives of it, arises when all our capacities function in accordance 
with nature and are unimpeded. 
To elucidate further what is at issue in Aristotle’s contingent identification of happiness 
and pleasure, consider that there are differences between our notion of happiness and the 
ancient notion of εὐδαιµονία that Aristotle invokes and develops.  In our everyday talk, 347
ascriptions of happiness seem close to ascriptions of pleasure: we tend to ascribe happiness to 
persons at given moments, rather than to a person’s life as a whole, as Aristotle would.  348
Thus, to a modern ear the identification of happiness and pleasure may not even be 
surprising. But for Aristotle the ascription of happiness is the claim that someone is leading 
(or has led) a good life. Accordingly, happiness and pleasure may come apart. As a result, in 
Aristotle’s time the claim that happiness is the most pleasant thing of all may not have been 
 Examples of how εὐδαιµονία was conceived in Ancient Greece can be found in the Iliad, Homer described 347
Achilles as the best of the Achaeans. The Homeric characters are representative of a view according to which 
human flourishing, i.e. εὐδαιµονία, is achieved by being excellent. Achilles is the most excellent of the 
Achaeans because he fulfills his function at the best: he is the best warrior. Differently from Aristotle’s view, 
flourishing for the Homeric heroes coincided with acquiring wealth, prestige and political power. Solon’s view, 
according to which no one should be considered happy until death, was widespread in the Greek world (reported 
by Herodotus, Histories, I.30.3). Cf. Terence Irwin, “Permanent happiness: Aristotle and Solon,” in Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1985): 89-124. Irwin argues that Aristotle rejects the Socratic view that virtue 
alone is sufficient for happiness. In order to be happy, the virtuous person needs to make a good use of the 
goods. See also Terence Irwin, “Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions of happiness,” in The Norms of Nature, M. 
Schofield, G. Striker eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1986) pp. 205-245; Richard Kraut, “Two conceptions of 
happiness,” The Philosophical Review, 88, 2 (1979): 167-197. Katja Vogt in The good is the good life (ch. 2 of 
Desiring the good, OUP 2017) argues that at the beginning of the NE, Aristotle presents what she calls a 
“Cheating Puzzle”.  Namely, he introduces some premises concerning the relation between happiness, the good 
and the good life as widely agreed-upon. As she argues, Aristotle is well aware that not everyone thinks that the 
good is happiness. For example, and this is the topic of NE I.6, Plato says the good is the Form of the good. Vogt 
argues that Aristotle moves away from the Solonian-Herodotean view of happiness according to which a third 
person can ascribe happiness to someone and one needs to wait until the end of someone else’s life before 
describing her as “happy.” In addition, he also rejects Plato’s view according to which happiness is a state and 
not an activity (this account of happiness is held by Plato in the Symposium 202c-205d and in the Euthyphro 
278e-281e).
 NE, 1100 a 32 – 1100 b 10.348
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intuitive. Perhaps it was hard to accept because of the negative connotations that pleasure 
had, at least in discussions that envisaged hedonism as an opponent. Often, pleasure seems to 
have been associated with bodily or other “lowly” pleasures. In this context, Aristotle’s view 
that pleasure and happiness come to the same may be controversial, perhaps even pioneering. 
For after all, happiness is assumed to be the highest good of all. 
So far I provided some evidence in favor of the metaphysical claim - that the pleasant is 
non-derivative - by discussing Aristotle’s definition of pleasure and his notion of pleasure by 
nature. I analyzed also some evidence in favor of the ethical claim - that pleasure plays 
distinctive roles in the virtuous person’s life - by introducing ST and PT and through the 
contingent identity. Before looking more closely at the psychological claim, let us examine 
Moss’s proposal. 
5. The apparent good 
Moss defines appearance of goodness as “a motivating representation through 
phantasia, which derives from previous perception of its object as pleasant, and forms in turn 
the basis for thoughts about goodness.”  She argues that all motivations involve an 349
appearance of the desired object as good. On her account then, the pleasant is the object of 
desire qua apparent good. Phantasia is the faculty that detects it. According to Moss, 
phantasia’s job in picking up on the pleasant is similar to how perception works. The 
difference resides merely in the fact that, where pleasure and pain are concerned, phantasia 
can represent an object of desire even when it is not presently perceived; phantasia preserves 
and reproduces the pleasurable and the painful. The good, however, is not perceived or 
represented by phantasia. It is grasped through a concept and is the proper object of rational 
desire. This difference lays the ground for the way in which Moss conceives of the relation 
 Moss, p. Xii.349
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between the pleasant and the good. According to her position, the good picks out a property 
of objects in the world and the pleasant is what we may call a merely psychological property, 
or, perhaps, in terms introduced earlier, an attitude-dependent property. In these terms, Moss 
is an anti-realist about pleasure. The pleasant, the thought goes, is constituted by our 
attitudes. 
Moss argues that motivation always depends on evaluative cognition: in order to have a 
rational or an appetitive desire for something, the object needs to appear good to the 
subject.  She argues that Aristotle understands the apparent good in a quite literal sense, 350
which she elucidates by comparison with optical illusion: in the same way in which we 
perceive something as X while it is in reality Y, by perceiving something as pleasant we 
believe that it is good.  As she argues, through phantasia the subject experiences quasi-351
perceptual phenomena of the object appearing good to her. The expression “quasi-perceptual” 
aims at capturing the idea that phantasia seems to work like perception: it produces an image 
in the same way in which perception presents to us the object perceived. In effect, she argues, 
we desire the pleasant because phantasia produces appearances of goodness. Previous 
experiences of perception of the same object as pleasant function as the material from which 
phantasia forms appearances of that object as good. Thus, phantasia produces images of the 
object as pleasant and, as Moss argues, as good.  For Moss, we desire the pleasant only 352
insofar as we believe that the pleasant object is good. She argues in favor of a causal relation 
 Moss, J., Aristotle on the apparent good: perception, phantasia, thought and desire (Oxford, 2012), p. 4.350
 Moss quotes De Insomnis 460 b 16-20, in order to explain this point: Aristotle argues that there are two 351
distinct faculties, one with which we judge and the other with which we have appearances of things. This duality 
is the cause of optical illusion, for example the fact that the sun appears to be only one foot in diameter. 
 This connection between pleasure and phantasia is explained in Rhetoric 1370 a 27-35. One may argue that 352
this view cannot be applied in the case of the pleasure discussed in the ethics.
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according to which we desire the pleasant because it appears good.  In effect, on Moss’ 353
reconstruction, the pleasant is a derivative or dependent property: it is the mere appearance of 
the good. 
I shall concede several intuitions that figure in what we may call the illusion view of 
pleasure: the good can appear pleasant; the bad can appear pleasant; and often we are 
deceived about what is truly good. But this is compatible with both goodness and the pleasant 
being non-derivative, and this is the view I defend. On my view, the pleasant can motivate 
qua pleasant. It can also motivate qua seeming goodness. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
pleasant can motivate qua pleasant is significant, because it reflects a fact about the nature of 
value. In what follows, I address, specifically, three premises Moss formulates. Moss’ 
position relies on the following three premises: 
- All motivations involve evaluation.  
- Only by being cognized as good something is desired.  
- Pleasure is awareness of the pleasant object as good. 
These three premises are basic to her main proposal, that pleasure is the apparent good. 
But neither of these premises, I argue, is compelling. First of all, all motivations involve an 
evaluation of the object as bearer of some kind of value. So far I agree with Moss. However, 
this does not mean that the evaluation is an evaluation of the object as good. For it is not clear 
that all value is ultimately goodness. Moss seems to presuppose, without discussion, the 
premise that evaluation is eo ipso evaluation as good. This premise may strike us as familiar 
and intuitive, given that many contributions in ethics today presuppose it. However, this does 
 Lorenz proposes a different interpretation of the role of phantasia in motivation and he connects imagination 353
also with intellect and not only with perception: see H. Lorenz, The brute within, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
On the role of apparent good in motivation see also: H.S. Richardson, “Desire and the good in De Anima,” in 
Essays on Aristotle’s DA, M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (eds.), 1997, pp. 381-99; D.W. Hamlyn, Aristotle De 
Anima Books II and III,  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993; T. Irwin, Aristotle’s first principles, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988.
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not mean that the Aristotle of the EE shares it; and it is not even clear that philosophers today 
who, say, work in aesthetics or work specifically on the nature of pleasure accept it. In this 
spirit, I defend a view according to which at least in the EE (and Moss’ starting point is a 
passage in EE VII) there are three kinds of positive values: goodness, beauty, and pleasure.  354
Before I turn to the three premises of Moss’s argument, however, I address an even 
more basic issue. Moss seems to presuppose that the metaphysics of goodness is 
straightforward: it simply is, as it were, a property in the world, just like wooden or dry. And 
as such it is perceived in a certain way. Pleasure, on her picture, seems to be a psychological 
phenomenon that occurs when we judge some object or aspect of the world to be good. By 
drawing on some of the passages that are crucial to Moss’s interpretation, and adducing 
additional evidence, I call this picture into question. Both goodness and pleasure, I argue, are 
to be explained by reference both to agential attitudes and to features of the world. 
6.  Pleasure and the good 
Moss’ thesis may be summarized as follows: pleasure is how we perceive the good 
through phantasia. In order to examine this claim, I analyze some passages in the Physics and 
in De Anima, where Aristotle discusses pleasure in relation to perception. These passages 
help clarify the relation between the good and the pleasant. I approach these passages with 
two questions in mind: is pleasure our way of perceiving the good? And, are pleasure and 
goodness metaphysically on a par, both involving mind-dependent and mind-independent 
features of the world? If pleasure is merely how we perceive the good (and thus fully 
explained as a psychological property) and the good is a property of objects in the world 
(fully explained without reference to the attitudes of the agents), then we should agree with 
 Historically, this is not as much of an outlier than one may suppose. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant too 354
thinks that three value properties deserve to be studied: the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant.
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Moss’ interpretation. In Physics 247 a 16, Aristotle argues that pleasure and pain are 
connected to perception:  
(T6) All the virtues of character are concerned with bodily pleasures and pains, 
either in doing (in the present moment) or in memory or in hope. Those in doing 
are according to the sense-perceptual capacity, and must therefore be stirred by 
some sensible object, and the pleasures and pains of memory or hope are 
dependent upon those in doing (for they accompany the memory of past pleasure 
or the expectation of pleasure in the future), so that all such pleasure must spring 
from objects of perception.  355
In T6, it is not clear how we should understand the connection between pleasure and 
perception. Is pleasure always a feature of perception? Or is Aristotle discussing here a 
particular kind of pleasure? Aristotle mentions ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωµατικάς. This seems 
to suggest that he is referring to bodily pleasures (and pains), and not to pleasure (and pain) 
as a whole. For an agent to feel bodily pleasure in something, she must either currently 
perceive something, or remember a past perception, taking pleasure in it, or anticipate a 
perception, enjoying its prospect. Aristotle speaks about the pleasures and pains in doing (ἐν 
τῇ πράξει): these pleasures are stirred by sensible objects. All the other pleasures - those in 
memory and hope - depend on the pleasures in doing. That is, when we take pleasure in 
remembering something or in expecting something in the future, the memory of something or 
the expectation of something is pleasant because we remembered that we perceived that 
object as pleasant in the past. Let us say, the expectation of eating chocolate is pleasant 
because I remember how chocolate tastes. This memory is based on past perception of 
chocolate. In this sense, sense-perceptual activity is connected to pleasure. However, this 
 Physics 247 a 9-15, trans. by P.H. Wicksteed with changes by GB: ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ 355
λύπας τὰς σωµατικάς, αὗται δ᾿ ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττει ἢ ἐν τῷ µεµνῆσθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν. αἱ µὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ πράξει 
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησίν εἰσιν, ὥσθ᾿ ὑπ᾿ αἰσθητοῦ τινος κινεῖσθαι, αἱ δ᾿ ἐν τῇ µνήµῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀπὸ ταύτης (ἢ 
γὰρ οἷα ἔπαθον µεµνηµένοι ἥδονται ἢ ἐλπίζοντες οἷα µέλλουσιν)· ὥστ᾿ ἀνάγκη πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ 
τῶ αἰσθητῶν γίγνεσθαι. 
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does not suggest that pleasure is a feature of perception. It only speaks in favor of the idea 
that bodily pleasure derives from perception.  
The pleasant is always something that we perceive (or feel), even when the source is 
rational for example. We can say that we feel pleasure in doing philosophy. It is true that the 
agent feels or perceives something, namely she perceives pleasure. However, perception is 
not the source of pleasure. This leads to my second point: the pleasant seems to be a property 
in the mind of the agent. This claim may be considered in favor of Moss’ position. If we 
presuppose that for Aristotle, the good is an attitude-independent property (and as I noted, 
this is a disputed assumption), then it may seem that pleasure, if it is situated in an agent’s 
psychology, cannot be an independent property in its own right. That is, it may seem to 
follow from pleasures’s felt presence in an agent’s psychology that it must be dependent on a 
metaphysically more fundamental property, the good. And this is Moss’s position, though she 
does not spell it out in terms that the debate about realism and anti-realism supplies. But 
insofar as Aristotle’s position does not fall on either side of today’s division between realism 
and anti-realism, and insofar as for him also the good is explained both by reference to an 
agent’s attitudes and by reference to something attitude-independent (namely, that which is 
discerned), there is a further option: the pleasant might be just like the good, a property that is 
to be explained both by appeal to attitudes (features of an agent’s psychology, etc.) and by 
appeal to attitude-independent features of the world.  
One may disagree with Moss and argue that the pleasant and the good are non-
derivative. It exceeds the purpose of this chapter to argue in favor of a specific version of 
Aristotelian realism about value. I take it, however, that we cannot presuppose that the good 
is in any simple fashion a property of objects in the world; it is a relational property: what is 
good is good for some living being. And hence we cannot simply assume that the pleasant, if 
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it is to some extent explained via psychological attitudes, is any different. As in the case of 
the good, a full account may involve a complex story about the psychology of agents on the 
one hand, and an account of what actually is pleasant for agents, such that agents should 
perceive it as pleasant on the other hand. Moss’ argument seems to rely on the idea that the 
good is a property of objects in the world, while the pleasant is not. But both the good and the 
pleasant require agents for whom something is good or pleasant. We always need a subject in 
order to claim that something is good or pleasant. 
Let us examine more closely the example of chocolate. Chocolate is not pleasant 
simpliciter or good simpliciter. It may be pleasant for the chocolate-lover and good for the 
person who needs sugar. However, it may be not pleasant for the person who does not like 
chocolate and bad for the person who has diabetes. It may be indifferent for an agent who has 
lost the sense of taste and who does not need sugar but does not have diabetes either. 
Depending on the particular conditions and situations in which the subject is, something may 
be good or pleasant. However, chocolate in itself is not good or pleasant. And this line of 
thought applies not only to things like chocolate. Even virtue is good-for: it is good for 
human beings—this is one upshot of Aristotle’s famous function argument. There are human 
excellences, and these are ways of being good for human beings. 
 In book III of De Anima, Aristotle seems to consider pleasure as occurring 
simultaneously with a psychological state of feeling something. In particular, in De Anima 
431 a 12-13, he says: 
(T7) To feel pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptual mean in 
comparison to the good or bad as such.  356
 De Anima, 431 a 12-13, translation by W.S. Hett, with changes by GB: καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ 356
ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ µεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. R.D. Hicks translates as “to feel pleasure or 
pain is precisely to function with the sensitive mean, acting upon good or evil as such.”
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T7 is controversial, at least for three reasons: it is unclear what the perceptual mean is, 
what Aristotle takes “being active” to be, and how we should think of the good or bad as 
such. It is not plausible to ascribe to Aristotle the view that we take pleasure only in what 
really is good, and pain only in what really is bad. Hence the relationship between pleasure/
pain on the one hand and the good/bad on the other hand cannot be quite as straightforward 
as an initial reading of the passage may suggest. The idea of “being active” is perhaps least 
puzzling: Aristotle characterizes pleasure/pain as activities rather than states.  Regarding the 357
perceptual mean, Aristotle may invoke the explanation of what perception is that occurs in De 
Anima 424 a 5-6: 
    (T8) The organ of perception is a sort of mean between the opposition in the 
sensible objects.  358
Along these lines, Aristotle may refer to the organ of perception by speaking of a 
perceptual mean.  According to Aristotle, the sense-perceptual capacity can become like the 359
properties that it perceives, let us say hot or cold. It is the mean between two extremes, hot 
and cold, and in virtue of being such, it can perceive that something is hot or cold. This idea 
of the sense-organ taking on the property that it perceives, is much-debated and its 
reconstruction is controversial.  For present purposes, all that matters is that in pleasure (or 360
pain), Aristotle may take it that our sensory faculty itself may be altered. Suppose the agent 
 Pleasure is defined in EE 1153 a 13 as unimpeded activity according to our natural state. “Being active” may 357
refer to the fact that pleasure is not a state but qua activity, when we feel pleasure we engage in this activity, i.e. 
pleasure is being active toward something.
 De Anima, 424 a 5, translation by GB: ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον µεσότητός τινος οὒσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς 358
ἐναντιώσεως. 
 Moss argues that the perceptual mean must be either the faculty of perception or an organ of perception. Cf. 359
R.D. Hicks, Aristotle’s De Anima, Cambridge University Press, 1907. 
 A. Marmodoro, Aristotle on perceiving objects, Oxford University Press, 2014.360
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perceives something that is hot: this could be a case of the sensory faculty itself taking on the 
property hot. The case is not as straightforward if we examine the good. Qua reasoners, we 
may relate to the good by judging it to be good; but sensorily, the thought is, we may relate to 
it by taking pleasure in it. Moss takes this to mean that the pleasant is an appearance of the 
good and, further, that the pleasant is not a property in its own right. But this is not the only, 
and not the most plausible way of understanding Aristotle’s proposal. Instead, I submit, the 
first take-away of the passage is that pleasure has a felt quality in the mind, or in terms closer 
to Aristotle, in the agent’s psychology. 
I propose to translate πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν as in comparison to the good and bad. 
Aristotle uses πρὸς with the accusative in the sense of in comparison to or in reference to in 
other passages.  This translation has the advantage of clarifying that for Aristotle we do not 361
take pleasure only in the good and pain in the bad. Experience suggests that this idea is not 
correct: we sometimes take pleasure in the bad and pain in the good. In the context where the 
passage occurs, Aristotle pursues a comparison between knowledge, perception and action. 
When we engage in a process of knowledge, we deal with what is true or false. We assert or 
negate that something is true or false. Likewise, in perception, we deal with the pleasant or 
the painful and we pursue or avoid it. In action, we deal with the good or the bad, we pursue 
or avoid them. In this comparison, Aristotle argues that we pursue the pleasant or avoid the 
painful in comparison to what we do with the good and the bad. If interpreted in this way, the 
passage does not suggest that we take pleasure in the good, but that we pursue the pleasant in 
a similar way in which we pursue the good. In this sense, “good and bad as such” seems to 
suggest that there is a certain way of pursuing the good when the good is truly good. This 
 This use is attested in, among others, Plato, Thucydides, Herodotus. In Aristotle’s works, see Poetics  1451 a 361
8, Rhetoric 1409 a 4, Politics 1310 a 14. Particularly relevant is the use of pros with the accusative in order to 
express the opposition to what is haplôs in Posterior Analytics 72 a 1.
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way of pursuing the good is different if the good is a deceitful appearance. By speaking of the 
good and bad as such, Aristotle seems to stress the idea that we should compare the relation 
between pleasure/pain and perception, to the relation between the good/bad and perception, 
and that we should consider the case in which the good or the bad are truly good or bad (and 
not deceitful appearances). 
There seems to be a difference between properties that require more complex processes 
to be perceived (such as the pleasant and the good) and properties perceived with one sense 
(for example sweetness). Aristotle’s discussion of sweetness in De Anima 426 b 12, suggests 
that there is a difference between properties such as the pleasant, and sweetness. Something 
sweet may be pleasant for an agent in the same sense in which the good may be pleasant for 
someone. Taste is the sense with which we perceive sweetness. What is the sense for the 
pleasant? There is no unique sense for the pleasant. Differently from sweetness, the agent 
does not perceive the pleasant with taste, but she has to perceive the object as pleasant in 
order to pursue it. Aristotle argues that when the soul “says that something is pleasant or 
painful, in this case it avoids or pursues it.”  This process of “saying that something is 362
pleasant” is similar to when, by seeing (ὁρῶν) images and thought in the soul, we calculate 
and deliberate for the future and for the present. In the case of the pleasant, there is an 
additional step in the process that goes from perceiving X to pursuing X, namely we need to 
judge X as pleasant. While for sweetness, we perceive sweetness and we pursue it, in the case 
of the pleasant we perceive some features of the object, we judge it pleasant and we pursue 
the object.  
 De Anima, 431 b 7-12: ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσµασιν ἢ νοήµασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ 362
βουλεύεται τὰ µέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει, 
καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ 
κακῷ· ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί. 
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Moss takes it that De anima provides crucial evidence for her proposal, according to 
which pleasure is the perception of goodness.  Pursuing the analogy according to which the 363
good is the end (suggested already in the first lines of the NE), Moss interprets “being active 
toward something as good”, as striving and trying to pursue it as an end. Moss claims that the 
passage suggests that when the faculty of perception is in contact with the beneficial or the 
harmful, it responds with the feeling of pleasure or of pain. This feeling guides the agent 
toward the beneficial. In other words, on Moss’ reading, pleasure is a way of tracking the 
good. However, we can agree with much of her analysis and yet not accept the claim that 
pleasure is only a perceptual phenomenon to track the good.  
It is also true that an agent who engages in a good activity enjoys it, and that an agent 
who loves a good object (say, a good person or a good piece of music) feels pleasure. 
Nevertheless, the goodness of the activity or object is a distinct phenomenon from the 
pleasure that is taken in it. Considering pleasure only as the way the good feels fails to give 
adequate space to other things Aristotle has to say about pleasure, including famous accounts 
of what pleasure is. Yes, pleasure feels good and the good may feel pleasant to us. However, 
philosophers in today’s discussions of pleasure complain that by saying that pleasure feels 
good one says very little, or at any rate not enough, and I submit Aristotle agrees.  
7. Apparent and true pleasure 
If my argument is compelling, the pleasant is a non-derivative value-property. That 
leaves open, Moss might object, the option that it is not true pleasure which motivates us; and 
to some extent I agree. But true pleasure can motivate. And hence more needs to be said 
 J. Moss, Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of 363
the Good, in S. Tennenbaum, Desire, Practical Reason and the good, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 68. 
Moss quotes two ancient commentators who seem to interpret the passage in the same way: “To experience 
pleasure or distress … is nothing else but to perceive something as commensurate or incommensurate with the 
perceiver.” (Philoponus, commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima). “In being pleased perception cleaves to its 
proper (oikeia) activity as good, while in being pained it rejects it as bad.” (Simplicius, commentary on 
Aristotle’s De Anima). 
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about the distinction between apparent pleasure and true pleasure, and about true pleasure’s 
positive valence. In what follows, I examine relevant passages from the NE and the EE that 
elucidate the distinction between those for whom the appearance reflects the true nature of 
something and those for whom the appearance is misleading. In the passage of the EE that 
functions as starting point for Moss’ argument, Aristotle claims that the object of desire and 
wish is either the good or the apparent good, namely the pleasant. 
(T9) The object of desire and wish is either the good or the apparent good. That is 
why the pleasant is an object of desire (for it is an apparent good); some people 
believe that pleasure is good, while to others it appears good even if they believe 
that it is not, since appearance and belief are not in the same part of the soul. It is, 
however, clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear. With this distinction 
made, we must make another assumption. Some good things are good simpliciter 
and others are good for a particular person but not simpliciter. And the same 
things are good simpliciter and pleasant simpliciter. For we say that what is 
beneficial for a healthy body is good for a body simpliciter; but we do not say this 
about what is good for a sick body. Similarly, what is pleasant for a healthy and 
sound body is pleasant for a body simpliciter.  364
Aristotle argues that some people believe that pleasure is good and to others it appears 
good contrary to their beliefs. Pleasure appears good (phainetai) in the sense that phantasia 
produces an image of pleasure as good. In this passage, Aristotle distinguishes between 
having a belief and having an image of something through phantasia. Then he discusses the 
distinction between being good simpliciter and for someone (tini). The term simpliciter 
translates the Greek word haplôs. An analysis of the occurrences of haplôs (simpliciter) in the 
EE suggests the following. What is pleasant haplôs, at least as far as the EE is concerned, is 
 EE VII, 1235 b 25-30: τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόµενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ 364
ὀρεκτόν: φαινόµενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς µὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν µὴ δοκῇ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταὐτῷ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. ὅτι µέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, δῆλον. τούτου δὲ διωρισµένου 
ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. τῶν  γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ µὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὔ. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ 
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ µὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαµεν σώµατι συµφέροντα ἁπλῶς εἶναι σώµατι ἀγαθά, 
τὰ δὲ τῷ κάµνοντι οὔ,  οἷον φαρµακείας καὶ τοµάς. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἁπλῶς σώµατι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ 
ὁλοκλήρῳ. 
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what is pleasant for a human being in a standard state.  A human being in a standard state is 365
an adult, healthy individual in normal conditions.  What is pleasant haplôs is not pleasant 366
for a particular person in particular circumstances, but what is pleasant for human beings as 
we are by nature or for the most part. The agent in a standard state is different from the good 
agent, and from the best agent, which is the kalos kagathos. The claim that the good or 
pleasant simpliciter is the good or pleasant for the human being in the standard state marks an 
important difference with the proposal of the NE. In the NE, Aristotle says that the spoudaios 
is the standard and measure of pleasant and beautiful things.  Gosling and Taylor argue that 367
in the EE, “the criterion of pleasant without qualification [simpliciter] is the normal adult.”  368
They argue that what is pleasant simpliciter is determined by the preference of the person in 
sound conditions of body and soul. This is radically different from what we find in the NE, 
where the best agent is the measure of what is pleasant simpliciter. Taylor and Gosling 
suggest that in the NE, Aristotle is proposing his own version of the Protagorean quote “man 
is the measure.” According to the NE, “the good agent is the measure.” In this light, we can 
say that the EE’s version would be “the agent in the standard state is the measure.”  
For present purposes, two distinctions are fundamental: first, the distinction between 
being good or pleasant and appearing good or pleasant; second, the distinction between X 
being good or pleasant simpliciter, and X being good or pleasant for someone (tini). Aristotle 
 Olfert (Olfert, C, “What we learn from pleasure”, History of philosophy quarterly, 30 (2013), 35-51) 365
discusses three ways in which we can interpret the expression “good simpliciter”: (1) it is measured by what the 
good person would do, (2) it is good in all the relevant categories, (3) it is unqualifiedly good in the sense of 
best. 
 EE, 1236 a 3-5.366
 NE, 1113 a 34.367
 J. B.C. Gosling, C.W. Charles The Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 342.368
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claims that what appears good may be the result of a distorted perception of the subject.  He 369
explains this distinction through the example of the healthy body and of the sick body: 
healthy things may be bad for the sick body. Similarly, what appears good for particular 
persons may not be the good simpliciter.  It is not clear what Aristotle means with the verb 370
phainetai. One possible interpretation is the following: the subject imagines that something is 
in some way, let us say good or pleasant, even though it is not. As I see it, Aristotle claims 
that something can appear to have these properties (good, pleasant, beautiful…) and truly 
possess them, or we can be misguided by how things appear. In the second case, we imagine 
that something is good or pleasant, or for that matter beautiful, when it is not. But this does 
not entail that the pleasant is the apparent good or the beautiful is the apparent pleasant.  
It is essential to distinguish the pleasant simpliciter, the beautiful simpliciter and the 
good simpliciter from what appears pleasant, beautiful and good. The latter, again, falls into 
two classes: that which appears and is pleasant, beautiful and good, and that which merely 
appears pleasant, beautiful and good without being so. If the subject is able to perceive things 
as they truly are, the subject recognizes that the appearance is not misleading. At this point, 
she believes that the object is truly as it appears. It may be the case that the object is not as it 
appears: let us use the example of a cake that appears pleasant, but it is in reality poisoned. 
The agent recognizes the appearance as illusory and does not eat the cake. The object appears 
to be in some way. However, the agent does not believe that the object is as it appears. Of 
course it may be the case that the agent is not able to recognize that the appearance is illusory. 
In this last case, she believes that the cake is pleasant. 
 G. Pearson argues that the apparent good can be interpreted as what appears good but it is the result of an 369
error (see G. Pearson, Aristotle on desire, Cambridge University Press, 2012).
 EE, 1235 b 34-37.370
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Since Moss puts forward a reading that is mostly concerned with the NE, let us look at 
some passages on the apparent good in the NE. In NE 1113 a 16, Aristotle argues that 
βούλησις – wish – concerns the end and this is the good or the apparent good. He discusses 
opinions and he says that to some people the object of wish “seems (δοκεῖ)”  to be good and 371
to others it seems the apparent good. Then he argues: 
(T10) Those who claim that the object of wish is the good are committed to the 
view that what a person wishes if he is choosing incorrectly is not an object of 
wish (if it were an object of wish, it would also be a good, but it was, perhaps, 
bad). On the other hand, those who claim the apparent good to be the object of 
wish must say that nothing is an object of wish by nature, but only what seems so 
to each person; and different people have different, perhaps opposing, views.  372
In T10, Aristotle discusses two opinions: some people think that the object of wish is 
always the good. They think that, when one wishes for something other than the good, she is 
choosing incorrectly. Other people think that the object of wish is the apparent good, namely 
what appears good to people. For this last group, the object of wish varies from subject to 
subject. We may even say that it is relative to the individual. Aristotle argues that the true 
object of wish is the good. That is, if we consider the object of wish simpliciter and according 
to truth, as Aristotle claims, this is the good.   373
At this point, one may ask for what kind of agent the true object of wish is the good. 
There is a difference between the object of wish of the good person and of the bad or vicious 
person. Let us look at the good agent and compare this case with the bad or vicious agent. For 
the spoudaios – the good agent - the object of wish is the good insofar as this agent sees the 
 NE, 1113 a 16.371
 ΝE, 1113 a 17-22, all translations of the NE are by R. Crisp modified by GB: συµβαίνει δὲ τοῖς µὲν τὸ 372
βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι µὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ µὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούµενος  (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ 
ἀγαθόν: ἦν δ᾽, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ τὸ φαινόµενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι µὴ εἶναι φύσει 
βουλητόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν: ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία.
 NE, 1113 a 23.373
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truth.  The spoudaios knows how to discern the good from what appears to be good but it is 374
not. For the bad person the object of wish can be what appears good but it is not insofar as 
she does not perceive things as they truly are. In this sense, Aristotle compares the bad person 
to a sick body for which things that are normally healthy are not healthy. This comparison 
with the sick and healthy bodies appears also in the passage of the EE considered by Moss. 
This parallelism seems to suggest that the two passages argue for the same idea.  What is 375
pleasant may appear good for the bad person even if it is not. And this is not limited to 
pleasure appearing good. Something can appear good, beautiful and pleasant, and not having 
any of these properties. The bad person does not know how to detect what truly possesses 
these properties. For this agent, things appear distorted. In the NE, Aristotle says that the 
good person is the standard and measure of the beautiful and of the pleasant: 
(T11) For each state has its own conception of what is beautiful and pleasant, and 
one might say that the good person stands out a long way by seeing the truth in 
each case, being a sort of standard and measure of what is beautiful and pleasant. 
In the case of the many, however, pleasure seems to deceive them, because it 
looks like a good when it is not; people therefore choose what is pleasant thinking 
it to be a good, and avoid pain thinking it to be an evil.  376
What appears pleasant is illusory and deceptive in the case of the many who think that 
pleasure is good and pain is bad. For them there is a general confusion regarding what is truly 
pleasant, good, or beautiful. They are not able to distinguish the illusory appearance from 
reality. For this reason, Aristotle argues that for each ἕξιν – state – there are things beautiful 
 NE, 1113 a 33.374
 See NE, 1113 a 28-30; EE 1235 b 33-35.375
 NE, 1113 a 30-1113 b 2: καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ 376
σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ µέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ 
τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι: οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς 
κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
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and pleasant.  There seems to be a distinction between (1) what is beautiful and pleasant for 377
the good agent and for the bad agent, and (2) what appears beautiful and pleasant for the good 
agent and for the bad agent. The virtuous person perceives properties correctly. To this agent, 
the truly beautiful and pleasant appears beautiful and pleasant. If the virtuous person 
perceives something as pleasant, this means that it is pleasant simpliciter. The pleasant for 
someone (tini) can be the result of a distorted perception. Someone can perceive as pleasant 
what only appears pleasant: her condition is similar to the condition of a drunken person who 
finds pleasant the wine mixed with vinegar.  In the NE, Aristotle claims that everyone is 378
responsible for how things appear to her: 
(T12) But suppose somebody argues: everyone aims at what appears good to him, 
but over this appearance we have no control; rather, how the end appears to each 
person depends on what sort of person he is. So, if each person is in some way 
responsible for his own state, he will also be in some way responsible for how it 
appears.  379
This seems to follow from what Aristotle argues in NE 1113 a 30, namely that people 
who have a certain disposition perceive things as beautiful and pleasant even when they are 
not. The same things do not appear pleasant for the virtuous and for the bad person. Aristotle 
claims that if one is responsible for her own disposition, she is also responsible for how 
things appear to her. Appearances can be misleading. However, one can learn to recognize 
when an appearance is misleading and illusory. 
This distinction between appearing X and being Y seems to be valid not only in the 
case of the pleasant and of the good, but also in the case of other properties, for example in 
 NE, 1113 a 31.377
 EE, 1235 b 40.378
 NE, 1114 a 35- 1114 b 2: εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινοµένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ 379
κύριοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁποῖός ποθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ: εἰ µὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς 
ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος.
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the case of the beautiful. If other properties can appear in some way that does not reflect what 
they truly are, it cannot be right to claim that the pleasant is the apparent good, as Moss does, 
without claiming that also the beautiful is the apparent pleasant, and so forth.  
In NE II.2, Aristotle argues that there are three kinds of positive valence, each of them 
plays a distinctive role in motivation: the pleasant, the beautiful and the sumpheron, namely 
the advantageous.  For present purposes, the advantageous can be considered some kind of 380
goodness. Aristotle argues that the beautiful and the advantageous appear pleasant.  Thus, 381
also the beautiful and the advantageous can appear in some way, namely pleasant.  What 382
matters for my argument is that the pleasant cannot be considered a dependent property of the 
good, more than the beautiful or the advantageous. 
8. Pleasure and the best agent 
Now that all the three claims - the metaphysical claim, the psychological claim and the 
ethical claim - have been addressed, I turn to some additional evidence in favor of our initial 
thesis - the Pleasure Thesis. In the EE, Aristotle associates pleasure not only with happiness, 
but also with virtue and best agency. This association is a distinctive proposal of the EE; it is 
not put forward, or not in the same way, in the NE. One may ask for whom happiness is the 
most pleasant thing of all. The EE’s answer to this question is that happiness is most pleasant 
for the best agent. In the EE, the best agent is the καλός κἀγαθός, the person who possesses 
 NE 1104 b 30. 380
 NE, 1104 b 30-1105 a 1.381
 Regarding motivation and desire, the pleasant seems to elicit a different reaction if compared to other 382
properties. In De Anima 431 a 8, Aristotle claims that when we find something pleasant or painful, the soul 
makes a sort of affirmation or negation. Finding something pleasant is different from perceiving another 
property in the sense that we are naturally moved to express an evaluation on the object of perception and, if the 
evaluation is positive, we desire to pursue the object of perception. Corcilius argues that there is a non-rational 
desire to what is variably good, i.e. the pleasant, and a rational desire to what is invariably good. See K. 
Corcilius (2011), “Aristotle’s Definition of Non-rational Pleasure and Pain and Desire,” in J. Miller (ed.), 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide (Cambridge), pp. 117–43.
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the complex virtue of being-beautiful-and-good (καλοκἀγαθία),  and not the φρόνιµος,  or 383 384
the σοφός often considered by scholars as best agents of the NE. The καλός κἀγαθός has all 
the virtues, understood as including character virtues and virtues of practical and theoretical 
thinking. Καλοκἀγαθία is called complete virtue.  Happiness, being activity according to 385
complete virtue, includes the exercise of character virtues and also the exercise of virtues of 
practical and theoretical thinking. For this reason, only the καλός κἀγαθός enjoys true 
happiness. Thus, happiness is most pleasant for the καλός κἀγαθός. 
In EE 1222 a 7-14, pleasure is mentioned in the definition of virtue: virtue is “a mean 
point and has to do with certain means in pleasures and pains and in pleasant and painful 
things.”  This idea does not come up in the NE, where virtue is defined as the mean 386
between two extremes.  Though in NE 1104 b 9-10, Aristotle says that character virtue 387
concerns pleasure and pain, pleasure and pain do not appear in the NE’s definition of virtue. 
 EE VIII, 1248 b 8-1249 b 25.383
 This view is defended by McDowell in John McDowell, “Virtues and reason,” in Aristotle’s Ethics: critical 384
essays, N. Sherman ed. (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 1979), pp. 121-143. For a discussion of 
who the ideal agent is in the NE, see Shane Drefcinski, “The fallible phronimos,” in Ancient Philosophy 16 
(1996); pp. 139-153; Howard J. Curzer, “How good people do bad things. Aristotle on the misdeeds of the 
virtuous,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28, (2005):233-256; Magdalena Hoffman, Der Standard des 
Guten bei Aristoteles. Regularität im Umbestimmten, (Freiburg-Munich, Karl Albert, 2010); Ineke Sluiter, Ralph 
M. Rosen (eds.), Kakos. Badness and anti-value in Classical Antiquity, (Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2008).
 EE VIII, 1248 b 8- 16.385
 EE II, 1222 a 10-13, tr. B. Inwood, R. Woolf.386
 NE 1107 a 1-5.387
!192
For the καλός κἀγαθός, virtuous activity is second nature insofar as through habituation 
the agent has developed a natural disposition toward virtue.  This claim has two 388
dimensions. First, the completely virtuous person (the καλός κἀγαθός) is habituated to pursue 
virtue, and virtuous activity is natural for her in the sense that she does not have to force 
herself to pursue virtuous activity. On the contrary, virtuous activity is pleasant for her. 
Second, by pursuing virtue, the completely virtuous person pursues her complete flourishing 
as a human being. In both respects, virtue and virtuous activity include all virtues of 
character, as well as the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking.  
In EE VI, Aristotle ties pleasure to perfect activity. He argues that when our faculties 
perform their activities without any impediment, pleasure naturally arises. Some interpreters 
take issue with this claim, or at any rate with its generality. They ask whether it is possible for 
an agent to exercise an activity perfectly and yet fail to enjoy it.  Whether this is empirically 389
possible or not, I take it that Aristotle fully endorses the view that pleasure is the sign of 
perfect activity.  Here I agree with U. Coope. On her reading, feeling pleasure in virtuous 390
activity is a sign of the excellent agent. The person who is merely self-controlled (rather than 
virtuous) suffers from a rational failure, namely she fails to take rational pleasure in beautiful 
 Among Aristotle scholars, “second nature” refers to the acquisition of ethical virtues through habituation. 388
When the subject becomes habituated to virtue, acting virtuously becomes “second nature” to her. First nature 
refers to capacities that we have from birth and second nature to virtuous character developed through 
habituation. For a discussion of second nature see John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, (Harvard 
University Press, 1998); John Cooper, “Some remarks on Aristotle’s moral psychology,” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, 27 (1989): 25-42.
 EE VI, 1153 a 12-15. 389
 Cf. Gerd Van Riel, “Does a perfect activity necessarily yield pleasure? An evaluation of the relation between 390
pleasure and activity in Aristotle’s NE VII and X,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 7, 2 (1999): 
211-224. Van Riel argues that Aristotle does not explain the relation between perfect pleasure and perfect 
activity sufficiently clearly.
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actions.  Is pleasure the sign of perfect activity or of the excellent agent? In the light of my 391
argument so far the answer must be “both.” To recapitulate the core premises I discussed: 
happiness and pleasure are contingently identical; pleasure is unimpeded activity according to 
our natural state; and the best agent feels pleasure. Hence pleasure is both the sign of perfect 
activity and of the excellent agent: pleasure accompanies (µετά) perfect (τέλειον) activity;  392
and it naturally arises when our capacities function with no impediments. Let me compare the 
situation of the best agent who takes pleasure in happiness, as Aristotle defines it, with the 
one of the music critic who takes pleasure in listening to dodecaphonic music. The ordinary 
listener would not feel pleasure from listening to dodecaphonic music: the music sounds 
dissonant and it lacks harmony. However, the music critic who knows how the piece is 
composed and what kind of study and experimentation the piece requires, can fully appreciate 
it and feel pleasure. At the same time, listening to music is the activity that the music critic 
performs perfectly. For this reason, it is most pleasant for this agent. Similarly, the καλός 
κἀγαθός is the person who feels pleasure in virtuous activity, understood as activity in which 
all the virtues, including the virtues of theoretical thinking, are involved. Feeling pleasure in 
virtuous activity is the sign that the agent is excellent and also the sign that she is engaging in 
perfect activity. 
9. Pleasure and the divine 
In EE VI=NE VII, Aristotle argues that even god experiences pleasure. In Aristotle’s 
account, god does not have virtue. However, he feels perfect pleasure.  God’s pleasure is 393
 U. Coope, “Why does Aristotle think that ethical virtue is required for practical wisdom?” Phronesis, 57 391
(2012): 142-163.
 EE VI, 1152 b 8.392
 EE, 1154 b 25.393
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described as single and simple, while our pleasure is described as constantly changing. Our 
nature is not simple and perfect as the nature of god. This is the reason why we are not able to 
enjoy the kind of single and simple pleasure that god enjoys. The claim that god, who is the 
most perfect being, enjoys pleasure is another step in Aristotle’s demonstration of the positive 
role of pleasure in a good life (and, more generally, of PT). Pleasure can be illusory and bad 
for human begins insofar as our nature is not perfect; insofar as we are less then virtuous, we 
often pursue false pleasures. As Aristotle argues in EE VI=NE VII, our defective nature elicits 
in us a constant search for different pleasures. In contrast, god’s perfect nature makes him 
enjoy one, constant, true pleasure. However, this suggests that in enjoying pleasure, if and 
when we succeed in enjoying true pleasure (which Aristotle often refers to as the pleasant 
ἁπλῶς - simpliciter - or the pleasure by nature),  we are similar not only to the best agent, 394
but also to god.  The claim that pleasure - insofar as this is admittedly a significant proviso, 395
we succeed in enjoying in approximation what the best agent enjoys - makes us similar to the 
best agent and even to the divine is supported by a further argument that Aristotle proposes in 
EE VI=NE VII. While talking about the fact that everyone and every animal pursues pleasure, 
Aristotle argues as follows: 
(T13) Maybe they are really pursuing not the pleasure they think they are 
pursuing nor even the one they would say they are pursuing, but the same 
pleasure, since all things have by nature a divine component.  396
 Here simpliciter translates the Greek ἁπλῶς. 394
 On the pleasure of god see G. Aubry, “Nicomachean Ethics VII. 14 (1154a22-b34): the pain of the living and 395
divine pleasure,” in Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, C. Natali ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 
237-263.
 EE VI, 1153 b 30-33.396
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Aristotle remarks that bodily pleasures seem to be considered as the only type of 
pleasure, whereas there are in fact different types of pleasure. Pleasure is bad when one 
pursues different types of pleasure, among which there are excessive pleasures or pleasures 
that derive from bad sources. However, enjoying one single pleasure is something that only 
god does. If we get anywhere near this kind of pleasure, we thereby come to resemble the 
divine. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I defended the view that pleasure is non-derivative, it has a distinctive 
presence in the mind, and it plays an important role in human motivation. In defending these 
three claims, I situated my position vis-à-vis the debate and I explained my disagreement 
with Moss’s view that pleasure is the apparent good. I showed how the passage that functions 
as starting point for Moss’s argument can be read in a different way if we consider Aristotle’s 
project in the EE. As I argued, in the EE, Aristotle connects pleasure to happiness, he says 
that the best agent and even god enjoy pleasure. 
I analyzed different ways of categorizing pleasure that Aristotle proposes. I argued that, 
while there are illusory pleasures that come from bad sources, certain pleasures are pleasures 
by nature. They are choiceworthy, even though they should be pursued with moderation. 
These pleasures are pleasant for the particular being that human beings are. The very idea of 
something being pleasant by nature supports the view that pleasure is non-derivative. What is 
pleasant by nature is pleasant for the agent in the standard state. Differently from the NE, 
where the measure of the pleasant simpliciter is the good agent, in the EE, the measure of 
what is pleasant simpliciter is the agent in a standard state.  
I examined the difference between apparent pleasure and true pleasure through an 
examination of the passages in the EE and in the NE where Aristotle discusses pleasure and 
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the apparent good. I showed that also other properties, and not only the pleasant, can appear 
in some way. And yet, this does not make the beautiful the apparent good.  
If my analysis is compelling, by conceiving of pleasure as such and by connecting it to 
perfect activity and best agency, Aristotle assigns a positive role to pleasure in the good life. 
The pleasant is not just an appearance of the good: it is non-derivative and as the good, it has 




In this dissertation, I argued that Aristotle’s philosophical project in the EE differs in 
important respects from his project in the NE. The EE is, on the whole, less widely studied 
than the NE. This applies specifically to the dimensions in which, on my reading, it differs 
from the NE. The ideas on which I focused—kalokagathia, a unity of virtue that is 
unrestricted in scope, natural goods, and the role of three kinds of value, including pleasure, 
in a happy life—are philosophically rich. If my proposals are compelling, it would seem that 
the EE is not only less widely studied. More than that, it would seem to contain ideas that 
deserve far more attention than they received up to now. Arguably, these ideas are not only of 
historical interest. They also speak to our own intuitions. After all, we want our lives to be not 
only good, though that is by itself a tall measure. But we do want more. We also want beauty 
in our lives, and we would not choose a life that was not, as we experience it, pleasant. If we 
want all this, we want—and admire—happiness in the sense of the EE. Accordingly, the 
dimensions of the EE that I explored in this dissertation should help us generate new 
perspectives in virtue ethics, ethical naturalism, and virtue epistemology.   
Let me summarize the main findings of my dissertation briefly. First of all, I discussed 
one important difference between the EE’s philosophical project and the NE’s one. In the EE, 
Aristotle aims at proving the Superlative Thesis, and its most contentious aspect, the Pleasure 
Thesis, while in the NE, Aristotle starts from the question of how the good figures in human 
action. In other words, the EE focuses on how three values - the good, the beautiful, and the 
pleasant -  relate to happiness right from the start of the treatise, while the NE starts from the 
good. I showed how the formal and substantive accounts of happiness differ in the two 
treatises. The EE proposes a unified notion of the best life, which includes virtuous activity 
and contemplation. According to the NE, there are two lives that are, though not equally 
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good, both viewed as excellent: the life of politics and the life of contemplation. These two 
lives can be ranked, according to the hierarchical relation between theoretical thinking on the 
one hand, and the practical reasoning and affective activities involved in agency on the other 
hand. Ultimately, the life of contemplation is better than the life of politics.  
Second, I moved to the idea that the best agent of the two ethical treatises is not the 
same. The best agent of the EE is the kalos kagathos. This agent has all the virtues, including 
the virtues of theoretical and practical thinking. All the virtues are interrelated and co-
function as parts of kalokagathia. This way of conceiving of the best agent and of the best life 
emphasizes the importance of excellent thinking for excellent action. This is why, a moment 
ago, I said that my discussion bears also on normative epistemology; it bears on ways in 
which we can be better and worse thinkers, in ways that shape our ethical lives. According to 
this approach, the search for the truth is not only fundamental for philosophers and for 
philosophical investigation. Theoretical thinking is not simply disjunct from excellent 
deliberation and virtuous action. It relates, or so I argue, in manifold ways to decision making 
and the aim of leading a good human life. 
I turned next to the Eudemian notion of natural goods. I argued that Aristotle puts 
forward an unexplored form of ethical naturalism that I call Natural Goods Naturalism. 
According to NGN, what is good in the sense of the natural goods is good for human beings 
as we are by nature or for the most part. The notion of natural goods and NGN suggest that 
the EE differs in a central aspect from the NE. That is, the EE’s measure of the good, the 
beautiful and the pleasant is the agent in a standard state and not the phronimos, as in the NE. 
This Eudemian approach distinguishes three kinds of positive valence. Ethics, it seems, must 
come to grips with how it is that happiness involves positive valence of several kinds. This 
view, I submit, is rich and worth exploring further. Moral psychology and ancient-inspired 
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ethics is so far mostly concerned with ways in which we desire the good. If the EE is right, 
we desire the good, and also the beautiful and pleasant, and the superlative instantiations 
thereof coincide.  
NGN shares with other forms of naturalism the appeal to the ergon. While the Function 
Argument in the NE is well studied, the Function Argument in the EE has so far received 
little attention. I argued that if we compare the Function Argument as it appears in the NE, in 
the EE and in Plato’s Republic, important differences come to light. In the EE and in the 
Republic, talking about use is one way of talking about function. In other words, the notion of 
use and the notion of function seem to overlap. In the NE, the notion of use does not come up. 
This difference is important. It relates to a premise about the good that both Plato and 
Aristotle explore, namely that it benefits or in other words is “of use.” Is this an idea Aristotle 
gives up on in the NE, and if yes, why? Conversely, how does this idea shape the ethical 
outlook of the EE? My chapter on the Function Argument clears the ground for further 
inquiry. It is intentionally schematic, offering an overview of how the Function Arguments 
differ. Based on this, we can begin to analyze individual points of comparison. For now, my 
focus was on the subject of the Function Argument in the EE. I argued that it matters for the 
EE’s naturalism and ambitious conception of excellence that we study the function of the 
human soul, in ways that do not distinguish between different parts or faculties thereof.   
Finally, I discussed the Pleasure Thesis. For the Aristotle of the EE, pleasure has 
positive valence. This needs to be emphasized, because hedonism gives pleasure a shady 
reputation. Aristotle takes on an ambitious project, namely to demonstrate that, though there 
are many ways in which pleasure is not part of an ethically excellent life, pleasure in the 
superlative occurs precisely here: nothing other than the very best life is also most pleasant. 
As part of this approach, the Aristotle of the EE considers the view that the life of pleasure is 
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best not only as the view of “the many.” Though it is also a common belief of the many, it is 
a philosophical view that deserves serious attention. 
My purpose in writing this dissertation was to shed light on aspects of the Eudemian 
philosophical proposals that are interesting in their own right, ideas that are rich and complex 
in ways that can inspire new ideas. These new ideas can help us explore uncharted routes to 
think about happiness, virtue, nature, and pleasure. My research has opened up a host of 
questions that I wish to explore in future years. On my reading, the EE does not contain a 
theory of habituation. Instead, Aristotle’s approach to virtue in the EE analyzes the role of 
nature and natural development. In my next project, I aim to explore this difference and to 
investigate the role of virtue and of nature in the development of the virtues. Differently from 
the NE, where it seems that we develop the virtues of character by habituation and the virtues 
of thinking by teaching (there is little evidence on how we develop the virtues of thinking in 
the NE), in the EE, we develop all the virtues by nature, if nothing impedes this process. 
What is more, I plan to study how the individual virtues interact with each other and co-
function. I wish to focus on how the virtuous agent, the ordinary agent and the vicious agent, 
perceive and desire the apparent good, the apparent beautiful, and the apparent pleasant, as 
well as how they relate to what is truly good, beautiful, and pleasant. 
As my research shows, a careful study of Aristotle’s philosophical proposal in the EE is 
fundamental for our understanding of Aristotle’s ethics. More than that, it unveils 
philosophical perspectives that are worthy to be explored in their own right.  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